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SURVEY
The Elephant and the Four Blind Men:
The Burger Court and Its
Federal Tax Decisions*
BEVERLY I. MORANf
AND DANIEL M. SCHNEIDER*
Four blind men went to see the elephant. The first felt the elephant's
trunk and said: "The elephant is a snake." The second felt the ele-
phant's body and said: "The elephant is a wall." The third felt the
elephant's tail and said: "The elephant is a rope. " The fourth felt the
elephant's leg and said: "The elephant is a tree. "
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
This Article examines the Burger Court and its federal tax deci-
sions. We became interested in this project for three reasons. First,
we were struck by the small body of literature on the Supreme Court
and federal taxation. Second, as we reviewed the literature, we noted
that most articles tended either to criticize the Court or to prescribe
ways for the Court to apply various interpretive methods. Third, we
discovered that the literature focused either on only a few select fed-
eral tax cases, a single Supreme Court term, or a single Supreme
Court Justice. These three factors precipitated our interest to ex-
amine a significant number of Supreme Court federal tax opinions is-
sued over an extensive period of time.
B. What We Found
As shown below, much of our findings confirmed the conclusions
and findings of other articles analyzing Supreme Court decision mak-
ing. We observed four points, however, that either contradicted the
findings of prior literature or added significantly to them. First, de-
spite prior literature to the contrary, we found that federal tax issues
were much more mainstream than previously claimed. Although
other authors-including Supreme Court justices themselves-often
assert that the Court generally dislikes tax-related cases, we demon-
strate, in Part II of this article, the Certiorari section, that the Burger
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Court in fact granted a fair number of tax petitions and that the
Court's method for selecting tax-related cases was no different than its
general case selection method.
Second, the Certiorari section also demonstrates that the Burger
Court was quite sophisticated in granting petitions using the Court's
power to select cases that played to one of its institutional strengths:
the power of narrative. The use of narrative is one of the Court's
strengths that is not shared by other institutions. One of the greatest
challenges that lawmakers face-be they legislators, judges, or agency
administrators-is how to convey complex information. Sometimes
that information is best imparted through statutes and sometimes
through administrative forms such as regulations and revenue rulings.
In a complex statutory scheme like federal taxation, however, certain
fundamental principles develop that are not easily conveyed through
more stylized forms. Instead, just as cultures pass down their most
important tenets through parables and myths, fundamental legal prin-
ciples are similarly conveyed through judicial decisions-or a series of
narratives. Our system of stare decisis leaves the bulk of this prece-
dential process to courts as the institutions best suited to create narra-
tives set around single themes. We found that the Burger Court
maximized its expertise in this area by choosing a series of petitions
on single themes such as insurance, accounting, and the tax benefit
rule; this article emphasizes how the Burger Court's decisions in these
areas help formulate the tax culture that drives the federal tax system.
We were pleased to find that our choice of method-reviewing a
significant number of cases over an extensive period of time-painted
a different, and we think more accurate, portrait of the Court's use of
doctrine. For example, contrary to the findings of previous and less
comprehensive studies, we found that the Burger Court employed the
"plain language" doctrine much more than we expected and, con-
versely, employed the "nonliteral interpretations" much less than we
expected. In addition, our method unlocks a central mystery about
the Court's use of doctrine: we discovered that the Burger Court gen-
erally favored the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Agency") in
its actions while consistently claiming to favor Congress in its rhetoric.
We consider this contradiction, between what the Court said and what
the Court did, as an attempt to reconcile two competing interests. On
the one hand, we believe that the Burger Court favored the IRS be-
cause it is less subject to political malfunction than Congress. On the
other hand, the Burger Court's rhetorical deference to Congress at-
[VOL. 39:841
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tempts to comply with our shared notions of taxation as a vehicle of
democracy.
C. Methodology & Structure
1. Methodology
a. Why the Burger Court
We selected the decisions of the Burger Court as the data set for
our study for three reasons. First, the Burger Court covered seven-
teen years,1 which was about as long a period of time as we wanted to
survey. Second, the Burger Court is the most recently closed Court,
which provides us the benefit of fairly recent opinions and a finite
number of cases. Third, the Burger Court is the subject of several
insider reports by journalists and social scientists, which have helped
in shaping our ideas.
b. Which decisions
We limited the scope of our study to cases and opinions concern-
ing income taxation, deductions, gift and estate taxation, business tax
related issues, including corporate and partnership taxation, as well as
cases concerning tax exempt organizations. We did not review cases
concerning tax procedure, tax crimes, tax related constitutional issues
(for example, standing), Indian tax cases, or state and local taxation.
We emphasize that we had no ulterior motive in choosing the former
topics. Indeed, we had no idea what we would find when our search
was completed. We selected the former set of cases to match the liter-
ature's tendency to criticize the Court for lack of expertise or inter-
est.2 To test these criticisms, then, we concentrated on matters of
concern to those with such interests and expertise: tax lawyers. We
sought subjects and opinions that tax lawyers would likely read.
2. Structure
This article is divided into two major sections: petitions for writs
of certiorari to the Burger Court and the Burger Court's federal tax
opinions. We were interested in the certiorari-selection process for
three reasons. First, some commentators have suggested that because
of the small number of tax cases reviewed and decided by the
1. Warren Burger was Chief Justice from 1969-1986.
2. See infra Part II.C.1.
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Supreme Court each year, the Court is unable to make a meaningful
contribution to the field of federal taxation.3 As a result, we sought to
compare the certiorari-selection process in tax-related issues to the
certiorari process in general. Second, we were aware of the Court's
limited resources and questioned whether the Court utilized them ef-
fectively in the tax area by granting certiorari judiciously. Third, certi-
orari is the front line of the Supreme Court process, and we wanted to
examine that process closely.
We were interested in the Burger Court's federal tax opinions for
two reasons. First, most of the works we reviewed took very definite
positions about specific Supreme Court decisions, doctrines, or inter-
pretive methods.4 Second, we were interested to learn whether the
Burger Court justices lacked federal tax expertise and, more impor-
tant, whether the justices were attempting to accomplish a particular
purpose, or were merely haphazardly and begrudgingly deciding cases
they could not avoid.
a. The Certiorari Section
In the Certiorari section, we first review the general literature on
the certiorari process, placing particular emphasis on insider studies of
the Burger Court. Second, we compare the findings of these general
studies to the area of federal taxation. In making our comparison, we
espouse an approach never adopted before: we review all the certio-
rari petitions concerning tax-related issues filed during the Burger
Court years-1217 petitions in total.5 Thus, our comparison is based
on the actual petitions that the Burger Court reviewed over a seven-
teen-year period.
Comparing the certiorari-acceptance record of the Burger Court
concerning tax-related issues to the general certiorari process, we
draw some fresh conclusions. We demonstrate, for example, that the
Burger Court handled tax-related petitions for certiorari much like
any other in the certiorari process. More important, we discovered
that the Burger Court manipulated the certiorari process to return to
certain tax-related issues over and over again, and we emphasize how
3. See James B. Lewis, Introduction to Note, Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1979
Term, 34 TAx LAw. 423 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal
Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 623 (1986) (suggesting methods for the Supreme Court to re-
solve questions of nonliteral interpretation); Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance
in Taxation, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 859 (1982) (book review).
5. See Appendices A, B.
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this behavior actually plays to one of the Court's strengths: the
Court's use of narrative to explain certain fundamental tax principles.
b. Opinions
The Opinions section has four parts: 1) Plain Language; 2) Legis-
lative History; 3) Regulations; and 4) Deep Structure. This order trav-
els from those opinions giving maximum deference to Congress,
through those giving deference to the IRS, and finally to opinions re-
sulting from an activist Court.
We focus on these areas for a number of reasons. First, the litera-
ture on taxation and the Supreme Court underscores these areas.6
Second, these methods are a tax lawyer's major tools. Third, because
each method assumes a certain type of deference to one or more insti-
tutions, reviewing these methods permits us to study the Burger
Court's pattern of deferring to other institutions within the tax system.
We also focus on what the Court voices in its opinions and what
the court is doing to determine whether the two correspond. Accord-
ingly, each section contains a discussion of what the Burger Court said
about particular methods-an analysis of what the court actually did
over a number of criteria-and a contrast between what the interpre-
tive method is meant to do and what it achieves. An essential part of
this analysis requires a comparison between the roles of each of the
government institutions involved in the development of federal tax
law. For example, what role did the Court assign to Congress, the
Treasury, and itself? Did the Court assume the preeminent role in
making tax law, or did it defer to Congress or the Treasury? These
questions and answers refine our analysis of the Burger Court and
federal taxation.
c. Statistics
One of this Article's distinctions is that we examined a large
number of cases decided over an extended period of time, covering
the foundation of federal tax law. Consequently, each section offers
statistics on, for example, the number of opinions reflecting each
method, dissents, and government-taxpayer win-loss records.
With this introduction in mind, we turn to the Certiorari section
of the Article.
6. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 96.
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II. PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
A. Introduction
Gate keeping is an important function of any institution's opera-
tion. Central to a discussion of the Burger Court's federal tax deci-
sions is the Burger Court's process for selecting cases for review.
Thus, we learn as much by examining cases that the Burger Court
declined to review as by cases the Court accepted for review. Indeed,
the Court's selection process is a manifestation of what cases the
Court deems important and worthy of review, as well as what the
Court views as its own strengths and weaknesses.
Because more information is available about certiorari in general
than about its application in federal tax matters, we devote Part II.B.
to a general discussion of the certiorari process. In Part II.C., we first
survey what little information is available about the Burger Court and
petitions to that Court for certiorari in federal tax matters. Next, we
provide new information about the Burger Court, federal tax cases
and certiorari from our review of all the federal tax petitions for certi-
orari presented to the Burger Court between the Terms running from
1969 through 1985. Finally, we compare our own findings to the spec-
ulations of others who have reviewed the Court and the certiorari
process.
B. The Certiorari Process in General
Clearly, the Court is faced with more petitions for writ of certio-
rari than it can possibly review.7 As Professors Estreicher and Sexton
have observed:
[M]any constituencies compete for the Court's limited appellate re-
sources. Civil liberties advocates stress the importance of reviewing
7. Chief Justice Burger's tenure ran from 1969 to 1986. During that time, the number of
petitions presented each year grew from 4187 in the 1969 Term, 39 U.S.L.W. 3037 (July 14, 1970)
(1969 statistics), to 5082 in the 1985 Term, 55 U.S.L.W. 3038 (July 29, 1986) (1985 statistics).
Statistics available during the 1985 term indicate that 4410 of these 5082 cases were docketed
during the 1985 term.
Other statistics tend to suggest growth as well. For example, statistics compiled by the
Harvard Law Review indicate that in 1969, 2880 petitions for certiorari were denied or dismissed.
Note, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1,248 Table 1 (1970). Of these disposi-
tions, 1121 were on the appellate docket and 1759 were on the miscellaneous docket. While 4202
applications for review were filed during that term, id. at 254 n.9, no comparable statistics exist
for the 1985 Term. In the 1985 Term, the number denied had risen to 3999. Note, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1,308 Table II (1986). Of these dispositions, 1863 were on
the appellate docket and 2136 were on the miscellaneous docket. In these same years, opinions
issued grew from 112 to 172. See id.
[VOL. 39:841
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decisions rejecting claims of individual liberty. Government lawyers
emphasize the need for Supreme Court review of rulings interfering
with the workings of the modern regulatory state. Corporate coun-
sel contend that all decisions imposing substantial regulatory costs
on the private sector or thwarting significant commercial enterprise
merit the Court's attention. Others bemoan the Court's reluctance
to seize a particular vehicle for doctrinal clarification or expansion.
From each quarter, for different reasons, we hear that the Court is
not taking cases that it should be hearing-or that it is deciding
cases, drawn from other sectors, that it need not have heard.8
Given the many demands on the Court's limited resources, how
does the Court choose more than a hundred cases from the thousands
of petitions it receives each year? There is both an official and an
unofficial answer to this question.
1. Selecting cases for decision-the official story
Since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1925, the Supreme
Court has relied on the certiorari process to manage its docket.' Dur-
ing this period, the Court has developed official rules concerning the
certiorari process.10 For example, Rule 10 of the Supreme Court
Rules, which sets forth what the Court will consider in granting certio-
rari, provides:
1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The
8. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE 41
(1986) (footnotes omitted).
9. Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 937 (1925). Since 1988, appeals have ceased
being an avenue to the Court. Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988)).
The Court actually has enjoyed five types of jurisdiction: original, appellate, certiorari, certi-
fication, and extraordinary writs. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SET-
TINO IN rHE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, at ch. 2 (1991). Perry devotes much of his book
to the October 1976 through October 1980 Terms, id. at 9, during which time approximately 20%
to 25% of the cases reached the Supreme Court by appeal as of right. Id. at 25. A majority of
the remainder of the cases reached the Supreme Court by petitions for writ of certiorari. Id. at
27.
For analyses of recent changes, see Robert L. Stem, Remedies for Appellate Overloads: The
Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICATURE 103 (1988); Robert L. Stem et al., Epitaph for Mandatory
Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at 66. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over appeals as of
right is set forth at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1257 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. For example, Supreme Court rules require a petition for a writ of certiorari to be filed
within 90 days of the final judgment below. See Sup. C-r. R. 13.1. The petition may not exceed
30 pages, and the first page of the petition must state the questions presented. See Sup. CT. R.
14.4.
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following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered.
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a deci-
sion in conflict with the decision of another United States court of
appeals on the same matter ... or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this
Court's power of supervision."
Thus, in the official story, conflicts between the circuits take on
primary importance. Beyond this explicit rule, however, lies the unof-
ficial story of the best route to the Supreme Court.
2. Selecting cases for decision-beyond the Supreme Court's
official rules
While the official certiorari process focuses on splits in the cir-
cuits, the unofficial story reveals that the Court considers other factors
as well. As Chief Justice Vinson noted in 1949:
The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned
with the correction of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all
cases within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, the petitioner has al-
ready received one appellate review of his case. The debates in the
Constitutional Convention make clear that the purpose of the estab-
lishment of one supreme national tribunal was, in the words of John
Rutledge of South Carolina, "to secure the national rights & uni-
formity of Judgmts [sic]." The function of the Supreme Court is,
therefore, to resolve conflicts of opinion on federal questions that
have arisen among lower courts, to pass upon questions of wide im-
port under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
and to exercise supervisory power over lower federal courts .... To
remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only
those cases which present questions whose resolution will have im-
mediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties in-
volved. Those of you whose petitions for certiorari are granted by
the Supreme Court will know, therefore, that you are, in a sense,
prosecuting or defending class actions; that you represent not only
your clients, but tremendously important principles, upon which are
11. See generally I tRRY, supra note 9, at ch. 2 (discussing explicit jurisdiction of and proce-
dure for petitioning the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari); ROBERT L. STERN ET AL.,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, at ch. 6 (7th ed. 1993) (same).
[VOL. 39:841
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based the plans, hopes, and aspirations of a great many people
throughout the country.'2
Thus, the unofficial certiorari story is far more complex, richer and
more difficult to detail than a focus on splits among the circuits alone
would reveal. In fact, we selected the Burger Court as the data set for
our study because of, among other things, the various studies that had
compiled information about the Burger Court's unofficial certiorari
process. Much of this information derives from a study conducted by
Professor Perry, who had access to sixty-one Supreme Court law
clerks and five justices during the Burger Court years, and whose
work-along with Stern, Gressman, Shapiro, and Geller13-provides
much of the material for subsection II.B. of this Article.14 While Pro-
fessor Perry's study disclosed a great deal of information about the
Supreme Court's certiorari process 15 and use of the "cert pool"1 6 in
12. The Hon. Fred M. Vinson, Work of the Federal Courts, Address Before the American
Bar Association (September 7, 1949), in 69 S. Ct. vi (1949) (emphasis added).
13. See STERN ET AL., supra note 11.
14. See PERRY, supra note 9, at 17-20 (discussing methodology of book). One of the espe-
cial benefits of Perry's book is his extensive reliance on interviews he held with justices and law
clerks. Although these informants are largely anonymous, Perry still provides a wealth of infor-
mation. See id. His study also is focused on the Burger Court, specifically the October 1976
through the October 1980 Terms. See id. at 9. For other sources and studies examining the
Supreme Court's case selection process, see id. at 7 n.10.
15. For example, while every petition for a writ of certiorari must be reviewed, justices have
suggested that well over half of the cases are not meritorious. PERuV, supra note 9, at 34-36.
Perry relates, for example, that "Justice Harlan ... argued . . . 'that more than one-half [of the
certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court] were so untenable that they never should have been
filed,' " id. at 35 (citation omitted); that Chief Justice Vimson contended that "[w]hile a great
many of the 85% [of the certiorari petitions] that were denied were far from frivolous, far too
many reveal a serious misconception on the part of counsel concerning the role of the Supreme
Court in our federal system," id. at 36 (citation omitted); and that in 1937 Chief Justice Hughes
suggested that 60 percent of the certiorari petitions are meritless, while approximately 20 per-
cent "'have a fair degree of plausibility, but which fail to survive a critical examination,'" and
another 20 percent merit review. Id. at 34-35 (citation omitted).
Of these meritorious cases, only four percent of the petitions for certiorari are accepted.
See STERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 164.
A justice may examine a pool memorandum, rely on his or her clerks, or make the decision
himself or herself, as did Justice Brennan (based solely on his reading of the questions
presented). See William J. Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. Cm.
L. REv. 473, 477 (1973). Regardless of the method chosen, however, each justice must vote to
decide whether a certiorari petition should be granted. Any justice could, although only the
Chief Justice usually would, place a seemingly worthy case on the "discuss list." The case would
be discussed at the justices' next conference, and, if at least four justices voted to grant certiorari,
certiorari would be granted. See generally PERRY, supra note 9, at 43-50 (describing the "discuss
list," conference and petition review processes).
16. Until recently, each justice reviewed each petition for writ of certiorari either directly,
or at least initially, perhaps, through a clerk. Chief Justice Burger became concerned about the
Court's excessive amount of work and created the "cert pool." BoB WOODWARD & ScoTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 323 (1979). By the time of Justice Kennedy's appointment during
the stewardship of Chief Justice Rehnquist, six justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
1996]
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general, more interesting is the unofficial standards the Court applied




* Split between the circuits
* Ability to win on the merits
" Solicitor General's petitions
a. Timing
Because the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of issues before it,
Perry asserts that a single conflict between two circuits is often not
enough to warrant review by the Supreme Court. The Burger Court
generally bears out this assertion, as the justices sought to ensure that
an appropriate number of lower and circuit courts had addressed an
issue so that the Supreme Court would have the benefit of a full and
fair presentation of every facet of a dispute. Thus, the justices some-
times declined consideration of important questions until a later date
when a similar, but more seasoned, issue emerged.
17
White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy-used the pool. See PERRY, supra note 9, at
42. Of those other justices who sat on the Burger Court, Chief Justice Burger, of course, used
the pool, as did Powell; Justices Douglas, Stewart, Stevens, and Marshall did not. As noted,
Brennan, supra note 15, at 477, Justice Brennan not only refused to use the pool; he did not use
his clerks to review petitions. Id.; WOODWARD & ARmSTRONro. supra, at 323-24.
The theoretical efficiency of having one justice, or one justice's clerk, review each petition
for certiorari may not have translated into any actual efficiency. See PERRY, supra note 9, at 51-
60.
17. Part of this question is whether the case has "percolated" long enough so that a decision
carrying the Court's finality should now be reached. See PERRY, supra note 9, at 230-34; see also
STERN ET AtL, supra note 11, at 170-71 ("The Court has implied as much by referring repeatedly
in its opinions to the fact that certiorari was 'granted to resolve the conflict on this important
question,' or 'because of the importance of the question presented and the conflict of opinion on
the constitutional issue involved,'.. . or... because of a conflict 'and the need for a uniform rule
on the point.' ").
According to Perry, the frequency with which circuit courts have addressed an issue-for
example, five circuits as opposed to two or three circuits, suggests the timeliness of a case. See
PERRY, supra note 9, at 230-34. Similarly, a case might not have yet ripened or may be moot.
Even though the case is important, it may not have reached a final enough stage to merit consid-
eration. See STERN ET AL, supra note 9, at 173; see also PERRY, supra note 9, at 106-12 (assert-
ing that a case may be "digged"-i.e., dismissed after the Court has accepted it for review-
because of problems, unidentified at the certiorari stage, that emerge later, such as when it ap-
pears that the constitutional issue for which certiorari was granted cannot in fact be reached).
Similarly, even if a "sufficient" number of circuits have examined the issue at hand, if the issue
has been settled, the Court has less reason to review the case. See id. at 249-50; STERN ET AL-,
supra note 11, at 172.
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b. Best vehicle
The "best vehicle" method focuses on how well a particular case
presents the underlying issue. For example, the method focuses on
whether the facts of a particular case are "messy," complicated, or so
specific that they will draw the Court into deciding an individual case
rather than providing an opportunity for the Court to make a broader
statement.18 A successful argument against granting a petition is that
another petition in the "pipeline" will provide the Court a better op-
portunity to address a broader issue.19
c. Social importance
Whether a matter is important to the Court as an institution is
another reason for granting a petition for a writ of certiorari. Such
"institutionally" important cases present major questions of the day of
broad social significance. For example, the Court presumably was
compelled to take cases on desegregating public schools in Brown v.
Board of Education;2 ° on abortion in Roe v. Wade;21 and on reverse
discrimination in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.22
These cases presented issues that were socially important and, there-
fore, were institutionally important.
d. Split among the circuits
While a split among the circuits is one of the criteria expressly
listed in Supreme Court Rule 10,23 a mere split, without more, may be
insufficient to justify review.24 Rather, a conflict between circuits sug-
gests the presence of additional criteria, such as the importance of the
question raised." In addition, at least according to Professor Perry,
the Court's desire for timeliness suggests that a conflict among a
greater number of circuits (for example, four circuits) is more
"timely" than a conflict among fewer circuits (for example, two cir-
cuits) and thus more likely to be granted and, furthermore, that a peti-
18. PERRY, supra note 9, at 234-35.
19. Id. at 238-39.
20. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23. See supra Section Il.B.1.
24. Compare PERRY, supra note 9, at 127 ("[O]ne of the most important things to all the
justices [in granting certiorari] is when there is a split in the circuits.") and id. at 246-52 (conflict
among the circuits is "the single most important generalizable factor") with STERN ET AL., supra
note 11, at 168-73 (asserting that conflict among the circuits is not determinative).
25. See PERRYv, supra note 9, at 246-52; STERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 168-73.
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tion involving an important question as well as a split among circuits is
more likely to be granted.26
e. The merits of the decision below
In some ways, a justice's vote to grant a petition represents his
opinion on the merits of the lower court's decision. As one Justice
stated, " 'Generally, when people vote to grant, they feel that it is be-
cause [the decision below] is wrongly decided.' "27 Thus, the Court is
more likely to spend its time " 'correcting' rather than affirming,
'28
because " 'no justice] feels the obligation to correct something that
has been correctly decided.' "29
f. Solicitor General's petitions
As noted by Perry and others, the Solicitor General3 is much
more successful than private litigants in having his petitions granted.
31
C. The Certiorari Process and Federal Tax Cases
In this section we first review what commentators and Supreme
Court justices have expressed about the Court's general attitude to-
wards federal tax cases. Essentially what emerges is a view of Court
antipathy to tax-related matters. This antipathy, some commentators
assert, has resulted in the Court's failure to accept an optimal number
of federal tax petitions for review.32 Next, we offer insights culled
26. See PERRY, supra note 9, at 246-48.
27. Id. at 270 (quoting interview statement of unidentified justice); see id. at 269 (recording
the opinion of one justice that while it is "'not uncommon' " for the merits of a case to go
unconsidered in granting certiorari, "'you will hear [another justice] say that "the Ninth Circuit
is dead wrong in this case; I'll vote to grant."'" (quoting interview statement of unidentified
justice)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 269 (quoting interview statement of unidentified justice). See generally id. at 268-
70 (illustrating votes on petitions for certiorari as votes on merits).
30. The Solicitor General is, as has sometimes been said, the "tenth justice." Each private
litigant has only her own grievance; the Solicitor General must satisfy the government. Most
petitioners are unlikely to return to the Court; the government will always be back. Thus, the
Solicitor General has a vested interest in putting forth the cases he thinks are most noteworthy,
as well as those that assure him the greatest likelihood of winning. See LINCOLN CHAPLAIN, Tim
TENTH JusTicE 3 (1987) ("The Solicitor General's principal task is to represent the Executive
Branch of the government in the Supreme Court.").
31. See PERRY, supra note 9, at 93 (examining what petitions are put onto the Court's con-
ference discussion list and noting that "[c]ases petitioned by the solicitor general are effectively
assured a place on the list"); Lewis, supra note 3, at 427.
32. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 426-31 (noting that the Solicitor General was less successful
in petitioning federal tax cases than in other areas and attributing lack of success to Supreme
Court's declining interest in federal tax cases).
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from our review of every tax-related petition for certiorari presented
to the Burger Court. Finally, we compare our own observations to
those of other authors and conclude that, in general, the Court did not
create a higher standard for tax cases. Rather, we found that the
Court selected and rejected tax-related cases in much the same way it
accepted and rejected non tax-related cases.
1. Impressions
A review of the small pool of literature available leaves the dis-
tinct impression that the Court loathes tax cases and, indeed, avoids
them whenever possible. Even Justice Douglas observed that:
This Court has, to many, seemed particularly ill-equipped to resolve
income tax disputes between the Commissioner and the taxpayers.
The reasons are (1) that the field has become increasingly technical
and complicated due to the expansions of the Code and the prolifer-
ation of decisions, and (2) that we seldom see enough of them to
develop any expertise in the area. Indeed, we are called upon
mostly to resolve conflicts between the circuits which more provi-
dently should go to the standing committee of the Congress for
resolution.
33
Woodward and Armstrong supported Justice Douglas's observa-
tions when they maintained that Justice Burger assigned tax-related
cases to Associate justices as a form of punishment, noting that Justice
Blackmun "felt that he had suffered under ... Chief [Justice Burger,
including] receiving ... more than his share of tax . . . cases '" 34 and
that Justice Rehnquist was assigned a tax case as punishment for a
Christmas skit.
35
In a more academic vein, Professor Perry also notes the Court's
distaste for tax matters when he asserts that:
There are special tax courts in the United States, and tax cases are
usually extraordinarily complex. Several justices have come to be-
lieve that tax cases generally are not worth the Court's time or ef-
fort, and that it is better to leave the questions to the specialized tax
courts. All justices do not agree, but an overwhelming number of
33. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34. WOODWARD & ARmsTRoNo, supra note 16, at 224. This book documents the first
seven terms of the Burger Court.
35. Id. at 489-90; see also Erik M. Jensen, Of Crud and Dogs: An Updated Collection of
Quotations in Support of the Proposition that the Supreme Court Does Not Devote the Greatest
Care and Attention to Our Exciting Area of the Law; or Something the Tax Notes Editors Might
Use to Fill Up a Little Space in That Odd Week When Calvin Johnson Has Nothing to Print, 58
TAX NOTEs 1257 (1993) (another sample of Supreme Court's perceived distaste for tax matters).
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 857 1995-1996
Howard Law Journal
the clerks I interviewed did. They hated tax cases, even those who
worked for justices who liked tax cases.... One justice, assessed it
this way: . . . "I don't mind working on tax cases, but I certainly
don't go out and look for them. We have enough to do, although I
am impressed with their importance in the federal area." This jus-
tice, however, was out of sync with most of his brethren who felt
that tax issues were generally unimportant.
36
These negative perceptions and his own observations led another
Court observer to assert that: "The conclusion that the court has be-
come more reluctant to accept substantive federal tax cases is
inescapable.""
2. Empirical evidence
Based on the statements chronicled above, one might expect that,
generally, the Burger Court would deny certiorari to tax-related cases.
Yet the Court decides federal tax cases each year. This, therefore,
leads to the question of whether-assuming that the Court was not
evading tax-related issues-the Court was giving the area less than its
fair return? To answer this question we reviewed all the petitions for
certiorari concerning federal tax issues from 1969 to 1985, the span of
the Burger Court.38 Comparing what we found when we examined
only tax cases to what others discovered in their general reviews of the
Court's certiorari process, we observe that, in some ways, the Burger
Court treated tax cases much like any other case; but in other ways,
there are some significant differences.
a. Similarities between tax and other areas
(1) Gate keeping I
As noted by Justice Vinson, Professor Perry, and Stern, Gress-
man, Shapiro, and Geller, the justices view the certiorari process as a
36. PERRY, supra note 9, at 229-30.
37. Lewis, supra note 3, at 430.
38. We counted 1217 petitions in federal tax cases that were filed during this time. To expe-
dite our research, we divided the petitions into eight categories of our own choosing: business
tax, constitutional law, deductions, estate planning, exempt organizations, income, procedure,
and tax crimes. The petitions are summarized by numbers, category, and term in Appendix A.
We were more selective in choosing opinions to review in greater detail, guided by what we
believed would be the areas of greatest significance to general tax practitioners and, as it turned
out, areas of law least driven by cases tied to specific facts. Thus, we eliminated decisions per-
taining to taxes and constitutional law, procedure, and crimes. The remaining five areas pro-
duced 46 decisions. These decisions, including who petitioned, who won, and whether the case
involved a split among the circuits, are listed in Appendix C.
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way of uncovering questions of broad significance beyond each mat-
ter's relevance to the parties involved. 39 Given this standard, at least
one-half of the tax petitions we reviewed were inconsequential either
because the facts were too specific or the question raised was too nar-
row.40 As expected from the general literature, our review of all the
Burger Court's tax petitions demonstrates that these "inconsequen-
tial" petitions were never accepted.
41
(2) Ability to win on the merits
In the general literature we find the assertion that the justices are
more inclined to overturn than affirm;42 consequently, petitioning par-
ties should win more often than lose. This was at least marginally true
in the Burger Court's tax decisions. In accord with a predilection to
overturn, the party challenging the decision below won the Burger
Court's approval in sixty-one percent of all accepted tax matter peti-
tions.43 When it was the government that challenged the decision be-
low, its success rate increased to seventy-three percent. 44  Even
taxpayers (generally notable losers before the Court, as we shall see
below) won almost as much as they lost when they were the petition-
ers. The petitioning parties' success rate shows that winning on the
merits was as important in the tax area as it was overall.4"
(3) Best vehicle and timing
Whether a petition presents the "best vehicle" at the "proper
time" is the most subjective part of the certiorari process and, thus,
the hardest to quantify. Nevertheless, we were determined to evalu-
ate the Burger Court's use of these criteria, if at all, in selecting its tax
docket. To uncover this information, we reviewed all the tax petitions
for certiorari during the Burger years. Using a subset of these peti-
39. See supra notes 12, 17-19 and accompanying text.
40. For example, many of the petitions from criminal convictions are so entwined with spe-
cific facts as to be meaningless for Supreme Court review. The Court may fashion justice in a
particular case, but it cannot easily establish a broad principle of general import. The same is
true of the many petitions questioning the constitutionality of the federal income tax or petitions
involving procedure cases concerned with whether procedural safeguards were afforded the tax-
payer at trial or whether the appellate court exceeded the proper scope of its review. See supra
notes 15, 38.
41. See infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
43. See Appendix B.
44. Id.
45. Taxpayers won 41% of the cases they petitioned. See Appendix B. For discussion of
taxpayers' losses, see infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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tions, we demonstrate that the Burger Court did seek, and find, "best
vehicles" in the tax area, as much as it did in non-tax areas.
a) Selecting a substantive area
As discussed above, finding the "best vehicle" is essentially re-
duced to determining whether a specific petition is supported by
either a "clean" record or "clean" facts that highlight and refine the
underlying question presented. In contrast, "timing" tends to focus on
whether the question presented in the petition for certiorari has per-
colated enough in the lower courts to ensure vigorous advocacy on all
sides of the issue. Accordingly, our first step in evaluating "best vehi-
cle" and "timing" in the tax area was to select a group of petitions that
involved similar issues and to analyze why the Court selected one peti-
tion over another. We did this by applying the criteria discussed in
Part II.B. To illustrate our approach, we now focus on two sub-cate-
gories within the business tax area: (1) organizations/reorganizations/
separations; and (2) redemptions.46
46. We grouped the 79 business tax petitions into 15 areas suggested to us by the material.
Those groups, and the number of petitions in each, are: corporate organizations/reorganizations
and separations (12), dividends or capital gain (12), liquidations (10), related corporations (8),
partnership formations or distributions (7), redemptions (7), assignment of income (4), S corpo-
rations (4), penalty taxes (4), capital expenditures (3), foreign tax (2), tax benefit rule (2), what is
a corporation (2), cooperatives (1), and debt-equity (1). To see whether we were able to elimi-
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b) Organizations/reorganizations/separations
Of twelve petitions concerning corporate organizations, reorgani-
zations and separations, the Burger Court selected only one petition
for review: Paulsen v. Commissioner.47 Paulsen was an attractive case
for a number of reasons. First, it enabled the Court to return to a
topic it had examined before.4 8 Second, given the complexity of the
issues, Paulsen's facts were fairly clear and straightforward; therefore,
the Court could use its decision to develop broad principles. Finally,
Paulsen concerned mergers within the savings and loan industry at a
time when such transactions were occurring at an increasing rate. The
Paulsen petition thus provided the Burger Court an opportunity to
establish legal guidelines for both taxpayers and the government in a
particularly active and significant economic sector. For all these rea-
sons, Paulsen was a clear candidate for the "best vehicle" within the
reorganization sub-group.
Of the remaining eleven petitions, two were discarded from the
cert pool when the petitioners withdrew their petitions. 49 Two other
petitions raised important issues but may have failed the "timing"
test-the Court eventually did address the questions raised in later,
and presumably more seasoned, disputes.50 Five more petitions con-
cerned matters that were either inherently factual or were no longer
important by the time they reached the Supreme Court.51 The re-
nate cases for obvious reasons, we examined the organizations/reorganizations/separations and
redemptions areas in greater detail, as both areas contained a case that had been decided by the
Burger Court.
47. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985).
48. The issue concerned corporate reorganization rules and whether a shareholder in a
merged corporation maintained enough of his investment in the new corporation to avoid a tax
on his exchange of the old shares for stock in the new corporation. The Supreme Court had
addressed questions concerning continued investment in corporate reorganizations in such prior
decisions as LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S.
378 (1935); and John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
49. Heverly v. Commissioner, 451 U.S. 1012 (1981); Chapman v. Commissioner, 451 U.S.
1012 (1981). Settlement of the cases is noted in Margaret C. Henry, The Impact of Reeves v.
Comm'r on the Creeping Control "B" Reorganization: The Need for Legislative Reexamination of
Section 368(a)(1)(B), 10 J. CoRr. TAx'N 195, 199 (1983).
50. One case, Home Sav. & Loan v. Commissioner, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975), involved an issue
similar to Paulsen but was petitioned several years before Paulsen. Another addressed whether
cash received in a reorganization should be taxed as a dividend or as capital gain. Shimberg v.
United States, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979). That issue was subsequently reviewed by the Rehnquist
Court. Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989). Arguably, neither Home Savings nor Shim-
berg had ripened, and thus the petitions were denied.
51. Two petitions concerned liquidation-reincorporations: Schaffan v. Commissioner, 449
U.S. 836 (1980) and Cresta Corp. v. Commissioner, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971). Different tax conse-
quences flow from whether a corporation liquidates and reincorporates, as shareholders would
often argue, or has engaged in a reorganization, as the Internal Revenue Service would often
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maining three petitions concerned corporate separations, and each
was an important case in the field. 52 The justices might have passed
on these three petitions, however, for any number of reasons.
First, any one of the three petitions afforded the Court the oppor-
tunity to weigh in on substantive changes made to Section 355 in 1954,
thereby allowing the justices to exert their influence over the taxation
of corporate separations.5 3 Yet each of the petitions raised extremely
technical questions that the justices may have felt were beyond their
expertise.54 Furthermore, the nature of Section 355 and questions sur-
rounding corporate separations are not easily answered by deciding
any individual controversy; to make its mark, the Court might have
had to grant a number of petitions over several years. Finally the
Warren Court had reviewed a Section 355 case at the end of Chief
Justice Warren's tenure.5 5  Thus, because the Warren Court only re-
cently had decided a case in this area, and because the Court may
have needed several decisions to effectively interpret the scope and
meaning of Section 355, timing considerations may have argued for
waiting until other-perhaps more seasoned-petitions emerged.
Unfortunately, however, no such cases were petitioned during the
Burger Court years.
suggest. See BoRIs I. B-TTKER & JAMES S. EusrcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 112.64 (6th ed. 1994); DANIEL M. SCHNEIDER & PAUL E. HOEL-
SCHEN, JR., FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS §§ 17.02-.05 (1988). The
tension about the character of the event predates enactment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
See BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra, 112.64[2][a]-[b]. Therefore, little would be gained if the Burger
Court had reviewed this conflict.
Two petitions dealt with shareholders' loss of control over a corporation, Stephens v. United
States, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973) and Stanley v. Schuster, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Control, a term de-
fined by I.R.C. § 368(c), dates back to 1924 and is used in a variety of corporate tax statutes. See
SCHNEIDER & HOELSCHEN, supra, § 4.06. Thus, little purpose would be served if the Burger
Court had looked at this topic either.
In the fifth case, Lorch v. Commissioner, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980), the question was whether
expenses were deductible or had occurred pursuant to a reorganization, a characterization of the
event which would have precluded the taxpayers' deducting the expenses. Again, the factual
nature of the issue minimized the case's benefit to the Burger Court.
52. See Redding v. Commissioner, 450 U.S. 913 (1981) (presenting question of whether
transfer of warrants qualify as stock for purposes of § 355); Rafferty v. Commissioner, 408 U.S.
922 (1972) (presenting question of whether transaction failed to qualify under § 355 because it
was a "device"); and Gordon v. Commissioner, 400 U.S. 848 (1970) (presenting question of the
primacy of § 355 in regulating corporate separations).
53. See supra notes 47-48.
54. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
55. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968). The later Gordon case, 400 U.S. 848
(1970), in which the petition for certiorari was denied, was actually a further proceeding in the
1968 Supreme Court case.
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We cannot fully explain why the Court rejected the three corpo-
rate separation petitions, especially given that each raised important
questions about Section 355. We contend, however, that a combina-
tion of timing and a sense that the Court was not institutionally
equipped to handle the extremely technical tax matters involved
swayed the justices more than any desire to influence the area.
Regardless of the Court's rationale for refusing to grant these
three petitions, we have arrived at the Court's choice of one of four
viable petitions rather than the original twelve. This winnowing down
from the inconsequential cases (petitioned issues that have no poten-
tial for making broad statements on the issue) to the questionable
cases (petitions that have some merit but may not be the "best vehi-
cle" to address the issue) and finally the selected cases (in this data set
Paulsen) mirrors what others observe in the general certiorari process.
That is, that in the federal tax area, as in other substantive areas, the
Burger Court looked for a "best vehicle" in selecting its docket.
Corporate Organizations, etc.-







withdrawn M too factual




We repeated our winnowing away experiment with redemptions.
Here the question ordinarily is whether a taxpayer receives income
from her corporation as a shareholder and thus must pay the higher
ordinary income tax on dividends, or whether she is "cashing out" her
investment by selling shares back to the corporation, an act that mer-
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 863 1995-1996
Howard Law Journal
its the'lower capital gains tax rates.5 6 Over the course of the Burger
Court years, the Court had seven opportunities to address this ques-
tion but accepted only one redemption petition: United States v.
Davis'.
5 7
The Davis petition was a "best vehicle" because it raised several
important issues never before addressed by the Supreme Court and
was supported by very clean facts. 58 In other words, the important
and significant issues presented in the petition allowed the Burger
Court to step in once, make a substantial impact, and establish broad
rules to be (and that were) applied to a variety of other fact
situations.5 9
Because Davis allowed the Court to reach so many important at-
tribution issues in one decision, it had no reason to consider the next
petition that raised these issues.6" Rejecting that petition conse-
quently reduced the Court's possible choices from a total of seven pe-
titions to five petitions with one granted and the remaining petition
raising too many of the same issues as the granted petition to be a
"best vehicle."
Four other petitions concerned the interpretation of "meaningful
reduction" in a shareholder's stock, an issue whose broad dimensions
had already been sketched by Davis.61 Thus, these petitions were now
too specific to merit additional attention. The final petition addressed
too narrow a question, examining the overlap of Section 302 (gov-
56. Compare I.R.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (tax rates on ordinary income) with I.R.C.-
§ 1202 (1986) (before repeal in 1986) (deduction for capital gain, which led to lower tax rate).
57. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
58. For example, one especially important issue in Davis was a new rule concerning attribu-
tion of stock ownership between related parties that was intended to make it more difficult for
taxpayers to gain benefits by distributing their stock ownership over a larger range of people, all
of whom were related to the taxpayer and presumably under the taxpayer's influence or control.
See I.R.C. § 318 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Both §§ 318 and 302(b)(1) had been enacted in 1954. Although § 302(b)(1) incorporated
language used before 1954, the same language had different meanings in § 302(b)(1) and in its
predecessor. See Davis, 397 U.S. at 304-13.
Davis also enabled the Burger Court to send a message that the recently enacted law, which
attributes to the person whose stock is redeemed that stock owned by his relatives, should be
interpreted broadly. Further, Davis gave the Court the opportunity to characterize a redemp-
tion, also under recently enacted law, in which the shareholder did not suffer a "meaningful
reduction" in his stockholding, to warrant receipt of a dividend, not a capital gain. I.R.C. § 302
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
59. See BrrKER & EusTicE, supra note 51, 9.05.
60. Metzger v. Commissioner, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
61. Russo v. Commissioner, 454 U.S. 966 (1981); Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 416 U.S.
938 (1974); Brown v. United States, 414 U.S. 1011 (1973); Miele v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 1104
(1973).
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erning redemptions of stock) with another Code section, Section 351
(governing incorporations).
62
Once again, in the tax area, as elsewhere, the Burger Court fol-
lowed Justice Vinson's admonishment to accept only those petitions
that raise issues beyond their limited facts and adopted the "best vehi-
cle" analysis Professor Perry describes by choosing the most signifi-
cant redemption case it was offered and rejecting all others.
Redemptions
Reasons for Certiorari Decision
too narrow
4 A acc ep ted
14%
0 accepted







(4) The importance of the Solicitor General
As in non-tax cases, the Solicitor General was more successful
than taxpayers in his certiorari petitions to the Burger Court:63 the
Solicitor General's applications were accepted more often,64 he won
1996]
62. Coates Trust v. Commissioner, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
63. See PERRY, supra note 9, at 128 (75%-90% success rate).
64. Twenty-six of the Solicitor General's 86 petitions were accepted for a success rate of
30%. Only 22 of the taxpayers' 1131 petitions were accepted for a success rate of 2%. See
Appendices B, C.
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 865 1995-1996
Howard Law Journal
more cases than did taxpayers,65 and in granting his petitions, the
Court was less likely to require a split among the circuits. 66 Moreover,
the Solicitor General was better equipped to exploit splits among the
circuits than were taxpayers.67
(5) Federal tax compared to other areas of law-number of
petitions accepted
Given the literature on the Court's distaste for federal tax cases
discussed above, 68 one would expect to find that the Burger Court
granted fewer tax petitions than those based on other federal statutes.
On the contrary, we found that the number of accepted tax petitions
compared favorably to other areas involving highly technical federal
statutes.69 What these numbers suggest is that tax was not the Burger









65. The Solicitor General won 19 of 26 cases he successfully petitioned (73%). The taxpay-
ers won only 9 of 22 cases they successfully petitioned (41%). See Appendix C.
66. See infra note 77.
67. For example, the Solicitor General filed a petition in Hilton Hotels less than a month
after the taxpayer filed a petition in Woodward. See Appendix A, Deductions; 38 U.S.L.W.
3098-99, 3144. These cases then became companions when subsequently decided by the Burger
Court. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970), and Woodward v. Commis-
sioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
The Solicitor General's ability to petition a case which he knew would provoke a conflict
among the circuits is dependent, of course, on presence and timing. He cannot petition a case
which is not in a position to be petitioned, but his omnipresence is clearly an influential factor.
68. See supra Section II.C.1.
69. The annual Harvard Law Review surveys of the Supreme Court's activity for the imme-
diately preceding term suggest that tax was not slighted, or at least was not slighted more than
other, comparable statutory areas. Taxation appears in this survey as one of four categories of
"federal government litigation." The other three areas are administrative, including cases in-
volving administrative procedure, the Internal Revenue Service, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, or the National Labor Relations Board; cases involving enforcement of federal statutes,
for example, antitrust or unemployment compensation cases; and other actions involving the
federal government, for example, bankruptcy, Indian affairs, or Federal Tort Claim Act actions.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court 1994 Term, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1, 339 (1995) (Table III).
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Court's orphan stepchild. As with tax, labor law-another area gov-
erned by a complex federal statutory scheme-was often addressed by
the Court several times each term while banking and bankruptcy gen-
erally received somewhat less attention.70
In this light, tax fares favorably, or at least no less favorably, than Supreme Court review of
cases in other areas. For example, in the 1970 Term, there were four tax cases: three tax cases
plus one Internal Revenue Service case. In that same Term, there were two antitrust cases, four
labor cases (three N.L.R.B. cases plus one Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
case), two banking, and one bankruptcy case. See The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 347 (1971) (Table II). In the 1973 Term, there were six tax cases, seven labor cases (six
N.L.R.B. cases plus one Fair Labor Standards Act case), one banking (Bank Secrecy Act) and no
bankruptcy cases. See The Supreme Court 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 1. 278 (1974) (Table
III). In the 1977 Term, there were six tax cases, one patent case, one securities case, two anti-
trust cases, and one bankruptcy case. See The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1,
333 (1978) (Table III).
Specific information about tax decisions during the Burger Court years is provided in the
following table:
% of Tax Cases
Term Tax Cases Decided All Cases Decided to All Cases
1969 4 [30, IT] 94 4
1970 3 [3G, OT] 122 2
1971 4 [2G, 2T] 151 3
1972 7 [6G, iT] 164 4
1973 6 [4G, 2T] 157 4
1974 2 [2G, OT] 137 1
1975 1 [OG, IT] 159 1
1976 3 [2G, IT] 142 2
1977 6 [3G, 3T] 135 4
1978 3 [2G, IT] 138 2
1979 1 [1G, OT] 149 1
1980 5 [3G, 2T] 138 4
1981 4 [30, IT] 167 3
1982 6 [60, 0T] 162 4
1983 3 [2G, iT] 163 2
1984 4 [4G, OT] 151 3
1985 5 [4G, iT] 159 3
G = a decision in favor of the government
T = a decision in favor of the taxpayer.
These statistics are drawn from annual Harvard Law Review surveys of the Supreme Court's
immediately preceding term, published in the first issue of each new volume of the Review. See
The Supreme Court 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970); The Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1971); The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 297 (1972); The
Supreme Court 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1, 303 (1973); The Supreme Court 1973 Term, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1, 274 (1974); The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975); The
Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1977); The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 327 (1978); The Supreme
Court 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 275 (1979); The Supreme Court 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 289 (1980); The Supreme Court 1980 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1, 339 (1981); The Supreme
Court 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 304 (1982); The Supreme Court 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1,295 (1984); The Supreme Court 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1,307 (1984); The Supreme
Court 1984 Term, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1, 322 (1985); The Supreme Court 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 312 (1986).
70. See supra note 69.
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b. Differences between selection of tax and other petitions
(1) Social importance
Outside the tax area, Supreme Court observers note that the
Court looks for matters of social significance in choosing its docket.
71
Although this remains the case when the Court confronts tax matters,
the social importance criteria gives the Court very little to choose
from. With the exception of Bob Jones University v. United States,72
an action dealing with tax exemptions for racially discriminatory
schools, and Regan v. Taxation with Representation,73 an action con-
cerning freedom of speech and exempt organizations, no other certio-
rari petitions to the Burger Court raised issues of social significance in
the tax area. Both Bob Jones and Regan were granted and decided.
Thus, the justices gave as much attention to socially significant tax
matters as they possibly could, making tax matters similar to other
areas. Yet, given the infrequency with which social issues entwine
with tax issues, the Court must place less emphasis on social impor-
tance, lest it severely limit its tax docket.
(2) Number of requests for review
Unlike the general trend, in which petitions for review increased
each year, the number of requests for review of tax matters remained
constant during the Burger years.74 A review of these petitions dem-
onstrates consistency from Term to Term. As we saw above, consis-
tency in the certiorari context means that most petitions will be
71. See, e.g., PERR-Y, supra note 9, at 253-60.
72. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
73. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
74. The number of petitions filed in each of the terms of the Burger Court are as follows.
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denied, primarily because they repeatedly fail to present issues broad
enough to apply beyond their particular facts. Thus, although we can-
not maintain that the Court's alleged hostility towards tax matters re-
sulted in a decrease in tax-related certiorari petitions to the Burger
Court, we maintain that the Court's inhospitable reputation towards
tax-related issues encouraged certiorari applicants to use more care
than others in selecting issues for review.
(3) Split among the circuits
A split among the circuits was an important factor in having a
tax-related certiorari petition granted: thirty-three of the forty-six
cases (seventy-two percent) in our data set involved some sort of split
between circuits.75 The number of circuits involved in these splits,
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Term
Number of Petitions Filed
For more information on the number of petitions filed and the terms in which they were
filed, see Appendix B.
We cannot conclude whether this steady level of applications means that applicants with tax
questions were dissuaded from applying because we only examined actually filed petitions.
75. See Appendix B.
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however, was not as great as one would expect-especially in light of
Professor Perry's conclusions.
7 6
Furthermore, compared to the number of taxpayer certiorari pe-
titions accepted by the Burger Court, circuit splits were not as signifi-
cant in the Court's acceptance of the Solicitor General's certiorari
petitions.77 In addition, the Court often articulated other reasons for
accepting certiorari petitions: these included, for example, the
amount of money at stake in a particular case or the importance of an
issue or question to a particular industry.78
76. See supra Part II.B.2.d. Twenty of the 33 accepted petitions involved splits between
only two circuits and the Court of Claims as opposed to the three-, four-, and five-circuit splits
postulated by Professor Perry. See Appendix C.
Nine circuits split in one case: United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 303-04 (1970) (eight
circuits and Court of Claims).
Five circuits split in four cases: Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 164
(1981); Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 82 (1977); Commissioner v. Standard Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148, 151 (1977); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 36
(1976).
Four circuits split in four cases: United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 22 (1982)
(two lower courts also in conflict); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 5 (1981) (three
other lower courts also had decided case); Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569,
573-74 (1977); United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257, 258 (1973).
Three circuits split in four cases: Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131, 132-33 (1985) (one
lower court also in conflict); Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 192, 194 (1982); Fausner v.
Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973); United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 96 (1972).
Only two circuits split in 20 cases: Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 333 (1984);
Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 207 (1984) (conflict between a circuit court and Court of
Claims); Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 303 (1983); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305,
308-09 (1982); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979); United
Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180, 185 (1978) (implicitly, two circuits); Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561, 572 (1978); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 24
(1978); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 529-30 (1978); United States v. Consumer Life
Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725, 727 (1977); Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1975);
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (conflict between a circuit court and
Court of Claims); Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673, 677 (1974); Commis-
sioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134,141-42 (1974); Snow v. Com-
missioner, 416 U.S. 500, 501 (1974); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973) (two
other circuits also indirectly in conflict); Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 395
(1972); Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 3 (1970); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397
U.S. 580, 581 (1970) (companion case to Woodward); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572,
574 (1970) (indicating other federal circuits in conflict).
Conflicts were noted in one other case without enumeration of the number of courts in-
volved: St. Martin Evangelical Luth. Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 & n.10 (1981)
(noting, however, a "growing number of conflicting federal and state decisions on this issue").
77. Of the 46 cases in our data set, 26 resulted from certiorari applications by the Solicitor
General. Of these 26 cases, 16 involved splits in the circuits. Thus, only 62% of the Solicitor
General's successful certiorari applications involved splits. On the other hand, of the 46 cases in
our data set, 22 resulted from certiorari applications by taxpayers. Of these 22 cases, 19 involved
splits in the circuits. Thus, 86% of all successful taxpayer certiorari applications involved circuit
splits.
78. In one case, the Burger Court granted a petition simply because the taxpayer's position
was "in conflict with precedents of [the Supreme] Court." See United States v. Basye, 410 U.S.
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Some of the Burger Court's most important tax-related decisions,
however, were not accepted solely because of a split in the circuits. A
prime example of an important case that presented no conflicts at the
circuit level was Bob Jones University v. United States;79 another ex-
ample was Commissioner v. Tufts,80 a case which, although a split ex-
isted, was arguably waiting to be heard since its theoretical ancestor,
Crane v. Commissioner,8 was decided in 1947.
c. Developing themes
Our study of the Burger Court's certiorari-selection process un-
covered something never before addressed by other analyses of the
Burger Court and federal taxation. We discovered that the Burger
Court returned to certain tax-related themes again and again. Con-
cededly, in some tax-related areas, the Burger Court would select a
single case, make its mark, and move on.8' In other tax-related areas,
however, the Burger Court returned to certain issues several times.
83
441, 442 (1973). Importance of the issue was noted in other cases as well. See, e.g., Thor Power
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 525 (1979) ("important and recurring income tax ac-
counting issues"); Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 138, 151 (1977)
("question is important to the revenue"); Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 624
(1975) ("because of the importance of the issue in the administration of the accumulated earn-
ings tax"); United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. 401, 404 (1973)
("precedent for the tax treatment of substantial sums"), Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 346-47 (1971) ("importance of the issue for the savings and loan industry
and for the Government").
79. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (involving propriety of tax-
exempt status for University that barred admission to students who encouraged or were engaged
in interracial marriage).
80. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). For more on Tufts, see infra Part III.E.4.c.
81. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
82. See supra notes 47-62.
83. See infra notes 84.
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Further, we discovered that the Court did not choose its topics ran-
domly. On the contrary, our study revealed a pattern in the Burger
Court's certiorari-selection process that focused on issues relating to
proper accounting methods,' capitalization, 5 ownership of prop-
erty,86 assignment of income, 7 depletion,88 interest,8 9 and the tax ben-
efit rule,9" all of which disclose that the Court thought it important, as
it decided tax cases, to develop themes or trains of thought instead of,
for example, deciding factually specific cases of limited applicability.
From a legislator's standpoint, some of the subjects listed above
present drafting problems, because they are extremely fact sensitive.
For example, proper accounting methods are relatively scientific and
84. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979) (accounting for
inventory); Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433 U.S. 148 (1977) (insurer's
accounting for premiums); United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725 (1977) (in-
surer's accounting for reserves); Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977)
(accrual method taxpayer's accounting for deduction).
85. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974) (capitalizing costs associated with
construction); United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. 401 (1973)
(capitalizing nonshareholder contributions to capital); Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971) (capitalizing additional premiums paid to federal insuring corpora-
tion); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970) (capitalizing costs surrounding
appraisal of stock acquired from minority shareholders in merger); Woodward v. Commissioner,
397 U.S. 572 (1970) (capitalizing costs surrounding appraisal of stock acquired from minority
shareholder).
86. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982) (timing of interest that was disclaimed);
United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981) (economic interest in coal sufficient to support
depletion deduction); United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973) (ownership of savings
bond); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972) (retained interest in property transferred
into trust).
87. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (sale and leaseback of real estate);
United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973) (partner's assignment of income to retirement plan);
United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973) (inclusion in decedent's gross estate of co-owned
savings bond); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972) (inclusion in decedent's gross estate
of retained life estate); Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972) (allocation of in-
come between related parties under § 482).
88. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984) ("average daily production of domestic
crude oil" for purposes of percentage depletion); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981)
(determining economic interest upon which to base percentage depletion); Commissioner v.
Portland Cement Co. 450 U.S. 156 (1981) (determining gross income upon which to base per-
centage depletion).
89. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (interest-free loans were taxable gifts to
the extent of fair market value of use of money lent); Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehy-
drating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 (1974) (payment was not deductible debt discount); United
States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972) (payment attributable to purchase of
stock, not interest payments).
90. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) (tax benefit rule not applica-
ble to bank's payment of taxes in behalf of shareholders, which was subsequently refunded to
shareholders; tax benefit rule applied to corporation that deducted cattle feed but then distrib-
uted feed to its shareholders in liquidation); Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) (tax benefit
rule not applicable to partners whose partnership contributed assets, including bad debt reserve,
to corporation).
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thus amenable to standardized statutes. While this is true in most
cases, many situations lie on the margin where the proper accounting
method is dependent on the taxpayer's individual business and prac-
tices. To some extent, Congress confronts this challenge by requiring
that a taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflect income, and then
granting the Treasury Department broad discretion to define and
shape that concept.91 Yet, taxpayers and the IRS often disagree, and
it is difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to intervene and mediate
such disputes. Accordingly, it is understandable why the Burger
Court invoked its "power of supervision"' to provide guidance on
proper accounting methods.
From the Court's point of view, some of the listed subjects -for
example, the tax benefit rule and assignment of income-are judicial
creations. 3 Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court returns
to these issues rather than shift the responsibility of clarifying and in-
terpreting the meaning of certain regulations and statues to the Con-
gress or the IRS.
Other congressionally created tax-related concepts, however, are
difficult to define and explain in a neat set of statutes. Prior to the
enactment of Section 263A, for instance, the only statutory guidance
provided to taxpayers regarding the difference between capital ex-
penditures and expenses was that amounts "paid out for new buildings
or permanent improvements" were not deductible. 94 The lack of any
meaningful statutory guidance regarding the difference between capi-
tal expenditure and expenses, in turn, compelled taxpayers to rely on
their interpretations of court decisions addressing a wide array of fact
patterns. It is therefore understandable why the Burger Court felt
compelled to make a worthwhile contribution to the area (the Burger
Court addressed this issue five times).
We note that certain industries, such as oil and gas, appeared to
fascinate the Burger Court; and interest deductions and ownership of
property-topics with their own tax common law-attracted that
91. See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing that if the taxpayer's accounting
method "does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under
such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary does clearly reflect income").
92. SuP. CT. R. 10; see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
93. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) (tax benefit rule); United
States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973) (assignment of income); Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1
(1970) (tax benefit rule).
94. See I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1988). I.R.C. § 263A (1988) was enacted in 1986, just as the
Burger Court years ended, and provides specific rules for a wide array of expenditures including
trees, inventory, animals, and plants.
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Court's interest, we believe, because the Court felt it had particular
expertise in those areas. 95 Whatever the reason for its incursions,
these areas demonstrate that the Burger Court was quite active in
some tax areas despite any antipathy to the Internal Revenue Code as
a whole.
D. Conclusions
While it may be true that the Burger Court justices disliked tax-
related cases, a review of the Burger Court's certiorari-selection pro-
cess leaves little reason for dismay. Our findings revealed that, gener-
ally, the Burger Court's certiorari-selection process followed the same
patterns established in the Court's certiorari-selection process in other
substantive areas. Further, our findings revealed that any differences
in the certiorari-selection process between tax-related cases and other
substantive areas had more to do with the subject matter than with
any distaste for tax-related matters. For example, one can hardly
blame the Burger Court justices for deciding so few matters of social
importance. When the opportunity arose, the petitions were granted;
but tax does not often present such challenges. Moreover, the Burger
Court was willing to grant petitions with no splits in the circuits or
with fewer splits than some scholars would predict. In addition,
although the Court's tendency to favor the government (a matter we
discuss in detail below) may have dissuaded some petitioners, it did
not encourage higher quality requests. Thus, if the number of peti-
tions remained stable, taxpayers and the Treasury Department are as
much to blame as the Burger Court.
Finally, by returning to some tax-related issues several times, the
Burger Court demonstrated its willingness to take on aspects of the
Code and make them its own. This is particularly interesting because
it demonstrates that the Burger Court carved out a role for itself in a
highly technical and ever changing field. As noted above (and as we
will see below), the Court helped develop the law of federal taxation
often by deferring to Congressional mandates, seldom by deferring to
the Treasury Department, and frequently by placing the Court's own
mark in the area.
95. See BoRIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, Es.
TATES AND Gn'ts, at ch. 31 (2d ed. 1990) (interest); id. 4.42 (sale and leaseback); id. 6.2
(nominal versus beneficial ownership).
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III. THE BURGER COURT'S FEDERAL TAX OPINIONS
A. Introduction
We now move from the first major section of this paper-the
certiorari-selection process-to the second major section: The Burger
Court's Federal Tax Opinions.
In this section we first look at how the Burger Court justices
reached their decisions by examining the interpretive methods utilized
by the justices in deciding tax-law questions. Accordingly, we divide
the Opinions section into four subsections: 1) Plain Language; 2) Leg-
islative History; 3) Regulations; and 4) Deep Structure. This order
travels from those opinions giving maximum deference to Congress
(Plain Language and Legislative History), through those giving defer-
ence to the Executive branch and the IRS (Regulations), and finally
tax-related opinions rendered by an activist Supreme Court (Deep
Structure). These topics are suggested by prior literature on the
Supreme Court and federal tax cases, particularly those articles that
are prescriptive; that is, those articles that advocate particular inter-
pretive methods. 6
Our survey of the various interpretive methods available to
Supreme Court justices in deciding tax-related issues revealed that the
Court was inclined to articulate a preference for legislative supremacy
in all of its opinions regardless of which interpretive method it used.
Further, this preference for legislative supremacy was expressed even
when the Court used methods that seemed to oppose Congress in
favor of other institutions.
For example, the Supreme Court's reliance on tax regulations in
its decision-making process indicates the Court's preference for Exec-
utive branch mandates rather than Congressional ones. Our study re-
vealed, however, that when the Burger Court relied on regulations in
its decision-making process, the justices almost always based their reli-
96. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Regula-
tions, 44 TAX LAW. 343 (1991) (regulations); Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let
Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994) (regulations); Michael A.
Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax
Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 833-37 (1991) (legislative history); Karla W. Simon. Congress and
Taxes: A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1005 (1990) (regulations); see also
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363
(1986); Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L.
REV. 841 (1992) (revenue rulings); Isenbergh, supra note 4 (plain language). We have broad-
ened Professor Zelenak's nonliteral interpretation of Code language to "deep structure." See
Zelenak, supra note 4, at 639 (nonliteral interpretations).
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ance on deference to Congress.97 Further, as we will see, our defini-
tion of Deep Structure essentially requires no congressional mandate.
Our study revealed, however, that even in Deep Structure cases, the
Burger Court made efforts to show that it was deferring to Congres-
sional intent.
98
Next, because we believe that this deference to Congress was
more apparent than real, we examined what the Court actually did in
its decisions by analyzing dissenting opinions, government/taxpayer
win/loss ratios, as well as other statistics. Most important, however,
we emphasize which institution the Burger Court deferred to in its
opinions. This approach led to our conclusion that, regardless of the
rhetoric, the Burger Court often looked beyond Congress to favor the
Executive or the judiciary in its federal tax decisions.
Finally, we ask why a particular institution may be best suited to
address particular tax-related questions. For example, in the Regula-
tions section, we discuss why the IRS is less subject to political mal-
function than Congress and thus better suited to make certain tax-
related decisions. In the Deep Structure and Legislative History sec-
tions, on the other hand, we explore how the Burger Court's ability to
use narrative affected institutional choice.
B. The Plain Language of the Statute
In Part II.C.1, we pointed out that many commentators have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with how the Court handles tax matters. These
authors' disappointment comes, at least in part, from a perception that
the Court is not achieving internal consistency, nor developing broad
principles, within the Internal Revenue Code. As a result, these writ-
ers have offered a variety of interpretive devices to the Court. One of
these mechanisms-respect for the plain language of the Code-is of-
fered by Professor Joseph Isenbergh.99 Professor Isenbergh is trou-
bled by a series of court-created doctrines that discredit transactions
that otherwise meet the Internal Revenue Code's plain language. We
illustrate this concept by reviewing Helvering v. Gregory.10 °
In Gregory, a corporation owned an appreciated asset, which its
sole shareholder wanted to sell for her own account. Under the gen-
eral rules concerning corporate dividends, a simple distribution of the
97. See infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text.
98. See infra Part III.E.
99. Isenbergh, supra note 4.
100. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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asset to the shareholder would create an immediate shareholder-level
tax at "ordinary income" rates on the asset's fair market value-a
higher tax rate than would be the capital gains tax rate.101 To avoid
this result, the corporation employed the tax law's reorganization and
liquidation rules so that: (1) the shareholder's tax liability would be
delayed until she sold the property; and (2) the delayed tax would be
calculated at the lower "capital gains" rate. 102 Despite that the trans-
action met the Code's literal requirements, the Court refused to allow
the more favorable tax treatment. Instead, the Court treated the cor-
porate transaction as no different in substance from a corporate
dividend.'0 3
Professor Isenbergh has criticized Gregory's "substance over
form" doctrine as fatally flawed because: (1) statutes employ two
types of terms: (a) those that come from "life," and (b) those that
come from "art"; (2) a "life" term is one that describes an event that
exists independent of the statute while an "art" term is a creature of
statute;1' 4 (3) if a statute uses a term of "art," then judicial glosses
(such as substance over form) are inappropriate because the statute
itself requires the use of form over substance by limiting its benefits to
transactions that comply with its form; (4) thus, when terms of art are
employed, a taxpayer who complies with the statutory form should
escape any additional requirements derived from the Court's in-
dependent understanding of economic reality.1
0 5
For example, if the Internal Revenue Code provides a benefit for
"oil wells," a court has every right to use the substance-over-form doc-
trine to deny benefits to a gas well even if there are many similarities
101. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 277, § 112(i)(1)(B), 45 Stat. 791, 818.
102. Id. § 112(g), (i)(1)(B).
The transactions used, and the tax consequences the shareholder would attribute to the
steps, were:
1. The shareholder's corporation created a subsidiary and funded that subsidiary with the
appreciated assets. This transaction was not taxed under the reorganization provisions
available at the time. Id. § 112(i)(1)(B).
2. Next, the primary corporation distributed the subsidiary's stock to its shareholder pur-
suant to a plan of reorganization. The shareholder was not taxed on this distribution.
Id. § 112(g).
3. The subsidiary liquidated, and distributed its asset that the shareholder wanted to pos-
sess to her. The distribution was taxed, but at capital gains rates. Id. §§ 101, 115(c).
4. Finally, the shareholder's sale of the asset resulted in limited gain, because her basis in
the asset was approximately equal to the money she would receive from selling the
asset.
103. Id. § 115(a).
104. Points 1 and 2 are gleaned from lsenbergh, supra note 4, at 865-66.
105. Points 3 and 4 are found in id. at 866-83.
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between oil and gas wells because a difference between the two types
of wells exists whether or not there is a statute that uses those terms.
If, however, the Code's definition of reorganizations is limited to only
five of the hundreds of types of reorganizations that exist in the busi-
ness world, "reorganization" becomes a term of "art" because it cre-
ates a category of transactions that we would not acknowledge as
separate from other transactions absent the statutory definition.
Professor Isenbergh bases his argument on several principles.
His first principle is equality-that both taxpayers and the govern-
ment should be held to the same standard because, as is often noted,
doctrines that defeat the plain language standard are not effective
legal weapons for taxpayers. 10 6 A retreat from plain language also
frustrates the taxpayer's ability to predict results based on statutory
language, a consequence which is as great a benefit to tax lawyers as it
is a detriment to taxpayers. 10 7 Further, these court-created doctrines
are inefficient because the judicially-created rules are often over-
turned or modified by Congress.' 8
Professor Isenbergh's analysis raises an interesting point relevant
to this article: that a respect for the plain language doctrine necessar-
ily involves institutional choice. By articulating a decision in terms of
plain language, the Court asserts that Congress's words are more im-
portant than the Supreme Court's search for a deeper meaning of
those words. Conversely, by using doctrines that Professor Isenbergh
abhors-such as "business purpose," "substance over form," and
"step transactions"-the Court holds itself out as the ultimate inter-
preter of congressional meaning. Because we were concerned with
how the Burger Court determined which institution was best suited
for making specific tax-related decisions, we were interested in pursu-
ing the question of how and when the Burger Court used plain lan-
guage rhetoric in its decisions.
The remainder of this section contains four parts. In Part III.B.1,
we examine the Burger Court's plain language decisions. In Part
106. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970) (rejecting taxpayer's use of "busi-
ness purpose" available under prior law and of "substance over form" doctrines, and instead
relying on the plain language of the statute to impose a tax on dividend income); see also Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (The Court went beyond literal terms of stat-
ute.). For an example of how doctrinal glosses more often injure taxpayers than the government,
see B1-TKER & LOKKFN, supra note 95, 14.3.6.
107. "Indeed, it would not take too many cases [of this type] to justify the injunction not to
take a deep breath without calling a tax lawyer." Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 883.
108. See id. at 881.
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III.B.2 we make observations based on the total number of plain lan-
guage opinions we found. Part III.B.3 then attempts to put our obser-
vations into a broader context while Part III.B.4 points out some
problems with the Court's use of plain language.
1. The decisions
a. Introduction
Before we begin our analysis of the Burger Court's plain lan-
guage decisions, we want to emphasize what you will not see below.
First, you will find no analysis on whether any of the Court's decisions
were correct. Many of these decisions have been discussed elsewhere,
and readers interested in the consequences of these cases should refer
to those publications. 109 We also do not discuss meaning; whether we
control words or words control us is not our primary concern. We do,
however, underscore the fact that Burger Court justices strongly dis-
agreed about the significance of the plain language doctrine as an in-
109. See, e.g., Kenneth Blumstein, When Is a Redemption "Not Essentially Equivalent to a
Dividend"?, 7 J. CORP. TAX'N 99 (1980); Louis A. Del Cotto & Kenneth F. Joyce, Interest Free
Loans and Dickman v. Commissioner: A Letter to the Supreme Court, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 589
(1983); Raymond E. Dunn, Jr., Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 14 WAKr FOREST L. REV. 882
(1978); Mark B. Edwards, Interest-Free Loans Are Held to Be Gifts in Supreme Court's Recent
Dickman Decision, 60 J. TAX'N 266 (1984); Craig W. Friedrich, Recent Developments, 12 J.
CORP. TAX'N 218 (1985); John D. Gronda, Note, Taxation-Cash Meal Payments Under the 1954
Internal Re-'enue Code, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 215 (1979); Amy R. Hinderer, Research and Experi-
mental Expenditures-Section 174 Distinguished From Section 162, 40 Mo. L. REV. 685 (1975);
Richard M. Horwood & Ronald Hindin, Supreme Court Adopts Liberal Definition of R & D
Deductibility Under Section 174,41 J. TAx'N 2 (1974); Jonathan K. Layne, Cash Meal Allowance
Payments, 27 EMoRY LJ. 791 (1978); John W. Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174:
Will Snow Fall?, 27 TAx LAW. 381 (1974); William A. Loutos, Interest-Free Loans: An Endan-
gered Species, 62 TAXES 445 (1984); Nicholas G. Moore et al., How Limited Partnerships Tax-
Shelter the R&D of New Products or Technology, 49 J. TAX'N 138 (1978); Ellis B. Murov, Meal
Allowance for State Troopers Not Excludable From Gross Income, 52 TuL. L. REV. 650 (1978);
Philip F. Postlewaite & Susan R. Finneran, Section 302(b)(1): The Expanding Minnow, 64 VA. L.
REV. 561 (1978); Gregory J. Soukup, The Continuity-Of-Proprietary-Interest Doctrine and Thrift
Institution Mergers, 12 J. CORP. TAX'N 141 (1985); Steps to Take in Planning Intrafamily Trans-
fers After Adverse Interest-Free Loan Decision, 32 TAX'N FOR Accr. 276 (1984); Larry R.
Thompson, Research and Experimental Expenditures in Anticipation of Entering a Trade or Busi-
ness Held to Be Deductible Under § 174-Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974), 36 Ono
ST. L.J. 175 (1975); Eric S. Ziegler, The Taxability of Cash Meal Allowances: Form Prevails Over
Substance, 38 LA. L. REV. 907 (1978); Matthew J. Zinn & Mark J. Silverman, Redemptions of
Stock Under Section 302(b)(1), 32 TAX LAW. 91 (1978); J. Michael Bernard, Comment, Classifi-
cation of Shareholder Interest in Mutual Savings and Loans for Purposes of Nontaxable Reorga-
nizations Under I.R.C. §§ 354 and 361, 53 U. CiN. L. REV. 177 (1984); Sharp Sorensen, Note,
Paulsen v. Commissioner: The Continuity of Interest Doctrine and Tax-Free Mergers Involving
Mutual Savings and Loan Associations, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 623 (1984); Note, Dickman v. Com-
missioner: The Supreme Court Applies the Gift Tax to Interest-Free Loans, 35 ALA. L. REV. 553
(1984).
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terpretive tool. 10 Thus, we do not offer a philosophic definition of
plain language. Instead, we accept each justice's assertion that his de-
cision is based on plain language as he understand the term. To illus-
trate this point, we refer to two decisions that relied on the plain
language doctrine, Paulsen v. Commissioner"' and United States v.
Davis."' In Paulsen, the Court referred to the plain language doc-
trine in a dissenting opinion while in Davis, the Court referred to the
doctrine in a majority opinion.
b. Illustrative plain language decisions
Returning to the reorganization rules which fascinated Professor
Isenbergh in his analysis of Gregory, we shift our focus to Paulsen v.
Commissioner."3 In Paulsen, the plaintiff-taxpayers owned "guaranty
stock" in a state-regulated savings and loan association that had
merged with a federal savings and loan association. As part of the
merger, the taxpayers exchanged their guaranty stock for passbook
savings accounts and certificates of deposit in the federal savings and
loan. Generally, such exchanges result in taxable gain or loss. Share-
holders, however, are immune from taxation, if the stock exchange is
part of a reorganization, under Section 354 of the Internal Revenue
Code.114 Relying on the Section 354 exception, the Paulsen taxpayers
reported no income from the exchange of their guaranty stock to pass-
book saving accounts and certificate of deposits. The government,
however, disagreed and challenged the act.
Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor used the statute's plain
words to conclude that the taxpayers were entitled to nonrecognition.
In fact, according to O'Connor, any other holding would introduce
"an unfortunate and unnecessary element of uncertainty into an area
of our income tax laws where clear and consistent precedent is partic-
ularly helpful to both taxpayers and tax collectors.""' 5
Justice Rehnquist, however, did not agree with Justice
O'Connor's methodology. Writing for the Paulsen majority, Justice
Rehnquist declared:
110. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
111. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985).
112. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
113. For additional discussion of Paulsen, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
114. See I.R.C. § 354 (1988) (shareholder gain or loss not recognized). Because shareholder
gain or loss is not recognized, it is not taxed.
115. Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 144 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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under the literal terms of the Code the transaction would qualify as
a tax-free "reorganization" exchange rather than a sale or exchange
on which gain must be recognized and taxes paid.
Satisfying the literal terms of the reorganization provisions,
however, is not sufficient to qualify for nonrecognition of gain or
loss. The purpose of these provisions is "'to free from the imposi-
tion of an income tax purely "paper profits or losses" wherein there
is no realization of gain or loss in the business sense but merely the
recasting of the same interests in a different form.'"... In order to
exclude sales structured to satisfy the literal terms of the reorganiza-
tion provisions but not their purpose, this Court has construed the
statute to also require that the taxpayer's ownership interest in the
prior organization must continue in a meaningful fashion in the re-
organized enterprise.
16
This tension between the plain meaning of the words of the stat-
ute and the search a for a deeper meaning of the words is echoed in
United States v. Davis.1 7 In Davis, however, the majority adopted the
plain language doctrine as a basis for its opinion, while the dissent
urged the Court to make a more textured reading of the statute.
In Davis, the taxpayer, his wife, and children owned all the shares
in a corporation. In an effort to make the corporation a better credit
risk and obtain financing, Davis purchased $25,000 of the corpora-
tion's preferred shares. When the loan was repaid, and the additional
funds were no longer needed, Davis sold the shares back to the corpo-
ration for $25,000. He then reported the transaction as a tax-free re-
demption of his stock, because he received no more for the shares
than he originally paid.
1 8
Internal Revenue Code sections 301 and 316 impose a tax on the
fair market value of distributed corporate profits as dividends. In con-
trast, gain from the sale of investment property, such as stock, is ac-
corded preferential capital gains treatment. 119 By enacting Section
302, Congress recognized that some redemptions bear a greater re-
semblance to sales while others bear a greater resemblance to divi-
dends. Accordingly, under Section 302, Congress treats some
redemptions as gains or losses from the sale of a capital asset, while
others are taxed as ordinary income dividends.
116. Id. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
117. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
118. Id. at 303.
119. I.R.C. § 1221 (1988) (capital asset defined); id. § 1222 (capital gain defined); I.R.C.
§ 1202 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (deduction for capital gain) (repealed 1986).
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Davis could only rely on one of the four ways of ensuring capital
gains treatment of redemption funds under Section 302: that the pay-
ment was "not essentially equivalent to a dividend. ' 120 Based on this
exception, Davis reported the redemption as a sale that produced no
gain. The government, relying on Section 318 of the Code, denied
Davis the favorable tax treatment.
121
Under Section 302(b)(1), pro rata distributions are ineligible for
treatment as "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." This "no pro
rata distribution rule" appeared harmless to Davis, however, because
he was the only shareholder who exchanged his stock for cash. Thus,
because the redemption appeared to be non-pro rata, it was reason-
able for Davis to believe that he could benefit from the capital gains
treatment under Section 302.122 Nevertheless, under Section 318, Da-
vis was treated as owning both his wife's and children's shares. Be-
cause of Section 318's ownership attribution rules, the Burger Court
declared that the redemption was pro rata, because the 100% share-
holder received 100% of the redemption proceeds, making the distri-
bution identical to a dividend.'23
Some might contend that such convoluted machinations cannot
be expressed in plain language. The majority, however, held that "the
plain language of [Section 302] compels rejection of [the taxpayer's]
120. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1988).
121. Davis, 397 U.S. at 303.
122. For example, assume that A owns 50% of Corporation, that B owns 30% and that C
owns 20%. Assume further that each has paid $100 for each share of stock that she owns. If A
redeems five shares for $500, B redeems three shares for $300, and C redeems two shares for
$200, then these redemptions are pro rata and will be taxed as dividends. In other words, A will
be taxed on $500, B will be taxed on $300, and C will be taxed on $200. On the other hand, if A
redeems five shares for $500, while B and C redeem no shares, then the redemption is not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend-and A can treat the redemption as a sale. Because A has paid
$500 for the five redeemed shares, she has no taxable income as a result of the sale.
The reason for the difference in treatment is explained by Justice Marshall:
the provision had the obvious purpose of preventing a corporation from avoiding divi-
dend tax treatment by distributing earnings to its shareholders in two transactions-a
pro rata stock dividend followed by a pro rata redemption-that would have the same
economic consequences as a simple dividend. Congress, however, soon recognized that
even without a prior stock dividend essentially the same result could be effected
whereby any corporation, "especially one which has only a few stockholders, might be
able to make a distribution to its stockholders which would have the same effect as a
taxable dividend." In order to cover this situation, the law was amended to apply
"(whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend)" whenever a distribution in
redemption of stock was made "at such time and in such manner" that it was essentially
equivalent to a taxable dividend.
Davis, 397 U.S. at 308-09 (1970) (citations omitted); see also id. at 313 (pro rata redemption
cannot qualify under § 302(b)(1)).
123. Id. at 307.
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argument,"' 24 because it requires application of Section 318's attribu-
tion rules.125 It was now left to the dissent to argue, unsuccessfully, of
course, that the taxpayer's business purpose made the transaction
" 'not essentially equivalent to a dividend.' "126
2. Observations
Our review of the Burger Court's plain language federal tax deci-
sions convinced us that, although the justices utilized the plain lan-
guage doctrine frequently, they did not find it easy to apply. Further,
when the Court did use the plain language doctrine, it was most often
directed against the taxpayer, undermining the notion that an applica-
tion of the plain language doctrine is a neutral approach to statutory
interpretation.
a. Frequency of use
Over twenty-five percent of the Burger Court's decisions adopted
a plain language rationale.1 27 Moreover, the justices adopted the plain
language doctrine in all types of federal tax matters, demonstrating
their general approval of applying the doctrine to a variety of tax-
related questions.
1 28
b. Number of dissents
One of the most striking aspects of the Burger Court's use of
plain language is the controversy that it ignited. This is best illustrated
by contrasting the number of dissents that accompany plain language
opinions, and the dissents generated by the twelve non-plain language
opinions. For example, of the forty-six cases in our data set,, thirty-
four cases made no reference to plain language. These thirty-four de-
cisions generated twenty-one dissents; thus, sixty-two percent of deci-
sions involving no use of plain language doctrine carried no
dissents. 129 On the other hand, of the twelve cases in which at least
124. id. at 306.
125. Id. at 306-07.
126. id. at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. See cases cited infra note 130.
128. Using the categories outlined in the appendices, we see that plain language was used in
the business area (Paulsen and Davis), in the estate planning area (Dickman), in the tax exempt
area (American Bar Endowment, Bob Jones, St. Martin and HCSC-Laundry), in the income area
(United California Bank, Kowalski, Standard Life and Consumer Life), and in the deduction area
(Don E. Williams).
129. See Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner,
460 U.S. 370 (1983); Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982); Jewett v. Commissioner,
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Number of Cases Involving Plain Language
34 (::12
R Plain, Languagea at Issue
a Plain Language not at Issue
one justice employed the plain language doctrine, ten cases carry dis-
senting opinions. Thus, eighty-three percent of cases involving plain
language doctrine engendered controversy.130
c. Difficulty in applying standard
The higher percentage of dissents in plain language decisions
make clear that interpreting plain language is not nearly as simple as
the term implies. On the contrary, the large number of dissents sug-
gests that the plain language standard is a particularly difficult doc-
trine to apply.
455 U.S. 305 (1982); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); United States v.
Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472
(1979); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S.
528 (1978); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976); Ivan Allen Co. v. United
States, 422 U.S. 617 (1975); Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974); Central Tablet
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974); United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 412 U.S. 401 (1973); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); United States v.
Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); Commissioner v. First
Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972); United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972); Commissioner v.
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971); Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
130. See United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986); Paulsen v. Com-
missioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985); Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); Bob Jones Univ:
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); St. Martin Evangelical Luth. Church v. South Dakota, 451
U.S. 772 (1981); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981): United Cal. Bank v. United
States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978); Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); Commissioner v.
Standard Life & Accident Ins., 433 U.S. 148 (1977); United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430
U.S. 725 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); United States v.
Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
Of these 12 cases, the only two that did not prompt dissents were St. Martin and Standard
Life.
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An amusing illustration of this incongruity is found in HCSC-
Laundry v. United States, 3' where both the majority and dissent rely
on the plain language doctrine. Another illustration of how difficult it
can be to apply the plain language doctrine is by examining how often
plain language decisions were supported by additional references to
legislative history.'32 In our view, if the language is clear, and the re-
sult is dictated by that language, there is no need to look at legislative
history for further illumination. Yet, over eighty percent of the deci-
sions relying on plain language also relied on legislative history for
further support. 33
d. Plain language as an anti-taxpayer weapon
Confronted with the wide use of the plain language standard by
the Burger Court, we searched for any discernable patterns in its ap-
plication. We found that what distinguished the plain language stan-
dard from other interpretive methods was that: (1) plain language was
almost always used in favor of the government and against the tax-
payer; and (2) plain language was more often used by the majority
than the dissent. Again, among the Burger Court tax-related opinions
that relied on plain language, 134 only three favored the taxpayer (and
one of these was a dissenting opinion).1 35 Of the fifteen opinions gen-
erated by the twelve cases using plain language, nine were majority
opinions, while only six were dissenting opinions.
36
131. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981); see also St. Martin, 451 U.S. at 772
(plain language argument used in majority and in concurrence); Standard Life, 433 U.S. at 148
(same).
132. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 105; Dickman, 465 U.S. at 330; Bob Jones,
461 U.S. at 574; St. Martin, 451 U.S. at 772; HCSC-Laundry, 450 U.S. at 1; Kowalski, 434 U.S. at
77; Standard Life, 433 U.S. at 148; Consumer Life, 430 U.S. at 725; Don E. Williams, 429 U.S. at
569; Davis, 397 U.S. at 301.
133. See cases cited supra note 132.
134. See cases cited supra note 130.
135. See St. Martin, 451 U.S. at 772; United Cal. Bank, 439 U.S. at 180; Consumer Life, 430
U.S. at 725. The dissent was in United California Bank.
136. The uneven number comes from the fact that both the majority and the dissent in St.
Martin, HCSC.Laundry, and Standard Life used plain language to justify their positions. The
nine majority opinions were: United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986);
Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); St. Martin Evangelical Luth. Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981); Commissioner
v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins., 433 U.S. 148
(1977); United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Com-
missioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). The six non-majority
opinions (dissents and concurrences) were: Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); St. Martin, 451 U.S. at 772; HCSC-Laundry,
450 U.S. at 1; United California Bank, 439 U.S. at 180; Standard Life, 433 U.S. at 148.
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Based on these statistics, we cannot agree that the plain language
approach aids taxpayers and the government equally. On the con-
trary, our review of the Burger Court's federal tax decisions demon-
strates that plain language is almost always used against taxpayers and
in favor of the government. Thus, although proponents of plain lan-
guage may be correct when they resound Justice O'Connor's concern
for "clear and consistent precedent,"' 137 taxpayers should use caution
before advocating reliance on the plain language doctrine. If the Bur-
ger Court is any model, the precedent will almost certainly be used
against them.
3. Speculations-what does the Court hope to achieve with plain
language?
a. Introduction
The speculations we offer below are informed by our belief that
plain language is not a mandate; rather, it is a choice. The number of
dissenting opinions in the Burger Court's plain language decisions
chronicled above demonstrate how infrequently the justices found
clear congressional intent and how the justices' use of plain language
represents a preference rather than a yoke. 13s For us, the dissenting
opinions in the Burger Court's plain language opinions are proof that
plain language exists more in the reader's mind than on the printed
page.
b. Possible benefits of plain language
The Burger Court justices' frequent application of the plain lan-
guage doctrine in tax-related cases suggests that they recognized some
benefits to the approach. Unfortunately, the only benefit that the jus-
tices consistently cited was predictability-a benefit that is clearly un-
dercut by our observation that plain language can be used for many
purposes, as well as that its tendency is to produce sometimes contra-
dictory results. If consistency, however, is not the primary reason for
adopting a plain language approach, what other benefits might the
Court gain from plain language rhetoric? We speculate that the Bur-
ger Court used plain language signal to both lower courts and taxpay-
137. See Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131, 144 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Of the cases we looked at, there were no unanimous decisions. Each of the nine dis-
sents and the four concurrences show that the Court could have gone another way.
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ers the Court's goal of protecting the federal tax system in general,
and the Burger Court's docket in particular.
(1) Signal to lower courts
As Justice Vinson's address noted,139 a Supreme Court decision
does much more than settle a particular matter. It also acts as a guide
to lower courts, agencies, and potential litigants. In terms of plain
language and the Internal Revenue Code, this dual role places the
Supreme Court in a strange position.
On the one hand, most questions involving federal taxation are
answered by the Code's plain language. Otherwise, our federal tax
system would be far more chaotic than it sometimes is, or at least ap-
pears. Thus, one way to ensure that the federal tax system runs
smoothly is to encourage lower courts to seek out and apply the plain
language approach as often as possible. Thus, we suspect that the
Burger Court's frequent application of the plain language doctrine
was part of an effort to encourage lower courts and agencies to apply
the doctrine regularly.
While we know that most tax questions are easily resolved, we
also know that, by the time an issue reaches the Supreme Court, the
issue requires an analysis that goes beyond an application of the
Code's plain language. This tension between what the plain language
doctrine can achieve for the tax system as a whole and what it cannot
achieve at the Supreme Court level may explain the Burger Court's
contradictory use of plain language, as well as the Court's need to rely
on other interpretive devices (such as legislative history) in its plain
language decisions.
(2) Signal to taxpayers
That plain language decisions are so frequently used against tax-
payers raises an interesting question: do taxpayers deserve this treat-
ment? In other words, are plain language decisions the Court's
response to truly simple questions that taxpayers make complex by
attempting to avoid liability? If so, we can view the Court's frequent
use of plain language as a signal directed to a broad class of potential
litigants that such behavior is not rewarded.
This signal may help the entire tax system by reducing the
number of disputes at all points in the process. Taxpayers, the IRS,
139. See Vinson, supra note 12.
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and the lower courts are on notice that the Supreme Court will sup-
port the government when a government position is based on plain
language. Given the limited chance of success, a taxpayer must be
extremely committed to fight a plain language rationale up the line
through the administrative process and the lower courts. As a result,
the number of disputes may be reduced throughout the system.
The deference to plain language signal more than likely helps the
Court trim its own docket as well. Any taxpayer confronted with the
government's use of plain language must consider that his chances of
success are remarkably low. This, perhaps, is why the number of peti-
tions for certiorari in the tax area remained steady during the Burger
Court years, while the number of other petitions increased. 4 '
4. Problems with Plain Language
a. Muddied signals-inappropriate use of plain language
In Part III.B.3 we speculated that the Burger Court used plain
language as a way of encouraging taxpayers, lower courts, and the IRS
to find the most straightforward solutions to tax problems. On the
one hand, such encouragement is appropriate because the plain lan-
guage analysis should be applied by the IRS and lower courts, where
there are more questions with simple answers awaiting resolution. On
the other hand, plain language analysis is not as appropriate for the
Supreme Court because a higher percentage of the Court's questions
are complex.' 4 ' Because the Supreme Court entertains questions that
are more complex than those addressed by subordinate bodies, it actu-
ally relies on other factors in addition to the plain language analysis
when making its decisions. But, rather than admit the complexity, the
Court often cloaks decisions in plain language. Thus, the signal to
lower courts and the Agency becomes muddied because the Court
purports to use one type of analysis while actually engaging in an-
140. See Table A, supra note 74.
141. This is not to say that lower level reviewing bodies do not deal with complex questions.
Clearly they do. It is only to say that the lower the level of review, the higher the percentage of
simple questions. Thus, on the lower levels, plain language resolutions are more appropriate
than on the Supreme Court level, where the percentage of complex matters is far greater. The
complexity of an issue can have far-reaching political implications as well. See NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPER.ECr ALTERNArIVES 82-84 (1994) (recognizing that the complexity of an issue
can have great effect on the issue of minoritarian bias); id. at 83 ("Majorities faced with complex
issues . . . may be manipulated or misled into supporting positions that are detrimental to
them.").
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other. As a result of this contradiction, the Burger Court's plain lan-
guage decisions send a confused signal.
b. Muddied signals-dissents
Another problem with the Burger Court's plain language cases is
the number of dissenting opinions that these decisions generated. To
the extent that the number of dissents in plain language decisions re-
mains fifty percent higher than in other areas, the dissenting opinions
send a counter signal to taxpayers: that they may have an opportunity
to prevail. Further, dissenting opinions undercut the legitimacy of the
plain language standard by demonstrating that, in each case, justices
disagree with the notion that the issue before the Supreme Court can
be-as the majority opinion asserts-easily resolved. It seems to us
that the plain language standard's legitimacy rests on the assertion
that texts have determined meanings. This legitimacy, however, is un-
dermined whenever the rationale or methodology of a majority opin-
ion is countered by a dissenting opinion.
c. Plain language and institutional resources
Plain language raises at least two institutional questions: first,
whether the plain language doctrine helps preserve the Internal Reve-
nue Code's internal consistency (or help create broad principles
within the Internal Revenue Code)? And second, whether the appli-
cation of the plain language doctrine promotes efficiency by preserv-
ing institutional resources?
Plain language is not an efficient way either to improve the
Code's internal consistency or to develop broad principles. As a prac-
tical matter, the plain language standard requires that the Supreme
Court forgo any interest in either goal in favor of a rigid adherence to
a mechanical application of statutory language. In essence, courts are
directed to apply strict language and to disregard results. If the conse-
quences of a plain language application are contrary to what Congress
intended, it is presumed that Congress will itself act to remedy the
situation. It may argued, however, that this approach-standing
alone-is inefficient, because it forces an institution confronted with a
problem to stand by passively while implementing and applying defec-
tive rules or policies. Given that Congress is the constitutionally des-
ignated institution for creating tax law, this potential inefficiency may
be acceptable if the deference ultimately pleases Congress. The cen-
tral question thus is whether Congress prefers a deferential Court in
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the area of federal taxation or whether Congress also is sending sig-
nals that indicate otherwise. In this regard we note that the federal
tax law is filled with court-made rules that Congress seems satisfied
with-at least as demonstrated by its failure to overturn them.142 In-
deed, Congress, by remaining passive in response to Supreme Court
tax rulings, has "repealed" very few Supreme Court federal tax
decisions.
Thus, Congress's failure to disembowel most Supreme Court fed-
eral tax decisions in general-and Burger Court tax decisions specifi-
cally-begs the following questions: is it more efficient for the Court
to invite congressional response by merely exposing absurdities? Or
is it more efficient for the Court to correct internal flaws? The latter
question is based on an expectation that Congress would act to over-
ride the Court's holdings if congressional intent had been
contravened.
To some extent, the Court's strict use of plain meaning to expose
a statute's faults hoards institutional resources. The Court interprets a
statute, reveals its flaws, and leaves Congress to remedy any remain-
ing flaws. As a result, the Court's resources are saved, because it does
not have to fashion a solution that may be overturned. To some ex-
tent, however, the plain language approach squanders institutional re-
sources as well, particularly if plain language reveals a serious
statutory flaw.1 43 The Court has a limited ability to review questions
in general and an even more limited tax docket. So long as a question
has made its way to the Court, why not remedy the problem?
Congress's general reluctance to rewrite federal tax decisions by
subsequently enacting laws to contradict the Court's decisions under-
scores the argument that Congress finds efficiency in a more, rather
than less, aggressive Court. Accordingly, if we accept the premise that
Congress should be the institution responsible for creating tax law, we
must also consider that, as a "leading" institution, it is signalling the
Court towards a more activist position.
142. For example, Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct.
Cl. 1954), offers an explanation of basis that cannot be supported by plain language. Likewise,
Crane offers an interpretation of amount realized that is equally absent from the statute. See
infra notes 332-33. See also Tufts, discussed infra at notes 329-35; Galler, supra note 96, passim
(recognizing that courts' deference to IRS revenue rulings in the face of congressional silence
gives interpretive rulings legislative effect).
143. We would use the plain language result in Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131
(1985), as one example of such a revealed statutory flaw. See supra notes 113-16 and accompa-
nying text.
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a. The attraction of legislative history
In Part III of this Article we examine different interpretative
methods used by the Burger Court in deciding federal tax questions.
Discussion of the various interpretive techniques begins with an analy-
sis of methods that confer high deference to Congress-for example,
plain language-and moves through each method towards the Deep
Structure section, and a more activist Court. Because courts and com-
mentators have vacillated over the proper role of legislative history in
statutory interpretation, not every court's sequence of topics would
naturally flow from Plain Language to Legislative History.'" Courts'
regard for legislative history has spanned the spectrum from no regard
to high regard and back again. Yet that sequence is natural for the
Burger Court's federal tax decisions, because the Burger Court
seemed to find deference to Congress in the form of legislative history
a necessary side dish to the majority of its tax decisions.
14 5
Often combining legislative history with other interpretive meth-
ods (such as plain language or regulations), the Burger Court used
legislative history a great deal when deciding federal tax matters. Of
the forty-six cases we surveyed, the majority, the concurrence, or the
dissent used legislative history fifty-four percent of the time.146 Our
finding that the Burger Court respected and, indeed, was fond of legis-
lative history was not unusual. In fact, it confirms Professor Carro's
144. Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, Use of Legislative Histories by the United States
Supreme Court: A Statistical Analysis, 9 J. LEGrs. 282, 283-84 (1982).
145. Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Inter-
pretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L.J. 160, 160-75.
146. Cases using legislative history are: Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990); United
States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986); United States v. American College of
Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986); Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); Commissioner
v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); St.
Martin Evangelical Luth. Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981); HCSC-Laundry v.
United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
482 (1979); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978); Commissioner
v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins., 433 U.S. 148
(1977); United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Com-
missioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976); Central
Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974); Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500
(1974); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); United States v. Mississippi Chem., 405
U.S. 298 (1972); United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972); Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
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earlier study that showed the Supreme Court used legislative histories
in tax matters more than in any other area. 147 The nature of tax legis-
lation makes legislative history attractive for a number of reasons.
First, although tax law derives from many sources, including judicial
decisions and regulations, one cannot escape the essentially statutory
nature of the area. In response to this, one trend we found through-
out the Burger Court's federal tax decisions was its constant reference
to Congress and congressional intent. Often the Burger Court found
that intent in legislative history.
Second, federal tax statutes, generally, are accompanied by un-
usually rich legislative histories. Internal Revenue Code changes
often come complete with extensive reports from the House Ways and
Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee and the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation, as well as with statements from the Treasury,
House, and Senate hearings and floor debates. Furthermore, mem-
bers of Congress often base their votes on committee reports rather
than on statutory language.
148
Reliance on reports rather than statutory language leads to legis-
lative history's third attraction: the limits of statutory language. The
Internal Revenue Code is a self-contained legal system. As such, it
can be particularly complex and self-referential. Often, its most fun-
damental concepts are the least well defined and yet the most closely
held. These Code "fundamentals" are particularly difficult to express
in statutes because statutory form is highly stylized and technical,
making it inappropriate for articulating the sorts of deeper assump-
tions and complex interrelationships that drive many tax sections.
But, where statutes fail, legislative history often does not. A para-
graph in a committee report can often illuminate a bit of aspiration
that a sub-sub-section can only hint at.
b. Types of legislative history
Although the comparative value of various types of legislative
history is an interesting question, it is not the subject of this Article.149
147. Carro & Brann, supra note 144, at 287.
148. Livingston, supra note 96, at 833-37.
149. The debate over the use of legislative histories sometimes centers on the types of history-
put into play. For example, one objection to giving credence to statements from the floor is that
these declarations are only the opinion of one among many. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text,
History and Structure in Statutory interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 61 (1993); Richard
L. Rainey, Stare Decisis and Statutory Interpretation: An Argument for a Complete Overruling of
the National Parks Test, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1430 (1993); Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legis-
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Accordingly, our survey does not distinguish among types of legisla-
tive histories. Nor are we directly concerned with whether it is legiti-
mate for courts to use these histories when interpreting federal tax
statutes. Instead, we are interested in how the Burger Court used the
wide array of tools that fall under the heading "legislative history"
when deciding federal tax matters. As a result, this section discusses
committee reports, statements from the floor, statements from Treas-
ury and even Congress's failures to act, a topic discussed at greater
length in the Regulations section of this paper.
c. Uses of legislative history
The Burger Court used legislative history in many, sometimes
contradictory, ways. One way was to combine legislative history with
other interpretive methods. For example, the Burger Court coupled
plain language with legislative history in ten of twenty-five legislative
history cases, for a total of forty percent.
Legislative History/Plain Language Decisions
15
10
10 Legislative History not M Legislative History
Coupled with Plain Coupled with Plain
Language Language
Even more frequently, however, the justices employed legislative his-
tories to decipher garbled language. In sixteen of twenty-five cases
lative History in Statutory Interpretation Cases in the 1992 Supreme Court Term: Scalia Rails But
Legislative History Remains on Track, 23 Sw. U. L. REV. 47 (1993); Philip P. Frickey, From the
Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MWN. L. REV.
241 (1992). Committee reports might be criticized because they are written by committee staff-
ers, not members of Congress, Livingston, supra note 96, at 833-37; and where does Congress's
failure to act fit into the picture? Is the use of legislative history ever legitimate and, if so, when?
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(sixty-four percent) the justices claimed that legislative history guided
them when Code language failed.
150
Legislative History Decisions
Number of Cases Where Used to
Interpret Allegedly Unclear Statute
9
0 Language of Code U Language of Code
Allegedly Unclear Allegedly Clear
Combined with two other categories, we found that the Burger Court
used legislative history in at least four ways: (1) to support another
method of statutory interpretation such as plain language or deep
structure; (2) to test regulations; (3) to signify congressional intent
where there was no congressional expression; and (4) to offer gui-
dance for "unclear language."
d. Dissents
Legislative history was attractive to all the justices, who turned
to it at one time or another in majority opinions, concurrences, and
dissents. Yet the mere fact that legislative history was widely used did
not make it controversial. Although the amount of controversy en-
gendered was slightly higher than average, legislative history majori-
ties did not generate as many dissents as we saw in Plain Language
cases15 1 and will see again in Deep Structure cases. 15 2 The twenty-five
legislative history cases generated nineteen dissents, for a total of sev-w
enty-six percent.
150. The plain language decisions, combined with the unclear language decisions, total more
than 100% because legislative history was sometimes used by both the majority and the dissent
in the same case. Thus, in the 25 cases we discuss there are more than 25 opinions using legisla-
tive history.
151. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
152. See infra Part III.E.
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e. Treatment of Taxpayer
Although legislative history was often combined with other meth-
ods, the taxpayer won more when the Burger Court invoked legisla-
tive history than when the Court relied solely on plain language,
regulations, or deep structure. Eight of the Court's twenty-five legis-
lative history cases supported the taxpayer's position, so that the tax-
payer won thirty-two percent of the time.
153
2. The Burger Court's use of Legislative History in federal tax
matters
The Burger Court used legislative history from a number of dif-
ferent perspectives, befitting legislative history's wide range of uses.
Because the Burger Court so often combined use of legislative history
with other interpretive methods, legislative history's use is first sam-
pled in combination with Plain Language and Deep Structure. We
then examine how the Burger Court interpreted the lack of congres-
sional action and follow by studying use of legislative history in combi-
nation with regulations and, finally, with unclear language.
a. Legislative History combined with plain language and deep
structure
(1) Legislative history and plain language
As we saw above, plain language decisions are sometimes based
on an unadorned assertion of straightforward statutory language. Oc-
casionally, legislative history is added for a double demonstration of
plain meaning. Sometimes, conflicting sides both find support in legis-
lative history and plain language. A case that combines all of these
perspectives is St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church.5
St. Martin concerned the scope of exemption from federal unem-
ployment insurance taxes for certain religious schools under the Fed-
eral Unemployment Tax Act. The problem arose because of a series
of amendments to the Act, each of which had narrowed the number of
statutory exemptions. For example, until 1970, all services "per-
153. Decisions that supported the taxpayer were: Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206
(1984); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); St. Martin Evangelical Luth.
Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180
(1978); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978); United States v. Consumer
Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977); Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974); United States v.
Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
154. St. Martin Evangelical Luth. Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981).
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formed in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational or other
organization described in section 501(c)(3)" were exempt. 155 Under
this provision the religious schools in St. Martin qualified for the
exemption.
In 1970, Congress eliminated the broad exemption outlined
above and substituted three narrower exemptions, one for churches,
one for ministers, and one for schools.156 Again, the religious schools
in St. Martin were exempt.
In 1976, Congress eliminated the exemption for schools while re-
taining the exemption for churches and ministers."5 7 Thus arose the
St. Martin problem. Were the religious schools in St. Martin now sub-
ject to the Federal Unemployment Insurance Act because Congress
repealed the exemption for schools, or were they still eligible for an
exemption because their employees worked for a church? 15 In St.
Martin, both the majority and the concurrence agreed on the plain
language of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act: that under the stat-
ute's plain language, religious schools remained exempt so long as
they were not separately incorporated from their governing church. 159
Because the schools in St. Martin were not separately incorporated,
their exemption remained intact. The majority and the concurrence
disagreed on the Act's legislative history, however, and how the St.
Martin result should have been reached. That disagreement had to do
with plain language and legislative history.
According to both the majority and concurrence, the schools in
St. Martin were spared because they were eligible as both "schools"
and "churches" before 1976, and only the school exemption was elimi-
nated by the 1976 amendments. The majority and Justice Stevens dis-
agreed, however, on whether Congress actually intended to keep
these religious schools exempt after the 1976 amendments or whether
the exemption was compelled by poor draftsmanship.
According to the majority, the statute's legislative history showed
that Congress wanted to retain exemptions for religious schools even
after the 1976 amendment. The majority based its view on the House
and Senate reports concerning the 1970 church exemption, which said:
155. Id. at 776.
156. Id. at 777.
157. id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 784 (majority opinion); id. at 790 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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This paragraph excludes services of persons where the employer is a
church or convention or association of churches, but does not ex-
clude certain services performed for an organization which may be
religious in orientation unless it is operated primarily for religious
purposes and is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally sup-
ported by a church (or convention or association of churches).
Thus, the services of the janitor of a church would be excluded but
services of a janitor for a separately incorporated college, although
it may be church related, would be covered. A college devoted pri-
marily to preparing students for the ministry would be exempt, as
would a novitiate or a house of study training candidates to become
members of religious orders. On the other hand, a church related
(separately incorporated) charitable organization (such as, for ex-
ample, an orphanage or a home for the aged) would not be consid-
ered under this paragraph to be operated primarily for religious
purposes.
160
For the majority, this 1970 legislative history demonstrated that the
church exemption originally covered church-controlled religious
schools. Further, the majority reasoned that, because this church ex-
emption was untouched by the 1976 amendments, Congress intended
to keep church-related schools exempt even after it eliminated the ex-
emption for schools.
Just as surely as the 1970 legislative history cleared up the matter
for the majority, the 1976 legislative history confused the issue for Jus-
tice Stevens. Based on House and Senate reports that stated that the
1976 amendments covered "all educational institutions," Justice Ste-
vens concluded that Congress meant to eliminate the exemption for
religious schools. 16 1 However, by failing to amend the church exemp-
tion along with the school exemption, Congress fell into a drafting
trap that kept the religious schools exempt. 162 Justice Stevens was
thus able to argue that, although legislative history clearly showed that
160. Id. at 781 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 612, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1969)).
161.
"Section 115(b) also has the effect of requiring the State to pay unemployment
compensation on the basis of services performed for all educational institutions. Under
existing law, the State is only required to provide coverage of services, performed for
institutions of higher education."
Id. at 789 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56
(1975)).
"The bill would require the States to extend the coverage of their unemployment com-
pensation programs to employees of nonprofit elementary and secondary schools (pres-
ent law requires coverage for employees of institutions of higher education)."
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976)).
162. Id. at 790 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Congress meant to repeal the church school exemption, the statute's
plain language compelled him to spare the schools. "Despite this leg-
islative history, I agree with the Court's conclusion .... Although
Congress' intention to cover such employees was, in my judgment,
clear, the 1976 Amendments simply failed to give effect to that
intention." '163
For both the majority and the concurrence, then, plain language
was the deciding factor. But, for the majority, that plain language was
supported by a legislative history that, Justice Stevens argued, entirely
undermined it.M We again see the power of plain language first dis-
cussed in Part III.A.: words can take on a power that is greater than
their author's intent.
In addition, the majority and the concurrence show radically dif-
ferent deference to Congress and yet end up in agreement. The ma-
jority could claim that it was only following Congress' intent because
the majority's version of legislative history and plain language agree.
But the concurrence has a trickier problem. Which intent? The mis-
taken intent of the statute or the true intent of the legislative history?
Finally, does it make a difference if each side ends up in the same
place, or does it only confirm that plain language can (and does) sup-
port widely different opinions?
(2) Legislative history and deep structure
Of all the decisions that use legislative history, perhaps the most
challenging is Bob Jones University v. United States.6 5 As we will see
in more detail in the Deep Structure section of this paper, the Bob
Jones decision is difficult to reconcile with any of the standard inter-
pretive tools discussed in this article. 66 Neither the statutory lan-
guage, the Treasury regulations, nor the legislative history clearly
support the majority's decision. In fact, as pointed out in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, all of these sources actually favor the opposi-
163. Id.
164. Other cases in which the justices combined plain language and legislative history are:
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990); United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477
US. 105 (1986); Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); HCSC-Laundry v. United
States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978); Commissioner
v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins., 433 U.S. 148
(1977); United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Com-
missioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977).
165. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
166. See infra Part III.E.
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tion. 167 Yet the majority stretches and shapes these materials to its
purpose, thereby hiding its own activist role. Nowhere is this artifice
more clever than when the Bob Jones majority uses legislative history.
In Bob Jones the Court decided that racially discriminatory reli-
gious schools were ineligible for tax exemptions under Section
501(c)(3). This was a complex decision because, from the exemption's
creation until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service routinely favored
these schools.1" And even after it began to deny exemptions in 1970,
the Service did not change its regulations (which would have required
an extensive public comment period) 169 but, instead, announced its
denial in a revenue ruling.170 Thus, when the Burger Court was asked
to deny the exemption in 1983, it was faced with a long history against
that position. Further, the shorter history supporting denial of the ex-
emption to the taxpayer was only based on a revenue ruling, while the
longer history was based on the weightier statute and regulations. De-
spite these limitations, however, the Burger Court managed to con-
struct an elaborate legislative history against the exemption.
First, the Court asserted that: "It is a well-established canon of
statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal lan-
guage of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain
purpose of the statute.' 7 1 This the Court had to do to avoid the stat-
ute, which supported the exemption.
Next, the Court found that the exemption should be analyzed
within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the
background of congressional purposes.1 72 This approach allowed the
Court to construct a legislative history from sources beyond the stat-
ute, again because the statute's specific history supported an
exemption.
The Court found another, more forgiving, history in the law of
charitable trusts.' 73 According to the Court, one hundred years of de-
cisions supported the view that no action was charitable if it was
167. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 612-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 577.
169. See generally Asimow, supra note 96, passim (discussing the requirement and role of the
public comment period in formulating and implementing Treasury regulations).
170. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 578. Revenue Rulings are less weighty authority than regula-
tions. See generally Galler, supra note 96, passim (arguing that courts should not accord revenue
rulings extraordinary treatment).
171. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 588 n.12.
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against public policy. 174 Furthermore, since 1954, public policy had
stood against racial discrimination in schools. 175 This public policy
was reflected in the revenue ruling banning the exemption.
Moreover, since 1970,, Congress knew that the Service was deny-
ing exemptions to racially discriminatory schools. Yet, despite this
knowledge, Congress did nothing to reconfirm the exemption. This
lack of legislative action became the legislative history on which the
Court based its support for the revenue ruling.
176
The lack of legislative action as a form of legislative history did
not trouble Justice Powell, who concurred, 77 but it certainly staggered
Justice Rehnquist, who stated:
Perhaps recognizing the lack of support in the statute itself, or
in its history, for the 1970 IRS change in interpretation, the Court
finds that "[t]he actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that
the IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercising its authority,"
concluding that there is "an unusually strong case of legislative ac-
quiescence in and ratification by implication of the 1970 and 1971
rulings." The Court relies first on several bills introduced to over-
turn the IRS interpretation of § 501(c)(3). But we have said before,
and it is equally applicable here, that this type of congressional inac-
tion is of virtually no weight in determining legislative intent. These
bills and related hearings indicate little more than that a vigorous
debate has existed in Congress concerning the new IRS position.
178
b. Failure to act as legislative history
The Court again viewed Congress's failure to act as legislative
history to make its point in United States v. Foster Lumber Com-
pany.179 In Foster Lumber, discussed in more detail in the Regula-
tions section below,80 the taxpayer argued that Congress would not
create a deduction-here, a Code section 172 net operating loss-
merely to "waste" its benefits by creating rules limiting its use.18 1 The
Court responded by showing that, for the particular deduction in
question, Congress had indeed acted in 1924 to prevent "waste."
However, the Court also found that Congress then backed away from
174. Id. at 591.
175. Id. at 593-99.
176. Id. at 599.
177. Id. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
178. Id. at 620 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
179. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976).
180. See infra Part III.D.
181. Foster Lumber, 429 U.S. at 42-44.
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this position in 1939 by eliminating the-anti-waste provision. The 1924
legislation thus showed the Court that Congress knew how to prevent
waste when it wanted to. Accordingly, if after 1939 Congress failed to
cure the taxpayer's problem, then its 'failure to-do so indicated its in-
tent to allow the waste.1
8 2
c. Legislative history and regulations
With the advent of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council183 and its emphasis on deference to Treasury regula-
tions, the use of legislative history to support or reject regulations
takes on new meaning. Assuming no clear statutory language, how
influential should legislative history be when a regulation clearly cov-
ers a matter? Although more fully explored in the Regulations sec-
tion below, the Burger Court's use of legislative history and Agency
regulations deserves some discussion here.
The Burger Court used legislative history to interpret regulations
in National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States' s and United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer Company,18 5 among other cases. 186 In Na-
tional Muffler, the question was whether an association of Midas Muf-
fler franchisees was a tax-exempt business league under section
501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code. Agency regulations limited
business league exemptions to organizations " 'of the same general
class as a chamber of commerce or board of trade ... [whose] activi-
ties [are] directed to the improvement of business conditions or to the
promotion of the general objects of one or more lines of business as
distinguished from the performance of particular services for individ-
ual persons.' "1187 Courts have subsequently interpreted these regula-
tions and their predecessors as limited to either (1) an entire industry
or (2) to all the components of an industry within a geographic
area.188 Using these regulations as authority, the Internal Revenue
182. Id. at 44-46.
183. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
184. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
185. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
186. Examples of other decisions include: Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984); Jew-
ett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 309 (1982); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 21 (1978); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978).
187. National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 482 (quoting Treas. Regs. 74, Art. 528 (1929)) (emphasis
added).
188. National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 475.
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Service denied the exemption because Midas Muffler franchisees rep-
resented only a segment of an "entire industry.'
189
In upholding the denial of exemption, the Burger Court spent
considerable time on the business league exemption's legislative his-
tory.190 According to the Court, .that history showed that from 1913
until 1929 Congress and the Treasury experimented with several defi-
nitions. In response to litigation that occurred during this period, the
Treasury adopted the "line of business" rule in 1929. This rule, which
limited the exemption to groups open to entire industries, remained
unchanged for the next fifty years and, consequently, was supported
by fifty years of subsequent reenactment.' 9 ' Given this basis in legis-
lative history, the regulation was due "serious deference.'
' 92
In contrast to National Muffler, in Vogel Fertilizer the Court used
legislative history to invalidate a regulation. Vogel concerned the ex-
tent of the controlled corporations rule under section 1563(a)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Controlled corporations are separate en-
tities that are treated as one when they share a set amount of common
ownership, an undesirable treatment for the controlled corporations
in Vogel. The question the Court faced was whether the common
ownership rules were to be interpreted narrowly or broadly.
Despite acknowledging that the controlled corporations regula-
tions were technically consistent with the statute,' 93 the Court rejected
them, stating:
This Court has firmly rejected the suggestion that a regulation is to
be sustained simply because it is not "technically inconsistent" with
the statutory language, when that regulation is fundamentally at
odds with the manifest congressional design. The challenged Regu-
lation is not a reasonable statutory interpretation unless it harmo-
nizes with the statute's "origin and purpose."
The legislative history of § 1563(a)(2) resolves any ambiguity in
the statutory language and makes it plain that Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-
1(a)(3) is not a reasonable statutory interpretation. Through the
controlled-group test, Congress intended to curb the abuse of multi-
ple incorporation-large organizations subdividing into smaller cor-
porations and receiving unintended tax benefits from the multiple
use of surtax exemptions, accumulated earnings credits, and various
189. Id. at 474-75.
190. Id. at 478-84.
191. For a greater discussion of the reenactment doctrine, see infra Part I11.D.
192. National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 484.
193. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982).
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other tax provisions designed to aid small businesses. . . . The in-
tended targets of § 1563(a)(2) were groups of interrelated corpora-
tions-corporations characterized by common control and
ownership. 194
As we will see in more detail in our discussion of Regulations,
below, National Muffler and Vogel Fertilizer are out of line with Chev-
ron to the extent that Chevron calls for greater deference to Agency
regulations. Instead, National Muffler and Vogel are each based on
deference to Congress, whether through plain language or legislative
history.
What becomes clear below, however, is that this deference is
more apparent than real. When confronted with regulations, the Bur-
ger Court was much more likely to uphold the Treasury than these
two cases demonstrate. Yet the Burger Court claimed to bow to legis-
lative supremacy, a point expanded upon below. Whether or not it
actually followed Congress in its federal tax decisions, the Burger
Court made sure to bow in its rhetoric to legislative supremacy.
Perhaps this is a fourth reason why legislative history was so pop-
ular with the Burger Court. As we saw in St. Martin, legislative his-
tory is as flexible as plain language and can support any position. It is
particularly well suited for legislative supremacy stances, however, be-
cause it creates the impression of deference.
d. Legislative history as a guide to unclear language
Despite objections from opponents of legislative history, 9 5 the
Burger Court most frequently used legislative history to clarify statu-
tory language. 196 Examples cover every tax topic and almost every
conceivable question; and furthermore, legislative history was used
194. Id. at 26-27 (citations omitted).
195. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, Judicial Decisionmaking The Role of Text, Precedent and Rule
of Law, 17 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 57 (1994).
196. Burger Court decisions that used legislative history to explain unclear language include:
United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986) (majority and dissent); Com-
missioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984) (majority and dissent); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 330 (1983) (majority); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982) (majority and dis-
sent); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978) (majority); Central Ill. Pub. Serv. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978) (dissent); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978) (major-
ity); Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977) (majority); Commissioner v. Standard Life &
Accident Ins., 433 U.S. 148 (1977) (majority); United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725
(1977) (dissent); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976) (dissent); Central Tablet
Mfg. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974) (majority); Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500
(1974) (majority); United States v. Mississippi Chem., 405 U.S. 298 (1972) (majority); United
States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972) (concurrence); Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971) (majority).
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this way extensively by majorities,, dissenters, and concurrers, both to
support the taxpayer and the government.' 97 Commissioner v. En-
gle'98 displays many sides of legislative history as a guide to unclear
language.
Engle concerned percentage depletion allowances for domestic
oil and gas wells. Under the percentage depletion allowance system,
qualifying taxpayers deduct a statutorily determined amount from
their taxable income. In Engle that amount was determined in part by
"average daily production of domestic crude oil." The deduction was
questioned in Engle because the taxpayers' income was not tied to oil
or gas production and, thus, was paid whether or not there was any
"average daily production."' 99
In Engle the majority found that the statute could be read in at
least three ways: (1) as denying any deduction not specifically tied to
production;20 0 (2) as allowing a deduction regardless of whether physi-
cal extraction occurred during the year for which the deduction was
claimed;2"' or (3) as deferring deductions earned in non-production
years to future years when production occurred.20 2 Given that "[e]ach
of these possible interpretations of new § 613A can be reconciled with
the language of the statute itself," 20 3 the Court reflected that "[olur
duty... is 'to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to
be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious
with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress mani-
fested.' ,,204 In searching out this congressional purpose, "[t]he cir-
cumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may be
particularly relevant '20 5 because:
[t]he true meaning of a single section of a statute in a setting as
complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its language,
197. See cases cited supra note 196.
198. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984).
199. Id at 212. In one case, the taxpayers assigned their rights while retaining overriding
royalties. In 1975, they received $7600 on these royalties even though nothing was produced. Id.
In the second case, the wells produced, but the lessors' contract gave the taxpayers payments
whether the wells produced or not. Id. at 213.
200. Id. at 215.
201. Id. at 216.
202. Id. at 216-17.
203. Id. at 217 ("Congress' repeated references to 'production' during the 'taxable year'
could not have been completely inadvertent, but each of the possible interpretations gives mean-
ing to those references.").
204. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282,297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
205. Id.
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cannot be ascertained if it be considered apart from related sections,
or if the mind be isolated from the history of the income tax legisla-
tion of which it is an integral part.
20 6
In its version of that legislative history, the majority found that
"[t]he reasonableness of each possible interpretation of the statute can
also be measured against the legislative process by which § 613A was
enacted."2 7 This process showed that section 613A was adopted in
response "to the public outcry concerning the country's growing de-
pendence on foreign energy and to the alleged excessive profits that
major integrated oil companies were earning. '20 8 Given that "Con-
gress was concerned with shrinking domestic production levels and
with assisting smaller producers to compete with the larger ones,' 20 9 it
could not have meant to "withdraw the percentage depletion allow-
ance on lease bonus or advance' royalty income arising from oil and
gas properties."21 0 Accordingly, the deduction was allowed.
Again, despite the majority's forceful tale, there was another
equally plausible reading presented by the dissent. First, once it was
clear that the statute could sustain multiple meanings, Justice Black-
mun argued for bypassing legislative history altogether in favor of a
regulation.211 According to Justice Blackmun this deference was justi-
fied because "the Commissioner is better able than any court, includ-
ing this one, to assess the practical consequences of particular
interpretations and to resolve statutory ambiguities in ways that mini-
mize administrative difficulties. 2 12 But, if the majority was going to
defer to Congress instead of the Agency, then Justice Blackmun
would show that its version of legislative history was incorrect.
Given the poverty of § 613A's legislative history as a source for the
Court's conclusion that the Commissioner's interpretation is unrea-
sonable, the Court ultimately must rest its analysis on its characteri-
zation of the underlying purpose of Congress. Reasoning
principally from the fact that the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 was
enacted during a period of national concern over energy shortages,
the Court assumes that Congress' fundamental purpose was to "in-
206. Id. at 223 (quoting Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934)) (alteration in
original).
207. Id. at 220.
208. Id. at 217.
209. Id. at 224.
210. Id. at 223-24.
211. Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212. Id.
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crease production by the independent producers and royalty
owners." ...
With due respect, this analysis simply ignores the terms and
structure of the statute that it purports to construe. Section 613A(c)
cannot have been meant to increase production by independent
producers over pre-existing levels; it did not create a new tax sub-
sidy but merely preserved an old one.213
3. Conclusions
In this paper we examine various themes that traverse the Burger
Court's federal tax opinions. One theme is rhetoric. What we learn is
that the Burger Court justices were fond of the rhetoric of legislative
supremacy, a theme that echoes in every area studied. In Plain Lan-
guage the Court painted itself as the passive discoverer of congres-
sional intent.2t4 As we will see in Regulations, the Burger Court used
legislative supremacy as justification for deferring to the Internal Rev-
enue Service. Even when the Court was acting on its own, as in Deep
Structure,215 it used the lack of congressional action (as in Bob Jones)
as a way to defer to Congress.216 There is no doubt that congressional
supremacy was an important aspect of many Burger Court tax
opinions.
There is also no doubt that legislative history was quite popular
with the justices. Twenty-five cases had opinions that relied on legisla-
tive history to some extent,217 sometimes with different versions of a
history used by a majority, concurrence, and dissent, each seeking to
support its interpretation as mere congressional will.
That many versions of the same legislative history are used for
different causes demonstrates that legislative history is as (or more)
malleable than plain language. Further, if legislative history exists at
all, it is probably far more abundant than the applicable statutory lan-
guage, offering more to choose from in crafting an argument. Conse-
quently, an opinion that uses legislative history gets both the
maximum flexibility that comes from a malleable medium that can be
shaped to fit many arguments and the rhetorical safety that comes
213. Id. at 233-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214. See supra Part 11.B.
215. See infra Part III.E.
216. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.b.; supra notes 165-82 and accompanying text.
217. See cases cited supra note 146.
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with deference to Congress. It is no wonder that legislative history is
an aspect of so many arguments.
Whether rhetorical deference is matched by actual deference,
however, is another matter. In this regard, legislative history is so
widespread that it loses a specific focus. It does not so much show
deference to a particular institution as it shows deference for defer-
ence's sake-to any relevant institution, depending on the circum-
stances. In some areas, such as regulations, it appears that the Court
actually deferred to the Agency, even as it claimed to be deferring to
Congress. In Deep Structure, the Court is essentially followed its own
interpretation of Code language and structure. In Plain Language and
Legislative History we see that deference can be (and often is) used to
support arguments on either side. Thus, we cannot say that the high
use of plain language and legislative history necessarily means a high
deference to Congress as well.
D. Deference to Treasury Regulations
1. Introduction
The federal tax system is subject to tremendous executive control,
much of it exercised through Agency regulations.218  Recently, de-
bates over how courts should treat regulations have centered on Chev-
ron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.219 Because the
Burger Court promulgated Chevron, and because of the vast number
of tax regulations, we expected Chevron's mark on many Burger
Court decisions. Remarkably, we found instead that the Burger Court
used a myriad of approaches to Treasury regulations, none of which fit
the Chevron model.
In this section we examine the Burger Court's deference to Treas-
ury regulations. First, we focus on Chevron in general. Next, we ex-
amine Chevron's use in tax cases. Because we found that courts have
218. As a practical matter the vast majority of tax returns are handled exclusively by the
Internal Revenue Service, which applies its own regulations and rules.
The Department of Treasury issues regulations through the Internal Revenue Service under
the authority granted it by I.R.C. § 7805 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Internal Revenue Service
issues hundreds of pages of regulations each year.
219. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
In Chevron, the Burger Court established a two-prong approach for testing the validity of
agency regulations, a mode of inquiry that was "understood to mark a significant transformation
in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of deference." Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 971 (1992).
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not relied on Chevron, we then review the Burger Court's rationales
for deciding federal tax cases involving regulations.
2. Deference to regulations--,in general
a. Introduction-importance of Chevron
Courts use a variety of approaches to agency regulations. As Pro-
fessor Merrill states:
The attitude of courts toward administrative interpretations of
statutes has ranged between two extremes. At one pole, courts ig-
nore the administrative view. When operating in this "independent
judgment" mode, a court employs traditional tools of statutory in-
terpretation-analysis of text, legislative history, and various ca-
nons of construction-to arrive at what it regards as the best
interpretation of the statute, just as it would in a case where the
executive branch has not spoken previously. At the other pole,
courts frame the inquiry in terms of whether the administrative in-
terpretation is one that a reasonable interpreter might embrace. In
this "deference" mode, a court implicitly acknowledges that the
statute is susceptible to multiple readings. The task of the court is
viewed not as discovering the best interpretation, but rather as as-
suring that the executive view does not contradict the statute and
otherwise furthers legitimate objectives.
220
Before Chevron was decided, Merrill continues,
the Supreme Court had no unifying theory for determining when to
defer to agency interpretations of statutes. The approach was in-
stead pragmatic and contextual. One feature of the Court's practice
was that deference could range over a spectrum from "great" to
"some" to "little" (although no attempt was ever made to calibrate
different degrees of deference with any precision). A particularly
common approach was to cite the views of those charged with ad-
ministration of the statute as one of several reasons for adopting a
particular construction.22'
220. Merrill, supra note 219, at 971 (footnote omitted).
221. Id. at 972 (footnotes omitted). Merrill perceived judicial deference to be greatest
before Chevron in three situations. First, a court might address "Congress' interpretative in-
tent." Id. at 973. A legislative, as opposed to an interpretative regulation, see infra notes 243-
252 and accompanying text, reflects such intent. Thus, for example, a court would be more likely
to defer to a regulation if it were legislative than if it were interpretative. Second, a court might
defer to a regulation by emphasizing the agency's possession of specific attributes, such as exper-
tise, or by voicing a determination to apply a standard consistently. Merrill, supra note 219, at
973. Finally, a court might be swayed to sustain a regulation by an agency's reasoned considera-
tion in promulgating the regulation. Id. at 974. For another article about Chevron that under-
scores Chevron's historical antecedents, see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
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Chevron involved an Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
regulation of an air pollution statute. The statute granted permits to
operate "stationary sources" of air pollution,222 a term of art defined
by EPA regulations. 223 These'regulations allowed businesses to aggre-
gate several pieces of equipment at one industrial site-in technical
terms, to treat the equipment as being in one "bubble" -instead of
separately testing each piece. Thus, a plant owner could modify a sin-
gle piece of equipment without meeting permit requirements for that
piece if his alterations did not increase the total pollution generated
by all the equipment within the bubble.22 4 Although the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals set aside these EPA regula-
tions, 22 5 on review, the Burger Court declared that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, al-
ways, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, how-
ever, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.
226
Thus, the Court established a two-prong test. Under the first
prong, the question is whether Congress has "directly addressed the
precise question at issue." If the answer to this question is no, then a
court must ask whether the regulation "is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute." If so, the regulation controls. Given that it is
almost impossible for Congress precisely to address all possible appli-
cations of any statute, in most situations, Chevron shifts deference
from Congress to the agency.
Both our research and other commentators indicate that legislative regulations are given
great weight in the tax area. See infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
222. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 841-42.
226. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
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b. The overall impact of Chevron
Chevron is controversial for several reasons. First, its all-or-noth-
ing approach allows courts to ignore regulations if Congress had ad-
dressed the precise matter but requires that courts defer to regulations
if Congress is not clear. Again, given that, at least for some judges,
the plain language of statutes is always unclear,227 Chevron shifts from
deference to Congress to deference to the Agency. Second, Chevron
reverses the interpretation default mode of lesser to greater defer-
ence. Under Chevron, courts must justify their independent judgment
if they disregard a regulation but need offer no justification to apply a
regulation. Finally, Chevron minimizes the importance of other tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction, such as legislative history.228
c. Courts' reliance upon Chevron in federal tax cases
Although Chevron did not involve Treasury regulations specifi-
cally, Chevron offers guidance about regulations generally; and tax
cases often involve regulations. Federal tax is an area where the "reg-
ulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency consider[s] the
matter [under regulation] in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the
decision [affecting the regulation inevitably] involves reconciling con-
flicting policies. ' '229 Despite what we might expect, however, neither
227. See supra Part III.B.
228. Commentators have had diverse reactions to Chevron. Some commentators have
viewed Chevron as an assault on Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cianch) 137 (1803), which
established the principle of judicial review over executive and legislative actions. See, e.g.,
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1983) (pre-Chevron article arguing that Marbury's standard of judicial review
of constitutional law cannot be extended as easily onto administrative agencies). Others have
argued that deference is due to administrative agencies' regulations and that Chevron reasonably
restores such respect. See, e.g., Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law &
Policy, 58 GEo. WASi-. L. REV. 821 (1990). Yet others question Chevron's importance and
would derive new rules from Chevron that neither restore the right of judicial review nor require
a court to slavishly defer to an agency's pronouncements. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 219, at
975-1025 (asserting that Chevron's importance is overrated and, in any case, unworkable, be-
cause the Court did not uniformly apply Chevron after deciding it); Sunstein, supra note 221
(discussing Chevron generally and calling for further examination); Breyer, supra note 96 (argu-
ing for giving greater judicial deference to administrative agencies in areas of their expertise).
For other discussions about Chevron, see Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer
to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1275 (suggesting that Chevron should not be
interpreted to require mechanical application of regulations); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 984 (reviewing the effect of Chevron on subsequent decisions and concluding, among other
things, that judicial deference to agencies has increased).
229. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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the Burger Court specifically, nor courts in general, have applied
Chevron to tax cases.
230
(1) The Burger Court
In the federal tax area, the Supreme Court has paid some, albeit
scant, heed to Chevron. Three of the forty-six decisions included in
our study were decided after Chevron,231 and one of these cases in-
volved regulations; but the Court did not mention Chevron in that
decision.232 Perhaps the Burger Court did not rely on Chevron be-
cause the case was decided late in the Burger era. Yet, as we point out
below, the Burger Court's tax decisions do not even foreshadow Chev-
ron. Further, although the Rehnquist Court inherited Chevron and
thus had more time to apply it, the Rehnquist Court's tax decisions
are, in general, Chevron-free as well.
(2) The Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court relied on Chevron in Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corp. v. LTV Corp.233 In LTV the Court upheld the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation's actions after examining the legislative
history of the pertinent law and finding no contrary legislative intent.
However, the Court was sustaining the Agency's actions, not its regu-
lations. 234 Beyond this decision, the Rehnquist Court applied Chev-
ron to federal tax cases in only a cursory fashion.
235
230. Evidence about whether Chevron has been followed outside the tax area is conflicting.
Compare Merrill, supra note 219, passim (Chevron not applied) with Schuck & Elliott, supra
note 228, passim (Chevron applied). It is therefore difficult to judge whether the Burger Court
swam with, or against, the tide in the federal tax area.
231. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986); United States v.
American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986); Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131
(1985).
232. See United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
The Burger Court did note Chevron in a federal procedural tax case, United States v. Boyle,
469 U.S. 241 (1985), but in rather cursory fashion in a footnote. Id. at 246 n.4 (recognizing that a
long-standing regulation consistent with a statute is to be given deference).
233. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
234. Id. at 647-52.
235. Two examples of the cursory fashion in which the Rehnquist Court has cited Chevron in
federal tax cases are: Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 576 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (pointing out majority's failure to defer to long-standing regulation and
citing Chevron, as well as several other cases, for support); and United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.
229, 242 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Internal Revenue Service's regulation is not
a reasonable interpretation of statute, citing Chevron).
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(3) Lower federal courts
Other federal courts also have a spotty history with Chevron.
Some courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, have followed Chevron in fed-
eral tax cases.2 3e Others, like the Ninth Circuit and the Tax Court,
have resisted Chevron, even when addressing the same issues con-
fronted by the Sixth Circuit. 37
d. What standards did the Burger Court apply when deciding
whether to rely on regulations in federal tax cases?
The Burger Court did not use the Chevron model to judge Treas-
ury regulations either in its deference to those regulations or by using
Chevron's specific two-prong approach. What standards, then, did the
Burger Court use to decide how to apply regulations in federal tax
cases?
The Burger Court analyzed regulations in eighteen of the cases in
our forty-six case data base.
2 38
236. A review of significant tax cases citing to Chevron suggests that the Sixth Circuit was
the most rigorous in applying the case. In Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 948
F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991), the taxpayer opposed the Service's promulgation of a regulation that
replaced contradictory, older regulations. After a thorough review, the court concluded that
Congress had not addressed the precise issue in question, so that the regulation, which was both
a "reasonable and permissible" interpretation, should be sustained. Id. at 304.
The court also relied heavily on Chevron to sustain the Service's position in a revenue ruling
in Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1993) (Federal Insurance
Contribution Act taxes at issue).
237. In contrast to the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply Chevron when it
confronted the Peoples Federal issue. See Pacific First Fed. Say. Bank v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d
800 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Tax Court also faced the Peoples Federal issue after having been scolded by the Sixth
Circuit for failing to follow Chevron when the Tax Court decided Peoples Federal. Georgia Fed.
Bank v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 105 (1992) (applying Chevron but finding an inadequate congres-
sional statement and thus concluding that the regulation was unreasonable and, therefore, inva-
lid); see also Nalle v. Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Chevron. as
confirmation that less deference is owed to interpretive regulations by an agency other than the
agency charged with enforcement of the statute at issue); Gary v. United States, 708 F. Supp.
1188, 1191 (D. Colo. 1989) (recognizing Chevron for the premise that courts should examine
congressional intent and legislative history, but holding that the language of statute, if "clear in
context" is controlling absent contrary legislative history).
238. The 18 cases are: United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986);
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982); United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S.
156 (1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); Thor Power
Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978); Cen-
tral Ill. Pub. Serv. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978); Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77
(1977); United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Com-
missioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976); Commis-
sioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973);
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Number of Cases Analyzing Regulations
] Regulation at Issue
S Regulation not el Isue-1
Thus, regulations were a common, though not overwhelming, aspect
of the Burger Court's federal tax decisions. In these eighteen cases,
the reviewed regulation was almost always sustained and almost al-
ways used to decide in the government's favor. The four decisions
overturning regulations were also the four cases decided in the tax-
payer's favor.
We found four agency regulation review patterns in the Burger
Court's opinions, none of which foreshadowed Chevron:239 (1) the
Court examined "legislative regulations,, 240 upholding the few legis-
lative regulations it considered, usually in the government's favor; (2)
the Court relied on the "reenactment" doctrine, 241 again upholding
the regulations, and again usually deciding in the government's favor;
(3) the Court applied regulations without justifying its deference to
the regulations, and the government usually won in these cases as
well; (4) the Court searched for and implemented a congressional
mandate when applying regulations.242 It was primarily in this last
category that the Court decided in the taxpayer's behalf.
Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972); United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93
(1972); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
239. For these patterns' reflections of courts' general approach to regulations before Chev-
ron, see supra note 221.
240. See infra text accompanying notes 243-52 (detailing situations where regulations were
issued pursuant to Congress's express delegation of power to the Internal Revenue Service to
issue regulations).
241. Under Reenactment doctrine, where a regulation is in existence at the time Congress
reenacts the pertinent law, it follows that Congress knows of the regulation's existence and ap-
proves of it when reenacting the law.
242. This approach resembles Chevron, in part because of its explicit search for a congres-
sional intent. Ultimately, however, it must be distinguished from Chevron because of the rea-
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(1) Legislative regulations
The Burger Court heard three cases involving legislative regula-
tions243 and sustained the regulations in each. Two of the decisions
favored the government. In Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co.,244
the government contested depletion deductions under Section 611(a).
Section 611 states that the "reasonable" depletion "allowance [is] in
all cases to be made under regulations prescribed by the
[Commissioner]."2I"
After examining the section 611 regulations, the Court ques-
tioned whether it was compelled to follow them and concluded that:
These regulations command our respect, for Congress has dele-
gated to the Secretary of the Treasury, not to this Court, the task "of
administering the tax laws of the Nation." We therefore must defer
to Treasury Regulations that "implement the congressional mandate
in some reasonable manner." To put the same principle conversely,
Treasury Regulations "must be sustained unless unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes." Indeed, our custom-
ary deference to Treasury Regulations is particularly appropriate in
this case, for the Court previously has recognized the necessity of a
"broad rule-making delegation" of authority in the area of
depletion.
246
Deference to this regulation was the predominant factor in the
Court's decision.
A legislative rule was also at stake in Thor Power Tool Co. v.
Commissioner.24 7 One of the issues in Thor Power was accounting for
inventory, a topic governed by sections 446 and 471 of the Internal
sons which signalled Chevron's departure from prior law: Chevron's all-or-nothing approach, its
reversion of the default mode for examining regulations, and its rejection of other methods of
statutory construction.
243. Courts and commentators often distinguish between "legislative" and "interpretive"
regulations. A legislative regulation is promulgated pursuant to direct congressional delegation.
See Asimow, supra note 96, at 350 ("Legislative rules complete an incomplete statute and affect
rights or obligations."). In contrast, interpretive regulations are issued under the Agency's gen-
eral rule-making authority. Perhaps the most important distinction between the two types of
regulations is that, traditionally, legislative regulations receive more judicial deference. See id. at
350-57.
I.R.C. § 7805(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations. Professor
Asimow argues that tax regulations promulgated pursuant to this provision are generally treated
as interpretive regulations, while regulations promulgated pursuant to a more specific statutory
authorization are treated as legislative regulations. Asmiow, supra note 96, at 357-61.
244. Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981).
245. I.R.C. § 61l(a) (1988).
246. Portland Cement, 450 U.S. at 169 (citations omitted).
247. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
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Revenue Code. Section 446(a) requires taxpayers to compute their
taxable income in accordance with their regular accounting methods.
Section 446(b), however, cautions that if the taxpayer's method "does
not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be
made under such method as, in the opinion of the [Commissioner],
does clearly reflect income."248 Section 471 specifically addresses in-
ventories and again defers to the opinion of the Secretary of the
Treasury. 49
As in Portland Cement, deference to the legislative regulation was
central to the Court's opinion in Thor Power, and again the govern-
ment won. In Thor Power, however, the Court also focused on the
taxpayer's failure to prove facts needed to prevail under the
regulations.
Only in Commissioner v. First Security Bank25 0 did the Court sup-
port the taxpayer. In that action, the Commissioner tried to reallocate
income between two related corporations under a regulation which
stated:
"The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are
assumed to have complete power to cause each controlled taxpayer
so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records
truly reflect the taxable income from the property and business of
each of the controlled taxpayers.,
251
The Court upheld the regulation but used the case's facts to apply the
regulation against the government, stating:
This regulation is consistent with the control concept hereto-
fore approved by this Court, although in a different context. The
regulation, as applied to the facts in this case, contemplates that
Holding Company-the controlling interest-must have "complete
power" to shift income among its subsidiaries. It is only where this
power exists, and has been exercised in such a way that the "true
taxable income" of a subsidiary has been understated, that the
Commissioner is authorized to reallocate under § 482. But Holding
248. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1988). Although this authorization does not rise to the level of author-
ity to promulgate regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of the statute, it nevertheless
shows reliance on the Commissioner to exercise discretion and vests in him a rule-making power
that more nearly resembles a legislative rule than an interpretive rule. See Asimow, supra note
96.
249. Section 471(a) states: "Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary the use of inventories
is necessary ... , inventories shall be taken by such taxpayer on such basis as the Secretary may
prescribe .. " I.R.C § 471(a) (1988).
250. Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972) (reallocation of income under
§ 482).
251. Id. at 404 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1971)).
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 915 1995-1996
Howard Law Journal
Company had no such power unless it acted in violation of federal
banking laws. The "complete power" referred to in the regulations
hardly includes the power to force a subsidiary to violate the law.
252
(2) Reenactment doctrine
The Burger Court occasionally relied on the reenactment doc-
trine, which asserts that regulations have legislative approval if Con-
gress reenacts the underlying Internal Revenue Code section while
knowing how that section has been regulated. As with legislative reg-
ulations, the reenactment doctrine is based on deference to Congress
rather than to the Executive. Reenactment doctrine is contrary to
Chevron, where deference to the Executive controls unless Congress
has made a clear and precise statement.253 The reenactment doctrine
focuses on, and defers to, the subtler congressional message of letting
sleeping dogs lie.254
The Burger Court's clearest articulation of the reenactment doc-
trine appears in National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States.
2 55
There, a group of franchisees sought an exemption as a "business
league" under section 501(c)(6). Section 501(c)(6)'s oldest predeces-
sor was enacted in 1913, while the regulation's closest predecessor was
originally promulgated in 1929.56 According to the Burger Court, the
regulation had "stood almost without change for half a century
through several re-enactments and one amendment of the statute. 2 57
Thus, the Court concluded:
while the Commissioner's reading of § 501(c)(6) perhaps is not the
only possible one, it does bear a fair relationship to the language of
the statute, it reflects the views of those who sought its enactment,
and it matches the purpose they articulated. It evolved as the Com-
missioner administered the statute and attempted to give to a new
phrase a content that would reflect congressional design. The regu-
lation has stood for 50 years, and the Commissioner infrequently
252. Id. at 404-05.
253. See supra text accompanying and following note 226.
254. In pragmatic terms, there is often little difference between deferring to Congress's def-
erence to the Executive's regulation, manifested in Congress's silence, and deferring to the Exec-
utive itself Yet there is great methodological difference between deferring to the Executive via
Congress's silence and deferring to the Executive via Chevron's rule, which calls for Executive
deference regardless of Congress's implied approval or disapproval.
255. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
256. See id. at 477-78 (history of the statute); id. at 482 (history of the regulation).
257. Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
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but consistently has interpreted it to exclude an organization like
the Association that is not industrywide. 5
The Court also took the statute's legislative history into account in its
decision to sustain the regulation and to decide in the governihent's
favor.25 9
The Court paid similar respect to an aged regulation in Don E.
Williams Co. v. Commissioner.260 There the taxpayer's ability to de-
duct a contribution to a pension plan was at issue. The predecessor
statute was enacted in 1939, and the predecessor regulation was
promulgated in 1942. "With the statute re-enacted in the 1954 Code,
this administrative construction may be said to have received congres-
sional approval."'261 Other factors that entered into the Court's deci-
sion in favor of the Commissioner were the statute's plain meaning
and its legislative history.262
(3) Regulations accepted without justification
The Court sustained Treasury regulations in five decisions with-
out justifying its deference to the Agency's rule. In four decisions, the
regulation was peripheral to the Court's reasoning; in one case the
regulation was central to the Court's decision.
(a) The regulation is peripheral to the Court's reasoning
For example, in Woodward v. Commissioner,2 63 the Court held
that the taxpayers' stock appraisal costs were nondeductible capital
expenditures. The Court cited the section 263 regulations to illustrate
the capital expenditure concept, but the regulations were not central
to the Court's opinion."6
In Commissioner v. Kowalski,26 the taxpayer argued that a meal
allowance he received from his employer was excluded from his taxa-
ble income. In deciding in the Commissioner's favor, the Court recog-
nized regulations promulgated under prior law, which created an
258. Id. at 484.
259. Id. at 477-84.
260. Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977).
261. Id. at 576-77. TWo other reenactment decisions were United States v. American College
of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986) (19-year-old regulation), and Jewett v. Commissioner, 455
U.S. 305 (1982) (24-year-old regulation). The government won both of these cases.
262. Don E. Williams, 429 U.S. at 574-75 (plain meaning); id. at 575-77 (legislative history).
263. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
264. Id. at 576.
265. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
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exclusion for items paid "for the convenience of the employer. '266
The Court continued, however, to hold that current law had negated
the convenience-of-the-employer doctrine.267
In United States v. Foster Lumber Co.,268 the Court confronted
the intersection of capital gains and a Section 172 net operating loss
carryback. 269 Because capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than or-
dinary income, Foster Lumber argued that its section 172 carrybacks
were "absorbed" by its ordinary income, but not by its capital gain.270
In its decision the Court noted that the taxpayer's view of the statute
did not conform to the regulations.
271
In Commissioner v. Tufts271 the Court cited Treasury regulations
to support its view that the subchapter K partnership tax rules do not
prevent a partner-level tax on partnership gain. 73 Although this con-
cept was central to the Court's decision, the regulation was not.
(b) The regulation is central to the Court's reasoning-Consumer
Life
In United States v. Consumer Life Insurance Co.,274 the Court
considered how to allocate insurance company reserves to determine
whether the corporation was a "life insurance" company. The Court
deferred to a Treasury regulation, which made "state practice
determinative."275
(c) Summary
The taxpayer won only one of these five cases, Consumer Life,
which is also the only decision where the regulation took center
stage. 276 Thus, when the Burger Court accepted a regulation without
266. Id. at 87.
267. Id. at 90-96.
268. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976).
269. Generally, I.R.C. § 172 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) allows a deduction for net operating
losses-the excess of its business deductions over its business income in a particular year-
against taxable income in another year. After the loss is carried back to reduce taxable income
in that earliest possible year, it is carried over to the next later year, and the next. The amount
carried over is the original § 172 deduction, less whatever taxable income existed in the earliest
year of the carryback.
270. The significance of this argument is that it provides maximum tax savings by matching
the income-reducing § 172 deductions to the high-taxed ordinary income.
271. Foster Lumber, 429 U.S. at 41 n.8 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.172-4 (1976)).
272. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
273. Id. at 315-17.
274. United States v. Consumer Life Ins. Co., 430 U.S. 725 (1977).
275. Id. at 752 n.37 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.801-5(b) (1960)).
276. See id.
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justifying its deference to that regulation, the regulation was usually
peripheral to the Court's decision, and the government was likely to
win-albeit on other grounds.
e. Deference to congressional mandate
While Chevron has not made its way into federal tax cases, defer-
ence to congressional intent was important to the Burger Court. The
Court often asked whether a regulation implemented a perceived con-
gressional purpose and rejected those that failed its test. However, in
the five cases where the Court looked for congressional guidance, it
applied the regulation only twice.27 7 Unlike the cases in the prior
three categories, the deference-to-Congress cases favored taxpayers
who won three of the five cases in this subset.
(1) Regulations deferred to
Fulman v. United States278 concerned the dividends-paid deduc-
tion, which could reduce a personal holding company tax. The ques-
tion was whether the deduction was measured by the distributed
property's fair market value or by the corporation's "adjusted basis"
in the property. The question was important, because if the adjusted
basis-ordinarily, what property costs a taxpayer 279 -was less than
the property's fair market value, and that adjusted basis was used in
the computation, the dividends-paid deduction would be less as well.
The Court quickly noted Congress's failure to provide a rule for
valuing distributed property in calculating the dividends-paid deduc-
tion.210 However, the Court used legislative history to establish that
the regulation's use of adjusted basis controlled."8
In Commissioner v. Idaho Power Company,2 82 the capital expen-
diture issue was raised again, as it had been in Woodward,28 3 and
again the Court examined the section 263 regulations:
The purpose of § 263 is to reflect the basic principle that a capi-
tal expenditure may not be deducted from current income. It serves
to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly
277. See Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978); Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.,
418 U.S. 1 (1974).
278. Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978).
279. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)
280. Fulman, 434 U.S. at 533.
281. Id. at 537-38.
282. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
283. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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attributable, through amortization, to later tax years when the capi-
tal asset becomes income producing. The regulations state that the
capital expenditures to which § 263(a) extends include the "cost of
acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings." This manifests
an administrative understanding that for purposes of § 263(a)(1),
"amount paid out" equates with "cost incurred." The Internal Rev-
enue Service for some time has taken the position that construction-
related depreciation is to be capitalized.2 4
Thus, where there was a broad congressional mandate and a silent
statute, the Burger Court relied on congressional purpose to justify
the more specific regulation.
(2) Regulations overturned
The regulations involved in the other three cases in this area were
not sustained by the Court. In all three, the Court found that the reg-
ulation undercut congressional intent.
In the first of these three cases, United States v. Vogel Fertilizer
Company,285 the Court examined the term "controlled group of cor-
porations" under section 1563(a)(2). In general, section 1563(a)(2)
imposes the "controlled group of corporations" label where the same
individuals own both large portions of a controlled group of corpora-
tions' voting shares and a majority of the group's stock. In Vogel Ferti-
lizer, the question was whether a "controlled group of corporations"
existed where one person owned most of the voting stock and another
owned much of the remaining stock. Treasury Regulation § 1.1563-
1(a)(3) required that the interests be considered in combination; thus
in the Vogel Fertilizer situation, the controlled group label would stick.
The Court, however, focused on the statute's legislative history,2 86 and
held that the same individuals were required to own both types of
stock before the government could find a controlled group.
In Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States,2 7 the Court
considered whether reimbursed expenses were subject to withholding
tax as on wages. Because the reimbursed amounts were income to the
recipients, the government argued, they were "wages." Again the
Court used legislative history to invalidate a regulation that treated
expense reimbursements as income.28 8 As a result, the employer was
[VOL. 39:841
284. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16 (citation omitted).
285. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
286. Id. at 27.
287. Central I11. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
288. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(2) (1977).
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not subject to withholding, even though the employee was taxed on
the income.
The final case, United States v. Cartwright,289 involved valuation
of mutual fund shares for estate tax purposes. Treasury Regulation
§ 20.2031-8(b) fixed value at the shares' "asked" price, which included
a sales charge. Ignoring the regulation, the taxpayer used the lower
"redemption price" to fix value.290  The Court found the regulation
inconsistent with the statute creating mutual funds and refused to fol-
291low the Agency.
f. Dissents
When Burger Court tax opinions involved regulations, the deci-
sions did not generate an extraordinary number of dissents. Dissents
were filed in twelve of the eighteen decisions in which the Court dis-
cussed regulations (sixty-seven percent). 292 Neither did the decisions
generate a large number of dissents when tax opinions did not involve
regulations, however. Dissents were filed in nineteen of the twenty-
eight cases in which regulations were not involved (sixty-eight per-
cent) .293 The difference between these two figures is statistically insig-
nificant. In contrast, the justices dissented in eighty-three percent of
the cases where the Court justified its ruling on the plain meaning
doctrine as opposed to only sixty-two percent of non-plain meaning
cases.294 As a result, dissenting opinions in plain meaning cases be-
289. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
290. Id. at 548-49.
291. Id. at 557.
292. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305
(1982); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978); Commis-
sioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977); United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977);
Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); United States v. Foster Lumber Co.,
429 U.S. 32 (1976); Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974); United States v. Cart-
wright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
293. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986); Paulsen v. Commis-
sioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985); Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); Commissioner v.
Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Hillsboro
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983); Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191
(1982); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1
(1981); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,
435 U.S. 561 (1978); Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617 (1975); Central Tablet Mfg. v.
United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974); United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 412
U.S. 401 (1973); United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S.
125 (1972); Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971); Nash v. United
States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
294. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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came our standard for measuring dissents in regulation cases. If dis-
senting opinions reveal the controversial nature of "plain meaning,"
then in the federal tax regulations area, the Burger Court justices
agreed-or disagreed-no more nor no less than in any other sub-
stantive federal tax area.
We therefore conclude that decisions based on regulations were
likely to trigger less strife than decisions based on plain language. Of
the various ways that regulations were handled-legislative, reenact-
ment, illustrative and deference to congressional purpose-the only
variance in dissents appeared in the three legislative regulation cases;
and only one of those three cases generated a dissent2 95 In all other
areas, a comparable number of dissenting opinions was filed.
g. Conclusion
(1) Summary of findings
When the Burger Court used regulations in its decision-making
process, the Court was likely to:
0 Agree as much as usual.
295. There were no dissents in Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981),
or Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979). There was a dissent in Commis-
sioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
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And the majority opinions prompted no great increase in dissents as
we saw in the Plain Language subset. This tendency to agree indicates
that the justices are more comfortable with basing decisions on regula-
tions than on plain language and more often agree about what a regu-
lation means than they do about what a statute means.
0 Use regulations in one of three ways: (a) to justify the outcome,
(b) to illustrate some feature of its reasoning, or (c) to test
against a broader congressional purpose.
These three applications reflect institutional choice. When regulations
are used to justify outcomes, the Court is deferring to the Agency.
When a regulation is used to illustrate some feature of the Court's
reasoning, the Court is imposing its own reading on the statute and
using various sources (regulations, of course, as well as legislative his-
tory and other sources) to justify its opinion. When the regulation is
tested against a broader congressional purpose, the Court uses the
regulation to justify the Court's view of Congress's will-whether or
not the regulation effectuates that view-even when there is no pre-
cise statutory language.
o Employ language indicating a deference to Congress rather than
a deference to the Agency.
Even when the Court explicitly found that the regulation was control-
ling, as with legislative regulations, it justified its deference by looking
to Congress, not the Agency. Three of the four categories we found-
legislative regulations, reenactment doctrine, and congressional man-
date-are based on deference to Congress. The last-regulations
used as illustration-does not provide any explicit justification for us-
ing the cited regulations. When the Court looked to a congressional
mandate to justify its decision, it usually bypassed the regulation in
favor of some broader statutory policy.
° Employ the regulation in the government's favor. Thus, even
though the Court's rhetoric focuses on Congress, its actions
favor Agency regulations. Further, the Court's decisions almost
always benefitted the government over the taxpayer.
(2) Explanation of findings
How the Burger Court used regulations presents an interesting
question: why did the Court spend so much time saying that it was
deferring to Congress when it actually relied on regulations? This
contradiction between what the Court said and did is particularly dis-
concerting because it seems so unnecessary. After all, Chevron justi-
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fies the same reliance on regulations in one simple, straightforward
rule. Furthermore, Chevron is easier to apply and easier to predict
than the four categories we outline above. Thus, the Court could ex-
pect lower courts and taxpayers to follow that rule more religiously
and thereby reduce demands on its resources. Yet, Chevron was not
foreshadowed in earlier Burger Court federal tax decisions and it
made almost no impact in federal tax matters even after its pro-
nouncement. This leads us to two questions: (1) in the federal tax
area, why would the Burger Court want to favor the Agency over the
Congress; and (2) if it had good reasons for favoring the Agency, why
did the Burger Court continue to use the language of deference to
Congress in the tax area, when it had abandoned that approach in
other substantive areas? We demonstrate below that the Burger
Court's preference for the Agency reflects an understanding that the
Agency is best suited to decide federal tax matters, while the Burger
Court's rhetoric acknowledges taxation's unique status in our federal
system.
a) A preference for the Agency
As pointed out by Professor Neil Komesar, the Supreme Court
has an extremely limited capacity for deciding matters.296 For exam-
ple, the Certiorari section demonstrates that the Burger Court ad-
dressed about as many tax matters as it could-a mere forty-six cases
in sixteen years.297 Given its physical limitations, the Court's effec-
tiveness lies not in its deciding cases but in selecting which other insti-
tution will control an area.298 According to Komesar, in making this
selection, the Court can never find the perfect institution; instead,
each institution has strengths and weaknesses that the Court should
compare. For Komesar, two significant criteria for making this judg-
ment are the political malfunctions of majoritarian and minoritarian
bias.299
Majoritarian bias exists when the majority is able to capture the
political process to the detriment of minorities. The Court acknowl-
edged this majoritarian bias in the famous footnote four in United
296. KOMESAR, supra note 141, at ch. 7.
297. See supra Part II.C.2.a.(5).
298. KOMESAR, supra note 141, at 134-38.
299. Id. at 136; see generally id. ch. 3 (offering a re-examination of the traditional mi-
noritarian-bias "interest group" theory of politics to include the influence of majority interests).
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States v. Carolene Products.300 Majoritarian bias occurs in the political
process when: (1) the minority is discrete, insular and immutable; (2)
the majority's stakes in the outcome are easily communicated; (3) the
majority's interests can be inexpensively exploited by politicians; and
as a result, (4) the majority is politically active.30 1 For example, Pro-
fessor Moran has pointed out that tax rates are an easily communi-
cated symbol of perceived "wrongs" in the federal tax system, even
though deductions and credits have a greater impact on tax liability.
0 2
Minoritarian bias exists when a minority is able to use the polit-
ical process for its own ends, even when those ends work against the
majority's interests. Minoritarian bias can occur when: (1) the minor-
ity has high stakes in a particular result; (2) the adverse effect on the
majority is spread thinly over a large population; and (3) the issue is
so complex that the majority's information and organization costs are
high.3" 3 For example, Professors Doernberg and McChesney show
that the complex process of tax legislation leaves that process open to
influence by special interests.
3 4
Using majoritarian and minoritarian bias as criteria, which insti-
tution is best suited for handling those tax matters that come before
the Court? We believe that, in the tax area, Congress is more subject
to both malfunctions than the Agency. Thus, as we demonstrate be-
low, the Court's preference for the Agency is sound regardless of what
rhetoric the Court uses to justify that preference.
b) Minoritarian bias
One distinction between legislatures and agencies is that agencies
are made up of specialists, while legislators are, of necessity, general-
300. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (arguing for application
of stringent judicial review when statutes prejudice "discrete and insular" minorities).
301. KOMESAR, supra note 141, at 73-79.
302. See Beverly I. Moran, Income Tax Rhetoric (or Why Do We Want Tax Reform?), 1992
Wis. L. REV. 2063.
303. KOMESAR, supra note 141, at 68-69.
304. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreas-
ing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987).
Professor Pierce demonstrates another example of minoritarian bias in the regulation of oil
and gas rates in the 1950s and 1960s where because: (1) the process of utility regulation is com-
plicated; (2) the cost of communicating to the majority the adverse effects of allowing utilities to
earn excessive rates was high; and (3) declining overall rates eliminated the simple symbol that
could inexpensively educate the majority on the issue that rates were out of proportion with
costs during this period. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the
Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. L.J. 2031,2048 (1989). When rising
utility rates helped create a cheap, easily exploited symbol, the political malfunction shifted and
majoritarian bias helped decrease rates. Id.
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ists. Specialists obviously have more expertise than generalists, but in
terms of institutional choice, that expertise is a two-edged sword. In-
creased knowledge is valuable because it allows for more insightful
and tailored problem solving; yet it is also dangerous because, where
the expertise is in a single area or industry, agencies become obvious
targets for "repeat players"-special interest groups and industry-in-
terested parties-who have the incentive to lobby, educate, and bribe
agency officials.
30 5
Thus, in the usual case, we would expect to find more mi-
noritarian bias in agencies than in Congress. While on the one hand,
it is harder for citizens to either monitor or influence agencies because
of their less "public" activities, at the same time, repeat players often
have the expertise and incentive to learn about agency practices and
influence agency personnel. What is true in the usual case, however,
is not always true in the federal tax area.
In the federal tax system, congressional committees-the House
Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee, and the
Joint Committee on Taxation-are filled with committee members
and staffers who are long-term players. These groups are smaller than
the Agency and their members and staffs stay on as long or longer
than their counterparts at the Service or Treasury. Further, the com-
plex process of legislating in the tax are makes it difficult for low-
stakes, large majorities to gather the same information that is cost ef-
fective for high-stakes, repeat players to obtain. Thus, in the tax sys-
tem, Congress presents an easier target for special interests than does
the Agency.
c) Majoritarian bias
Congress is also subject to more majoritarian bias than the
Agency for at least two reasons: first, because members of Congress
are elected, they are more sensitive to majoritarian concerns; 30 7 sec-
ond, because the traditional rhetoric of taxation is politically expedi-
ent, an atmosphere is created in which Congress is pressured to favor
the larger middle class over the smaller lower and upper income
groups.30 8 The problem for the Court is that the types of congres-
sional actions that would provoke majoritarian bias are not conducive
305. KOMESAR, supra note 141, at 95-96.
306. See Doemberg & McChesney, supra note 304, passim.
307. KOMESAR, supra note 141, at 74-75.
308. Moran, supra note 302, at 2066.
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to Court review. Unlike property law, where minorities can rely on
such protections as the Takings Clause,30 9 neither the Constitution nor
the courts have developed similar protections in the tax law. Thus,
even if it wanted to, the Court has little to say about congressional
actions that might raise majoritarian concerns, such as the setting of
rates or the granting of deductions and credits.
Accordingly, if the Burger Court looked at the tax system as a
series of institutions and decided tax questions based on which institu-
tion is best suited to monitor tax matters, it would often select the
Agency over Congress. The mystery is that the Burger Court devel-
oped the Chevron rule, which was perfectly tailored to shift power
from Congress to the Agency, and then it (and the Rehnquist Court
after it) failed to invoke that rule.
d) The unique position of taxation in the federal system
We believe that the Court's rhetorical preference for Congress
lies in the American view of taxation, a view that developed long
before the income tax. Americans are taught in elementary school
that a major reason for the American revolution was the colonists'
antipathy to taxation without representation. Yet we rarely consider
how that ancient concern shapes our present interests and institutions.
It was no accident that, on the federal level, the Constitution gives
Congress the exclusive right to tax.310 Nor was it an accident that this
preference for Congress is further modified by the requirement that
all tax legislation begin in the House of Representatives,311 sometimes
called the "people's" house, rather than in the more elite Senate.
These decisions illustrate our cultural need to reconcile taxation with
ideals of democracy and to focus those ideals in the Congress.312 So
while the Court may be willing to defer to the Executive when it
comes to issues such as air pollution, it cannot bring itself to use fun-
damentally un-democratic rhetoric when deciding tax matters.
1996]
309. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
310. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVI.
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
312. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1995).
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E. The Deep Structure of the Internal Revenue Code
1. Introduction
Prior sections of Part III focused on how the Burger Court used
the plain language doctrine, legislative history, and regulations to un-
cover the meaning of the Code's language. 313 Both Congress and the
Agency are active players in the federal tax system, and each institu-
tion produces a wide array of rules and regulations, which provide
guidance for courts reviewing tax-related cases. Despite the activist
efforts of both the Congress and the Agency, courts often are forced
to make decisions without external guidance; or worse, they are con-
strained to use rules that create structural anomalies. When neither
Congress nor the Agency has spoken, the Court can refuse to decide
and wait for a rule to develop, hoping that Congress or the Agency
will address the issue; or it can allow different rules to stand in differ-
ent circuits.314 Still, problems arise that should not be left unad-
dressed. And when such problems arose during the Burger Court's
tenure, the justices actively shaped tax law in accordance with their
own views of tax structure.
2. What is a deep structure opinion?
Because words strung together have no inherent meaning outside
of context, all meaning comes from an intersection of reader, text, and
context. Plain language opinions, as well as opinions based on legisla-
tive history and regulations, all exhibit an appreciation for this interac-
tion. We sharpen this discussion by examining Burger Court opinions
that fashioned tax law without the assistance of statutory language,
regulatory guidance or legislative history. In other words, we examine
Burger Court opinions where the Court itself felt compelled to resolve
a tax-related issue.
In studying the interaction between reader and text, we move
from an author-based approach (for example, plain language and leg-
islative history) towards a more contextual and reader-based method
(for example, regulations). In this section we examine the conse-
quences when both the Congress and the IRS remained passive, yield-
313. Even when the Court relied on the Agency by using regulations, it asked author-based
questions like whether Congress delegated its authority to the Agency to develop a rule or
whether the regulation furthered some congressional purpose. See supra notes 243-52 and ac-
companying text.
314. Clearly, many disputes remain untouched for years. See supra Part II (discussing how
few disputes reach the Supreme Court).
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ing to the Burger Court to take an active role in shaping federal tax
law. In Deep Structure opinions the Burger Court abandoned some
of its deferential rhetoric and acknowledged the Supreme Court's role
as a law maker-on par with other institutions.
3. Number of deep structure opinions
According to Professor Lawrence Zelenak:
The Code presents an unusual number of situations in which the
adequacy of language is challenged. It also provides an unusually
helpful context for interpreting its many difficult passages. The
combination of inadequate language and strong context results in a
large number of situations in which context seems to be at odds with
language.
315
Yet, despite many opportunities to involve itself in tax-related issues,
we found very few Burger Court deep structure opinions in our study.
Of the forty-six cases in our data set, only six (thirteen percent) relied
on deep structure. Furthermore, five of these cases generated dissent-
Number of Cases Looking at Deep Structure
40
EDeep Structure at Issue
Deep Structure not at Issue
ing opinions, making this form of interpretation as controversial as the
plain language doctrine.
For us, the small number of deep structure opinions combined
with the high number of dissents, indicates the Burger Court's polemic
view of the deep structure rhetoric. The Burger Court's view of the
deep structure method, however, is remarkable, given that when the
Court did utilize a deep structure analysis, it produced some of the
Burger Court's most memorable and important tax law decisions.
315. Zelenak, supra note 96, at 639 (footnote omitted).
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4. The deep structure decisions
a. United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
The Burger Court's first tentative foray into a deep structure
analysis was in United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail-
road Company.316 In Chicago, Burlington, a railroad company re-
ceived over $2,000,000 worth of railroad lines, stations, and bridges
from the federal government. Generally, companies-as well as indi-
viduals-are otherwise subject to taxation when receiving property
for free. The railroad company-which had not been taxed on the
$2,000,000 worth of assets it had received from the government-
sought a double tax benefit by claiming that the property value of the
assets it had received from the federal government had depreciated in
value, thereby entitling it both to an exclusion from income and a de-
duction from income for the single transaction.
317
In a tortured decision, Justice Blackmun distinguished precedent,
the Internal Revenue Code, as well as past Agency practice to deny
the railroad company's deduction.318 The dissent, however, criticized
the majority's rationalizations and emphasized that "the [majority
opinion] cites nothing in the statute, the regulations, or our prior cases
to warrant this [result]. 319
Reading Chicago, Burlington against the background of the pre-
cedent referred to by Justice Blackmun, the dissent's argument should
prevail. Indeed it is very difficult to distinguish between the railroad
company in Chicago, Burlington and other taxpayers who were al-
lowed deductions against property they received without being taxed.
The majority's decision, however, was correct when one considers the
Internal Revenue Code's deep structure.
One of the first principles of income taxation is that all income is
included in gross income and is therefore subject to taxation unless
specifically excluded by Congress. True, the transferred property in
Chicago, Burlington was excluded from the railroad's gross income;
but at the same time, no other receipts were excluded form the rail-
316. United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. 401 (1973).
317. To understand the double benefit, assume that the railroad had two sources of income:
(1) $2,000,000 of property from the federal government and (2) $2.000,000 of ticket sales earned
over a 30-year period. If the railroad is allowed to deduct the cost of the property it not only
avoids a tax on the $2.000.000 of property, it also avoids any tax on the ticket sales by deducting
the cost of the property against the fees.
318. Chicago, Burlington, 412 U.S. at 405-16.
319. Id. at 424 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 39:841
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 930 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
road's gross income. A depreciation deduction allowed against the
property received tax-free, on the other hand, would produce the
same result as an exclusion. It would allow "a seemingly anomalous
result ... that a corporate taxpayer receiving property from a non-
shareholder .. not only received the property free from income tax
but was allowed to assert a deduction for depreciation on the asset so
received tax free. ' 32 0 The Burger Court could have left the issue in
Chicago, Burlington for Congress to resolve-in fact, Congress did ex-
plicitly deny such deductions after the Burger Court's ruling. But
rather than wait for Congress to remedy the situation, the Burger
Court-taking on an activist role-refused the deduction based on its
understanding of the Internal Revenue Code's internal logic: no al-
lowance of double benefit.
b. Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner
The Court waited ten years before it returned to the deep struc-
ture methodology. In 1983 and 1984 the Court rendered five of its six
deep structure opinions.
In Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner,321 a corporate tax-
payer purchased cattle feed intending to use it the following year. The
following year, however, the corporation liquidated and distributed
the feed to its shareholders. Taken together, these two events created
a problem. On the one hand, the corporation received a Section 162
business deduction because of the implicit assumption that the corpo-
ration would consume the feed as part of its business operations.322
On the other hand, the following year-when the feed was distributed
to the shareholders-the corporation escaped taxation under the cor-
porate liquidation provisions. The shareholders, in turn, were able to
deduct the remaining feed as a business expense.323 Under the
scheme, therefore, the corporation immunized itself from taxation-
even though it never used the unconsumed feed in its business-
320. Id. at 407.
321. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). This flurry of cases in a
small time period may account for Professor Zelenak's belief that the Internal Revenue Code is
uniquely suited for nonliteral interpretations. Based on the small number of deep structure deci-
sions during the entire tenure of the Burger Court, however, we think that the Court disagreed.
322. I.R.C. § 162 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), provides a deduction for expenses paid or incurred
in carrying on a trade or business.
323. I.R.C. § 336 (1982) (amended 1986) (corporation not taxed when it distributes property
during its liquidation); I.R.C. §§ 333 and 334(c) (repealed 1986) (basis shareholders obtain in
certain liquidations when property is distributed to them). Here the basis in the feed was neces-
sary for the shareholders to deduct the feed.
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while, at the same time, the corporate shareholders were also able to
deduct the remaining feed as a business expense.
The Internal Revenue Code's annual accounting periods are
partly to blame for what happened in Hillsboro, because they allow
transactions made in one year to be treated separately from related
transactions that occur in other years.324 Because these annual ac-
counting periods sometimes distort income, the Supreme Court long
ago developed the "tax benefit rule": taxpayers must match related
325transactions.
Relying on precedent, the taxpayer in Hillsboro argued that the
tax benefit rule only applied when a previously deducted amount was
"recovered" in a later year. In contrast, the government asserted that
the rule applied when "later events are inconsistent with the deduc-
tions. '326 The Court concluded that:
The purpose of the rule ... is to approximate the results produced
by a tax system based on transactional rather than annual account-
ing. It has long been accepted that a taxpayer using accrual ac-
counting who accrues and deducts an expense in a tax year before it
becomes payable and who for some reason eventually does not have
to pay the liability must then take into income the amount of the
324. Timing is very important in federal income tax. It operates on an annual accounting
cycle. For example, assume that a taxpayer has $100 of income and a $100 deduction. If both
transactions occur in the same year, she has no taxable income and therefore pays no tax. See
I.R.C. § 63 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (defining taxable income); id. § 1 (imposing tax on taxable
income). If, however, she earns the $100 of income in one year and incurs the deduction in the
next, she has taxable income of $100 in the first year upon which she must pay tax and a $100
deduction in the next which will be of use if she has other income against which to deduct the
expense.
Timing also is problematic when a taxpayer deducts an expense in one year and then discov-
ers that her basis for the deduction is removed in a latter year; for example, a taxpayer who
deducts state income tax she has paid in one year and receives a refund for the tax in the next.
See I.R.C. § 164 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (deduction for state income tax). I.R.C. § 111(a) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992), excludes the recovery "to the extent such amount did not reduce the amount
of tax" in the prior year. For example, if the taxpayer did not deduct the state income tax she
had paid, she would exclude the refund from her income because it did not reduce her tax in the
prior year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(b)(3) (amended 1960) (only recovery of bad debt deduction
leads to income under § 111).
325. The tax benefit rule was first created by the Treasury Department in 1913. The courts
did not begin to accept the rule until 1929, but were convinced by 1931.
As late as 1929, for example, the Board of Tax Appeals seemed uncertain about the
validity of a Treasury regulation providing that income was realized on collecting a debt
previously charged off as worthless. Within a few months, however, the Board of Tax
Appeals accepted the so-called tax benefit rule enunciated by this regulation; by 1931 it
was described as the principle that "seems to be taken for granted, as indeed it must
be," and it has been a basic part of the federal income tax ever since.
BFrI-ER & LOKKEN, supra note 95, at 5-45. FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
Gurs 5-45 (1981) (citations omitted).
326. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 381 (1983).
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expense earlier deducted.... [T]he taxpayers' proposal would intro-
duce an undesirable formalism into the application of the tax bene-
fit rule.32 7
In the Code's text, one section specifically allowed nonrecogni-
tion-while no sections specifically required inclusion. Nevertheless,
the Burger Court rejected the taxpayer's arguments, because the
Court understood the Internal Revenue Code's context: that the
Code's framework and structure proscribed a deduction in one year
followed by an exclusion the following year.
328
c. Commissioner v. Tufts
The Burger Court announced its most famous deep structure de-
cision in Commissioner v. Tufts, 329 a complicated judgment that oper-
ates on many levels. In Tufts, five individuals and a corporation
formed a partnership. The partnership borrowed $1,850,000-from a
lender who had no personal recourse against either the individual
partners or the partnership as a whole-to construct an apartment
complex. After deducting $400,000 of depreciation in the apartment
complex, the property's value decreased to $1,400,000. Because the
property was now worth less than the $1,850,000 debt, the partners
sold the property to a third party in exchange for his assumption of
the nonrecourse debt.
In Tufts, the partners themselves had invested a limited amount
of cash in the partnership and, because they had invested so little, the
partners, on a practical level, had no economic interest in the apart-
ment complex. Yet, despite the fact that they had no economic inter-
est in the apartment complex, the partners were able to take a
$400,000 depreciation deduction against the mortgaged investment
which, in turn, gave each partner a substantial tax savings.
330
327. Id. at 381-82 (citations and footnotes omitted).
328. The other taxpayer in Hillsboro was required to withhold a state property tax in behalf
of its shareholders that had been imposed upon them. I.R.C. § 164(e) (1982), permitted the
corporation to deduct the tax, and the taxpayer deducted this tax. The tax was subsequently
refunded, and the government asserted that the tax benefit rule required the taxpayer to include
its prior deduction in income. The Court decided in the taxpayer's favor. We regard this to be
less of a deep structure case because the statute here did not so obviously permit the taxpayer to
exclude the recovered amount in income. Similarly, in the Burger Court's earlier tax benefit
case, Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), an amount was excluded, despite less of a statu-
tory directive to include the benefit in income than was the case of the liquidating corporation in
Hillsboro.
329. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
330. Assuming, for example, that the partners had a 70% marginal tax rate, they saved
$280,000 of taxes on other income without any cash investment.
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The question posed by Tufts thus concerned the consequences of
the property's sale to the third party. Would the partners be required
to include the full $1,850,000 debt in their amount realized (producing
a $400,000 gain)?; or would the partners be permitted to include the
$1,400,000 value of the property in their amount realized leading to a
$50,000 loss?
In Chicago, Burlington the Burger Court held that property ex-
changes should normally be subject to federal taxation. Under the
Internal Revenue Code's plain language, the tax is calculated by sub-
tracting the taxpayer's "amount realized" from the taxpayer's "ad-
justed basis." '331 In Tufts, the partnership gave up an apartment
complex with a $1,450,000 adjusted basis (original basis of $1,850,000
less depreciations deductions of $400,000). In exchange for what?
The partners argued that because the third party received
$1,400,000 worth of property in the exchange, they too, must have
received $1,400,000 on their side of the transaction. Relying on
this rationale, the partners reported a $50,000 tax loss from the ex-
change calculated as amount realized ($1,400,000) less adjusted basis
($1,450,000).
Although clearly advantageous to the taxpayers, this result is seri-
ously flawed because the taxpayers get both substantial tax savings
from depreciation plus an additional benefit from the loss deduction.
Further, these benefits come at no economic cost because the apart-
ment complex was financed with nonrecourse debt.
If the issue in Tufts had been raised during the formative years of
federal tax law, the problem could have been avoided; but by the time
the issue arose, both the Code and case law clearly favored the tax-
payer. The Supreme Court in Crane v. Commissioner,332 indicated
that taxpayers must reflect borrowed money-including nonrecourse
loans-in their basis. Thus, the partnership was correct to claim both
331. Under I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the difference between the taxpayer's
"amount realized" and "basis" is the gain or loss that she "realizes" and also ordinarily "recog-
nizes" when she sells the property. I.R.C. § 1001(b) defines the amount realized as the "sum of
any money received plus the fair market value of the property... received." I.R.C. § 1001(b)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Basis is defined by a variety of Code sections but, when someone
acquires property by buying it, her basis is defined by I.R.C. § 1012 as "the cost of such prop-
erty." I.R.C. § 1012 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). If the amount realized exceeds the basis, the
taxpayer has a gain and, if basis exceeds the amount realized, she has a loss. Realizing gain or
loss has no immediate tax consequence; recognizing gain or loss, however, does have immediate
tax consequences, because recognition is the point at which the taxpayer either takes more in-
come into account because of her gain or reduces her taxable income because of the loss. I.R.C.
§§ 61(a)(3), 165 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
332. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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a $1,850,000 initial basis and a $400,000 depreciation deduction
against that basis. Under section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code,
the taxpayer's amount realized was limited to cash plus the fair mar-
ket value of property received. Again, according to the holding in
Crane, the amount realized might not include the nonrecourse debt in
excess of the property's fair market value if that value was less than
the debt.
333
Rather than "permit the taxpayer to limit his realization to the
fair market value of the property ... [so that he obtains] a tax loss for
which he has suffered no corresponding economic loss, ' 3 34 the Burger
Court included the full debt in the partners' amount realized.
The calculation now became:
amount realized $1,850,000
minus adjusted basis ($1,450,000)
equals gain on the transfer of $ 400,000
As a result, the Court avoided giving the partners a tax loss with-
out a corresponding economic loss because the partners included their
prior depreciation deductions in income. This conclusion, the Burger
Court noted, was based on the Code's structure:
When encumbered property is sold or otherwise disposed of
and the purchaser assumes the mortgage, the associated extinguish-
ment of the mortgagor's obligation to repay is accounted for in the
computation of the amount realized. Because no difference be-
tween recourse and nonrecourse obligations is recognized in calcu-
333. In Crane, the property sold was subject to a nonrecourse debt; that is, the borrower had
no legal obligation to pay the debt. The lender, however, could seize the property whenever the
borrower failed to make a payment. Like the taxpayer in Tufts, Crane argued that, because she
had no legal obligation to pay the nonrecourse debt, her amount realized was limited to the
property's fair market value without the debt.
However, because the value of the property was greater than the amount of the debt at the
time of the sale, the Supreme Court argued that the borrower/taxpayer could be expected to
make payments on the debt, even though it was nonrecourse debt, so that she could obtain the
amount of the sales proceeds that exceeded the debt. Because the borrower could be expected
to pay the debt, the Court reasoned that the full debt could be included in amount realized
because the nonrecourse debt was similar to recourse debt. In other words, part of the value
that the taxpayer received on the exchange was the economic, albeit not legal, release from debt.
Unlike Crane, the property in Tufts was worth less than the amount of the mortgage. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court's economic argument failed. The Court acknowledged this failure
in the famous footnote 37 in Crane, where the Court stated that:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a
mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage.
Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor aban-
doned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot.
Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
334. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 313 (1983).
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lating basis, . . the Commissioner may ignore the nonrecourse
nature of the obligation in determining the amount realized upon
disposition of the encumbered property. He thus may include in the
amount realized the amount of the nonrecourse mortgage assumed
by the purchaser. The rationale for this treatment is that the origi-
nal inclusion of the amount of the mortgage in basis rested on the
assumption that the mortgagor incurred an obligation to repay.
Moreover, this treatment balances the fact that the mortgagor origi-
nally received the proceeds of the nonrecourse loan tax-free on the
same assumption. Unless the outstanding amount of the mortgage
is deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively will have re-
ceived untaxed income at the time the loan was extended and will
have received an unwarranted increase in the basis of his
property.335
It is important to note that nothing in the Internal Revenue Code
defined the phrase "amount realized" to include debt relief. Yet, as
the Burger Court correctly recognized, the Court-created rule inher-
ently flowed from the Internal Revenue Code's structure which dis-
courages deductions against untaxed income.
d. Bob Jones University v. United States
In Bob Jones University v. United States,33 6 the Burger Court dis-
tinctly relied on a deep structure analysis to reach its decision. The
issue in Jones was whether racially discriminatory church schools were
tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
The statute itself was silent on the issue, and more important, Agency
practice favored the exemption. 337 Still, lacking external guidelines,
the Burger Court declared that "[i]t is a well-established canon of stat-
utory construction that a court should go beyond the literal language
of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain pur-
pose of the statute. '338 The Burger Court thus denied the exemption
explaining that:
Section 501(c)(3) .. .must be analyzed and construed within the
framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the back-
ground of the Congressional purposes. Such an examination reveals
unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of the
335. Id. at 308-10 (citation and footnotes omitted).
336. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
337. As pointed out by the dissent, the government granted exemptions to schools that dis-
criminated for over 40 years before changing its policy in 1970. Id. at 617-19 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
338. Id. at 586.
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Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on
meeting certain common law standards of charity-namely, that an
institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose
and not be contrary to established public policy.
339
The decision in Jones clearly was discordant with the Internal
Revenue Code's plain language. Moreover, the legislative history of
the section, as well as the regulations, were contradictory at best. For
many years, the government routinely processed exemptions for ra-
cially discriminatory schools" ° while, for a short period of time, the
Agency denied exemptions to the same schools. 341 Congress had not
directly confronted the issue, although several failed attempts were
made in both Houses to influence the rule.342 Although the Court
purported to rely on plain language (the meaning of the word "char-
ity"), legislative history, and Agency practice to reach its decision, the
Court in fact had very little external guidance. As the dissent pointed
out: "In approaching this statutory construction question the Court
quite adeptly avoids the statute it is construing. This I am sure is no
accident, for there is nothing in the language of § 501(c)(3) that sup-.
ports the result obtained by the Court.
343
Yet, despite the lack of guidance, the Burger Court made the
right decision. Recognizing that tax exemptions are a form of public
subsidy, 314 the Burger Court abandoned the use of the Internal Rev-
enue Code, and instead relied on its own understanding of the impor-
tance of public finance. The Burger Court knew that the government
could not use the tax system indirectly to reward conduct that the gov-
ernment could not fund directly.
e. Dickman v. Commissioner
The Supreme Court again revealed its appreciation of Code
structure in Dickman v. Commissioner,14- a case concerning the appli-
339. Id.
340. From the time the exemption was adopted until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service
routinely processed applications from racially discriminatory schools. Id. at 619-20 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
341. The Internal Revenue Service changed its policy in 1970. Id. at 585.
342. The Court cites 13 attempts to overturn the Agency rule against discriminatory schools.
Id. at 600 n.25.
343. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612-13 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
344. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HA~v. L. REv. 705 (1970).
345. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
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cation of the gift tax to interest-free loans. The question in Dickman
was whether parents owed a gift tax when they lent their son an inter-
est-free demand loan.346
By subjecting the interest free use of money to the gift tax, the
Court firmly established that the free use of money is a valuable prop-
erty right:
The right to the use of $100,000 without charge is a valuable interest
in the money lent, as much so as the rent-free use of property con-
sisting of land and buildings. In either case, there is a measurable
economic value associated with the use of the property transferred.
The value of the use of money is found in what it can produce; the
measure of that value is interest-"rent" for the use of the funds.
We can assume that an interest-free loan for a fixed period, espe-
cially for a prolonged period, may have greater value than such a
loan made payable on demand, but it would defy common human
experience to say that an intrafamily loan payable on demand is not
subject to accommodation; its value may be reduced by virtue of its
demand status, but that value is surely not eliminated.347
While the Court clearly recognized that a taxpayer who received inter-
est-free money had an economic advantage over other taxpayers, the
Court could not refer to any section of the Internal Revenue Code for
support that sanctioned the imposition of a tax on monies obtained
from an interest-free loan. Instead, the Court relied on two deeply
imbedded tax policies.
First, the Court acknowledged that its new Court-created rule
would ultimately protect the integrity of income taxation:
A substantial no-interest loan from parent to child creates sig-
nificant tax benefits for the lender quite apart from the economic
advantages to the borrower. This is especially so when an individual
in a high income tax bracket transfers income-producing property to
an individual in a lower income tax bracket, thereby reducing the
taxable income of the high-bracket taxpayer at the expense, ulti-
mately, of all other taxpayers and the Government. Subjecting in-
terest-free loans to gift taxation minimizes the potential loss to the
346. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (gift tax imposed on gifts). Alterna-
tively, this transaction could be treated as generating income to the borrower. See, e.g., J. Simp-
son Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). For current income tax treatment of interest-
free loans, see IRC § 7872.
The income and gift taxes are separate taxes: therefore, treating the transaction as a gift for
some purposes and as income for others is not necessarily inconsistent.
347. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 337.
[voL. 39:841
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 938 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
federal fisc generated by the use of such loans as an income tax
avoidance mechanism for the transferor.
348
Second, the Court acknowledged that its new Court-created rule also
protected the integrity of estate taxation:
Gift taxation of interest-free loans also effectuates Congress' desire
to supplement the estate tax provisions. A gratuitous transfer of
income-producing property may enable the transferor to avoid the
future estate tax liability that would result if the earnings generated
by the property-rent, interest, or dividends -became a part of the
transferor's estate. Imposing the gift tax upon interest-free loans
bolsters the estate tax by preventing the diminution of the trans-
feror's estate in this fashion.349
Thus, the Court concluded:
Our holding that an interest-free demand loan results in a taxable
gift of the use of the transferred funds is fully consistent with one of
the major purposes of the federal gift tax statute: protection of the
estate tax and the income tax .... Failure to impose the gift tax on
interest-free loans would seriously undermine this estate and in-
come tax protection goal.
350
Like Tufts, the Dickman decision was grounded on the underlying
purposes of the Code-in this case, gift taxation-as opposed to spe-
cific Code sections or legislative history.
f. Paulsen v. Commissioner
The majority in Paulsen v. Commissioner35 1-discussed at length
in the plain language section35 2 -strongly defended the application of
the deep structure analysis when in declared:
Satisfying the literal terms of the reorganization provisions,
however, is not sufficient to qualify for nonrecognition of gain or
loss. The purpose of these provisions is "to free from the imposition
of an income tax purely 'paper profits or losses' " wherein there is
no realization of gain or loss in the business sense but merely the
recasting of the same interests in a different form.
353
348. Id. at 339.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 338.
351. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985).
352. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
353. Paulsen, 469 U.S. at 136 (citations omitted).
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5. Conclusions
Our study revealed that the Burger Court seldom applied a deep
structure analysis to its federal tax law cases. When a Burger Court
majority opinion invoked a deep structure analysis to reach its deci-
sion, it was almost always rebutted and criticized by a dissenting opin-
ion. Of the six majority opinions that applied the deep structure
analysis, for example, five of them had dissenting opinions. Our study
also revealed that when the Burger Court did apply a deep structure
analysis, the Court's holding often favored the government over the
taxpayer.354 Still, despite the fact that there were only six deep struc-
ture opinions, the Burger Court's deep structure pronouncements
were among its most important and interesting tax decisions.
When we questioned why and when the Burger Court decided to
use the deep structure interpretive method, we realized certain simi-
larities between the deep structure decisions and patterns we distin-
guished in our analysis of the Burger Court's certiorari-selection
process.
Recall that one of the patterns we noted in the Court's certiorari-
selection process section was that the Burger Court often selected sev-
eral cases that dealt with the same topic. For example, we found
seven cases concerning accounting methods,355 five concerning capital
expenditures,356 three concerning interest,357 three concerning deple-
tion, 358 two concerning the tax benefit rule,359 and two concerning as-
signment of income.360 In the certiorari section we concluded that
354. One of two taxpayers in Hillsboro avoided tax. In all the other cases, the government
prevailed.
355.' Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981); Thor Power Tool v. Com-
missioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979); United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978); Commis-
sioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins., 433 U.S. 148 (1977); United States v. Consumer Life
Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977); Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977); Ivan Allen
Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617 (1975).
356. Commissioner v. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. 1 (1974); United States v. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co., 412 U.S. 401 (1973); Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S.
345 (1971); United States v. Hilton Hotels, 397 U.S. 580 (1970): Woodward v. Commissioner, 397
U.S. 572 (1970).
357. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984); Commissioner v. National Alfalfa De-
hydrating & Milling, 417 U.S. 134 (1974); United States v. Mississippi Chem., 405 U.S. 298
(1972).
358. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571
(1981); Commissioner v. Portland Cement, 450 U.S. 156 (1981).
359. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983); Nash v. United States, 398
U.S. 1 (1970).
360. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973); Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S.
394 (1972).
[VOL. 39:841
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 940 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
what attracted the Burger Court to these subsets was that they raised
particular topics that were difficult to address in one statute, regula-
tion, or decision. These were questions that made "language inade-
quate"-at least the language generally found in statutes and
regulations. Because answering these issues require a sophisticated
understanding of the Code's underlying purpose, context and policies,
these topics are more readily understood through rules that develop
over time. 361 We believe that similar concerns motivated the Burger
Court's deep structure decisions.
Tax law is complex and context-driven, and rules often need more
room to develop. As time goes on, Congress responds with more
elaborate rules and while shifting more oversight responsibilities to
the Agency. At the same time, the Treasury Department endures by
producing more complex regulations. Indeed, sometimes, these regu-
lations become so complex that they take on a life of their own.362
Promulgating more complex and specific rules is an appropriate
response for a certain group of taxpayers-those with high stakes and
plenty of legal talent at their disposal. This group of taxpayers have
the incentive, skill and willingness to take advantage of every opportu-
nity to outsmart the tax system. The same group also spent much of
the Agency's time and resources. The greater the specificity of a sale,
the less likely that a taxpayer will be able to avoid its impact.363 This
aggressive behavior justifies the production of more rules to control
and contain members of this group.
On the other hand, other taxpayers will find themselves founder-
ing in an overloaded and rule-filled system that they cannot navigate,
and which some will deliberately defy because the knowledge re-
quired for compliance is too costly to obtain. What these taxpayers
need is a series of first principles that can be applied to their planning
and reporting. First principles, however, are not suited for recitation
in a series of rules because more activist taxpayers could use fhem
against the government, and because the concepts are too difficult to
explain in statutes or regulations.
1996]
361. See supra notes 46-62.
362. Interview with Lawrence Lokken, Section Newsletter (American Bar Association Sec-
tion on Taxation) Vol. 11 number 1, Fall, 1991, at 15-18.
363. For example, the tax shelter industry was substantially curtailed by the complex passive
activity rules of § 469. For more on § 469, see Bir-rKER & LOKKEN, supra note 95, $ 28.1.
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Like the handpicked cases we discussed in the Certiorari section,
the deep structure cases raise questions that are better explained in a
series of decisions as opposed to a statute or regulation.
These decisions generally do not benefit aggressive taxpayers
who are subjected to a wide array of IRS rules and Congressional
mandates. These decisions, rather, benefit those taxpayers who can
take advantage of Court-created guidelines to better understand the
underlying policies of the Code, as well as complex intricacies that
often lead to taxpayer confusion.
Our study in this section demonstrates that the Burger Court had
a sophisticated understanding of both the Internal Revenue Code's
structure and the federal tax system. The Burger Court was able to
select cases that required what only a Supreme Court could provide: a
series of narrative explanations that would assist in shaping and for-
mulating federal tax law. The Burger Court fully understood that
Courts can shape law through the legal equivalent of a series of short
stories and, more important, used this institutional feature to highlight
first principles as applied to a selected series of transactions over time.
IV. FINAL EVALUATION
The portrait of one Court, taken in full knowledge of all its certi-
orari selections and case decisions, is more reassuring than we were
led to believe. Viewed from this broader vantage point, the Burger
Court appears to have handled a difficult area relatively well. Given
its limited resources it chose cases through which it could make a dif-
ference, becoming actively involved in a number of issues. Given the
Court's constitutional restrictions and the view of democracy and tax-
ation that it shares with the rest of America, its rhetoric understanda-
bly deferred to Congress. Given the Court's preference for the
Executive (as most radically highlighted in Chevron), the Burger
Court often, again understandably, favored the Agency in application.
That preference might also flow from the Court's perception that
Congress is subject to greater institutional pressures than the Agency.
Although the Code's sometimes vague statutory language and rich
context invite nonliteral interpretations, the Burger Court rarely ven-
tured too far on its own, relying on Congress even in its deep structure
decisions. Taken together, the picture reveals a moderate Court that
was knowledgeable about tax law and the tax system. More impor-
tant, the Burger Court used its knowledge to good result.
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Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. United States (7th Cir.)
Mott v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Haverlah Estate v. United States (5th Cir.)
First Nat'l Bank v. United States (5th Cir.)
Detroit Bank & Trust v. United States (6th Cir.)
Thbbs v. United States (5th Cir.)
Jones v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
Harkness v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Stark v. United States (8th Cir.)
Chotin v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Duffy v. United States (6th Cir.)
Hicks v. United States (10th Cir.)
Sutton v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
Essex v. Vinal (8th Cir.)
Krause v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
Wyckoff Estate v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
1996]












3632 Smith Estate v. Commissioner (2d. Cir.)
3244 Bratton v. United States (6th Cir.)
3311 Paxton v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3407 Terriberry v. United States (5th Cir.)
3523 Gall v. United States (5th Cir.)
3184 Thalheimer v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3289 Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3422-3 National Bank v. United States (2d Cir.)
3023 Estate of Chesterton v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3676 Proesel v. United States (7th Cir.)
3170 Old Nat'l Bank v. United States (7th Cir.)
Sheedy v. United States (7th Cir.)
3299 Pennsylvania Bank & Trust v. United States (3d Cir.)
3669 Estate of Alperstein v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3184 SAICI v. United States (2d Cir.)
3522 Silverman v. United States (9th Cir.)
3631 Cady v. Commissioner (8th Cir.)
3694 Newman v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3848 Jewett v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3294 Wright Estate v. United States (9th Cir.)
3326 Robinson v. United States (5th Cir.)
3450 First Nat'l Bank v. United States (8th Cir.)
3494 Brigham Young Univ. v. United States (10th Cir.)
3624 Estate of Frieders v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3864 Estate of Ceppi v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
Rush v. United States (6th Cir.)
3594 Behar v. Southeast Bank Trust (11th Cir.)
3622 Doring v. United States (8th Cir.)
3693-4 United States v. Boyle (7th Cir.) G
3836 Commissioner v. Estate of Van Horne (9th Cir.) G
3252 Fein v. United States (8th Cir.)
3467 Reed v. United States (7th Cir.)
3018 United States v. Hemme (S.D. Ill.) G
3174 Whitt v. Commissioner (11th Cir.)
3174-5 Hemme v. United States (S.D. Ill.)
3353 Estate of Smith v. United States (5th Cir.)
3513 Pyle v. United States (7th Cir.)
3514 Manufacturers Hanover Trust v. United States (2d
Cir.)
3721 Payne v. United States (5th Cir.)
3816 Sherrod v. Commissioner (11th Cir.)
[VOL. 39:841
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 952 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
38 U.S.L.W. 3361 Founding Church of Scientology v. United States (Ct.
Cl.)
3448 Cannon v. Green (D.D.C.)
3500 United States v. Maryland Sav.-Share Ins. (D. Md.)
G
39 U.S.L.W. 3252 Coit v. Green (D.D.C.)
40 U.S.L.W. 3252 Coit v. Green (D.D.C.)
3308 Washington Trust Bank v. United States (9th Cir.)
3339 United States v. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry
(N.D. Okla.) G
3367-8 University Hill Found. v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
41 U.S.L.W. 3576 Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States
(10th Cir.)
3630-1 Bob Jones Univ. v. Connally (4th Cir.)
3631 Rose Hill Memorial Park Ass'n v. United States (Ct.
C1.)
42 U.S.L.W. 3112 Old Dominion Box v. United States (4th Cir.)
3130-1 Crenshaw County Private Sch. Found. v. Connally
(5th Cir.)
3644 Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration v. United
States (2d Cir.)
43 U.S.L.W. 3323 Haswell v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3544 Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon (D.C.
Cir.)
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (D.C.
Cir.) G
44 U.S.L.W. 3143 Land O'Lakes v. United States (8th Cir.)
46 U.S.L.W. 3576 American Soc'y of Travel Agents v. Blumenthal
(D.C. Cir.)
3593 National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States (2d
Cir.)
47 U.S.L.W. 3357-8 Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, VFW v. United
States (8th Cir.)
3539 Jaggard v. Commissioner (8th Cir.)
3614 Taxation with Representation v. United States (4th
Cir.)
48 U.S.L.W. 3471 Kirkpatrick v. United States (10th Cir.)
3704 Ohio County & Indep. Agric. Soc'y v. Commissioner
(6th Cir.)
3825-6 Carle Found. v. United States (7th Cir.)
49 U.S.L.W. 3317-8 HCSC-Laundry v. United States (3d Cir.)
3377 Akers v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
1996]







3448 Hospital Cent. Servs. Ass'n v. United States (9th
Cir.)
3591 Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3719 Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Servs. v. United
States (6th Cir.)
3920 Haring v. Regan (D.C. Cir.)
3455-6 Allen v. Wright (D.C. Cir.)
3849-50 Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Worker Soc'y v.
United States (D.C. Cir.)
3887-8 Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. United States (3d Cir.)
3108 Regan v. Taxation with Representation (D.C. Cir.) G
3188 Taxation with Representation v. Regan (D.C. Cir.)
3765 Rockefeller v. United States (8th Cir.)
3607 Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am v. Commis-
sioner (6th Cir.)
3845 United States v. American College of Physicians
(Fed. Cir.) G
3887 Gladney v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3238 West Cent. Coop. v. United States (8th Cir.)
3279 Mellon Bank v. United States (3d Cir.)












Angelus Funeral Home v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Commissioner v. Guardian Agency (7th Cir.) G
Local Fin. v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
United Benefit Life Ins. v. McCrory (8th Cir.)
United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R. (8th Cir.) G
Gabriele v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
Continental Can v. United States (Ct. CI.)
Kirk v. Commissioner (D.C. Cir.)
United States v. Waterman, Largen & Co. (Ct. Cl.)
G
3206 , Commercial Solvents v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3264 Bear Mfg. v. United States (7th Cir.)
3492 Bering v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Group Life & Health Ins. v. United States (5th Cir.)
40 U.S.L.W. 3063 Picchione v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
3064 Wallace v. United States (8th Cir.)
Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank (10th Cir.) G
3127 Early v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
Tougher v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
[VOL. 39:841




3284 Town Park Hotel v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3368 Morse v. United States (Ct. CI.)
3508 Big "D" Dev. v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3535 B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3596 Fink v. United States (Ct. C1.)
3092 Bonkowski v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3126 John B. White, Inc v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3151 Freese v. United States (10th Cir.)
3163-4 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United
States (Ct. CI.)
3164 Diehl v. United States (5th Cir.)
3279 Western & S. Life Ins. v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3303 Anders v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3399 Graves v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3547-8 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3576 Loevsky v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3603-4 United States v. Leathers (8th Cir.) G
3631 Hope v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3003-4 Commissioner v. Hope (3d Cir.) G
3094 Kellems v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3095 Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating &
Milling (10th Cir.) G
AMF Inc. v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Murray v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3112 Superior Pine Prods. v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3279 Vest v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
Juleo, Inc. v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
Harrison Property Management v. United States (Ct.
Cl.)
3324 Industrial Life Ins. v. United States (4th Cir.)
Warner v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3343 Blaz v. Manning (9th Cir.)
Beth W. Corp. v. United States (5th Cir.)
3396 Houston Chronicle Publishing v. United States (5th
Cir.)
3440 W.T. Grant Co. v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3476 United States v. Walt Disney Prods. (9th Cir.) G
3516 Hydrometals v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3560 Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3639 Sechrest v. United States (4th Cir.)
3671 Wolder v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3684 Commissioner v. Mutual Benefit (3d Cir.) G
3700 International Shoe Mach. v. United States (1st Cir.)
1996]















































Whitlock Estate v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
Outlaw v. United States (Ct. CI.)
Cubic Corp. v. United States (9th Cir.)
Cox v. United States (5th Cir.)
Wiles v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
Johnson v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
Economy Fin. v. United States (7th Cir.)
Carr Staley, Inc. v. United States (5th Cir.)
Klein v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
Cities Serv. v. United States (2d Cir.)
Hesse v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
United States v. Cities Serv. (2d Cir.) G
Haverly v. United States (7th Cir.)
Marshall Foods v. United States (8th Cir.)
White Farm Equip. v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
Commissioner v. Amerada Hess Corp. (3d Cir.) G
Bankers Trust v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
McGee v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
Kraut v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
United States v. Consumer Life Ins. (Ct. Cl.) G
First R.R. & Banking v. United States (5th Cir.)
Biedenharn Realty v. United States (5th Cir.)
Union Pac. R.R. v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. (10th
Cir.) G
Boise Cascade v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
General Foods v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Olk v. United States (9th Cir.)
Potito v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
Groves v. United States (5th Cir.)
Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States (8th Cir.)
Hess v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Commissioner v. Kowalski (3d Cir.) G
Le Beau Tours Inter-Am. v. United States (2d Cir.)
United States v. Smith (5th Cir.) G
Beer v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
Rodman v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
Koerner v. United States (4th Cir.)
Norton v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Harmont Plaza v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
Ford v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
Government of V.I. v. Vitco, Inc. (3d Cir.) G(AG)
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 956 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
3532 United Cal. Bank v. United States (9th Cir.)
3593 Southwestern Life Ins. v. United States (5th Cir.)
3656 Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States (5th Cir.)
3670 Furrer v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3731 Union Mut. Life Ins. v. United States (1st Cir.)
3759 Gelinas v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
47 U.S.L.W. 3020 Allied Fidelity v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3079 Sakol v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3236 Parker v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
Millar v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3430 Pleasanton Gravel v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3470 Tennessee-Carolina Transp. v. Commissioner (6th
Cir.)
3676 Cole v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3707-8 United Telecommunications v. Commissioner (10th
Cir.)
48 U.S.L.W. 3144 Hanover Ins. v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
3299 City of Bethel v. United States (9th Cir.)
3315 Brewster v. Commissioner (D.C. Cir.)
3394 Bosch v. United States (5th Cir.)
3424 Blanco v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
49 U.S.L.W. 3008 Myers v. United States (9th Cir.)
3029 Blake v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3041 Rosenbaum v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3068 Anderson v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3184 Little v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
3260 Suburban Realty v. United States (5th Cir.)
3276 T.F.H. Publications v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3477-8 Thrif-Tee v. United States (4th Cir.)
3631 Buttke v. Commissioner (8th Cir.)
3652 General Portland Cement v. United States (5th Cir.)
3695 Virgin Islands v. Regan (D.C. Cir.)
3748-9 Iske v. Commissioner (8th Cir.)
3848 Home Mut. Ins. v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
50 U.S.L.W. 3041 O'Hare v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3064 Diedrich v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3167-8 Kolom v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3168 Fedders Corp. v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3189 Pledger v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3361 Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3525 Brains v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
3578-9 United States v. Bliss Dairy (9th Cir.) G
3811 Unvert v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
1996]






























38 U.S.L.W. 3019 Washington v. United States (4th Cir.)
United States v. Donnelly Estate (6th Cir.) G
3060 Barnes v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
Hayes v. United States (7th Cir.)
3098 Scudder v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3236 United States v. Henry Falk (6th Cir.) G
Mitchell v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3292 Donaldson v. United States (5th Cir.)
3298 Lampman v. United States (9th Cir.)
3350 Cashio v. United States (5th Cir.)
3400 Giordano v. United States (8th Cir.)
Gajewski v. United States (8th Cir.)
3436 Shlom v. United States (2d Cir.)




Merchants Refrigerating v. United States (9th Cir.)
RCA Corp. v. United States (2d Cir.)
Arlington County v. United States (4th Cir.)
Lyle v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
Hilton Hotels v. United States (9th Cir.)
Plant v. United States (11th Cir.)
Texstar Corp. v. United States (5th Cir.)
Hawaiian Indep. Refinery v. United States (Fed.
Cir.)
Desert Palace v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Joseph Gann, Inc. v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
Lewellen v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
Wilson v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
Garvey v. United States (Fed. Cir.)
Johnson v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Urbanek v. United States (Fed. Cir.)
Southern Bancorp. v. United States (4th Cir.)
Yarbro v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
Schneier v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Cull v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
Rutter v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
Foster v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Wheeler v. United States (Fed. Cir.)
Dragatsis v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
Arkla, Inc. v. United States (5th Cir.)
Commissioner v. Groetzinger (7th Cir.) G
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 958 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
3516 Moyer v. United States (3d Cir.)
Monday v. United States (7th Cir.)
3527 United States v. McGugin (9th Cir.) G
39 U.S.L.W. 3040 Neaderland v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3080 Kyriaco v. United States (9th Cir.)
3111 Cooper Agency v. United States (4th Cir.)
3219 United States v. Mitchell (5th Cir.) G
3432 Rafter v. Hoyt (2d Cir.) court
3440 Held v. United States (6th Cir.)
3492 Flintkote Co. v. United States (2d Cir.)
40 U.S.L.W. 3063 Sigelbaum v. United States (5th Cir.)
3104 Geiger v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3187-8 Bonistall v. United States (6th Cir.)
3322 Rey v. United States (5th Cir.)
3368 C.D. Constr. v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3371 Ponder v. United States (5th Cir.)
3376 Couch v. United States (4th Cir.)
3404 Roberts v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3423 Regency Realty v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3488 Widelski v. United States (5th Cir.)
Liddon v. United States (5th Cir.)
3535 Fried v. United States (2d Cir.)
3552 Daniel v. United States (6th Cir.)
3604 Binder v. United States (2d Cir.)
Samuels v. United States (9th Cir.)
41 U.S.L.W. 3060 Cataldo v. United States (2d Cir.)
3117 Engle v. United States (8th Cir.)
3127 Rose v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3135 United States v. Bishop (9th Cir.) G
3216 Russell v. United States (10th Cir.)
3244 Hedrick Estate v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3320 Moore v. United States (5th Cir.)
3360 Brown v. United States (5th Cir.)
Robbins Tire & Rubber v. United States (5th Cir.)
3368 First State Bank v. United States (8th Cir.)
Jones v. United States (10th Cir.)
Siegel v. United States (9th Cir.)
3400 Pecos County State Bank v. United States (5th Cir.)
3424 Harris v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3439 Flood v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Kocher v. United States (2d Cir.)
3511 Newsome v. United States (5th Cir.)
3547 Nassau County v. United States (2d Cir.)
19961




3574 Ryan v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3612 Mueller v. Nixon (6th Cir.)
Richter v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3630 Clement v. United States (1st Cir.)
Wilson v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3003 Cleveland Trust v. United States (6th Cir.)
3004 Brigham v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3076 D.D.I., Inc. v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3094 Washington Theater Club v. D.C. Dep't of Fin. &
Revenue (D.C. Cir.)
Pennsylvania Transfer v. Whinston (3d Cir.)
3095 Air Terminal Cab v. United States (8th Cir.)
J.O. Johnson, Inc. v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3131 Monday v. United States (7th Cir.)
Bishop v. United States (5th Cir.)
3160 Donlon v. IRS (3d Cir.)
3206 Ianelli v. Long (3d Cir.)
3260 Schennault v. United States (7th Cir.)
3324 Gettelman v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3343 Canadian Parkhill Pipe Stringing v. United States
(7th Cir.)
3474 Boyd v. United States (7th Cir.)
3492 Burden v. United States (10th Cir.)
3504 Berkowitz v. United States (3d Cir.)
3516 Durovic v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3531 United States v. Bisceglia (6th Cir.) G
3571 White v. United States (5th Cir.)
Shepard v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3634-5 Villa v. United States (10th Cir.)
3636 Bickerstaff v. Thompkins (10th Cir.)
3639 Rafter v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3669 Bishop v. United States (9th Cir.)
3671-2 Your Host v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3707 United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. (5th Cir.) G
3004 Laing v. United States (2d Cir.)
3098 Miller v. United States (5th Cir.)
3115 United States v. Rambo (6th Cir.) G
Glimco v. United States (7th Cir.)
3115-6 Fisher v. United States (3d Cir.)
3131 United States v. Hall (6th Cir.) G
3176 Siegel v. United States (9th Cir.)
3219 Levinson v. United States (3d Cir.)
3396 Wersetsky Estate v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
[VOL. 39:841
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 960 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
3433 Tavares v. United States (9th Cir.)
United States v. Clark (5th Cir.) G
Commissioner v. Shapiro (D.C. Cir.) G
3468 Geraci v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3480 United States v. Janis (9th Cir.) G
3507 Second Nat'l Bank v. United States (5th Cir.)
3508 Meister v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3544 Brady v. United States (3d Cir.)
3588 Ritcher v. United States (7th Cir.)
3619 Kalb v. United States (2d Cir.)
3627 Cook v. United States (5th Cir.)
3629 Klein v. United States (10th Cir.)
3008 Hampton v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3095 In re Jeffords (3d Cir.)
3100 Troy's Welding v. United States (10th Cir.)
3112 Coson v. United States (9th Cir.)
3143 Sun First Nat'l Bank v. United States (5th Cir.)
3144 G.M. Leasing v. United States (10th Cir.)
Cobb v. United States (6th Cir.)
Baker v. United States (5th Cir.)
3168 Rockwell v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3243 Beattie v. United States (2d Cir.)
3244 Kendrick v. United States (7th Cir.)
3308 Shannon v. United States (9th Cir.)
3352 Adolph Coors v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
3443 Martinez v. United States (5th Cir.)
3523 People v. Illinois Cent. R.R. (7th Cir.) G(AG)
3570 A.L. Burbank & Co. v. United States (2d Cir.)
3627 Esser v. United States (7th Cir.)
3709-10 Silver Bell Indus. v. United States (10th Cir.)
3752 Great United Realty v. United States (4th Cir.)
3104 Gabriel v. United States (D.N.J.)
3155 Ledford v. United States (9th Cir.)
3166 Ballard v. United States (8th Cir.)
3183-4 Stone v. United States (2d Cir.)
3212 Hakim v. Commissioner (E.D. Mich.)
3373 Ramirez v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3373-4 Jones v. United States (8th Cir.)
3392 Canadian Parkhill Pipe Stringing v. United States
(7th Cir.)
3479 Dema v. United States (7th Cir.)
Cannon v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)








3540 Jacobson v. RICO (2d Cir.)
3577-8 Estate of Whitlock v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
3578 Central Ill. Pub. Serv. v. United States (7th Cir.)
3607 B & E Paving v. United States (2d Cir.)
3658 Gannet v. First Nat'l State Bank (3d Cir.)
3699 Silverman v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3736 Whitesel v. United States (6th Cir.)
3741 W.W. Windle Co. v. Commissioner (1st Cir.)
3742 Pennsylvania Transfer v. United States (3d Cir.)
Rosenblum v. United States (8th Cir.)
Marvel v. United States (10th Cir.)
3846 Fleming v. United States (5th Cir.)
3023 Slodov v. United States (6th Cir.)
3032 Spencer Press v. Alexander (D. Mass.)
3153 Crimson v. United States (9th Cir.)
3153-4 Asphalt Materials v. United States (2d Cir.)
3154 Naegele v. United States (8th Cir.)
3325 Irwin v. United States (10th Cir.)
3414 Johnson v. United States (5th Cir.)
3442 Cook County v. United States (7th Cir.) G(AG)
3472 G.M. Leasing v. United States (10th Cir.)
3545 Eisenberg v. United States (7th Cir.)
3606 Myslajek v. United States (8th Cir.)
Anthony v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3621 Foster v. United States (9th Cir.)
3714 Hunt v. United States (9th Cir.)
3730 Ryan Estate v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
Maggy v. United States (9th Cir.)
Lewin v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3744-5 Johnson v. United States (10th Cir.)
3758-9 Keech v. United States (2d Cir.)
3796-7 Diem v. United States (2d Cir.)
3012 Lysek v. United States (9th Cir.)
3079 Mercer v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3112 Jaskin v. United States (9th Cir.)
3140-1 Maulding v. United States (7th Cir.)
3426 Swisher v. United States (4th Cir.)
3428 Reece v. United States (9th Cir.)
3430 McKinney v. United States (5th Cir.)
3447 Tassop v. United States (2d Cir.)
Quinn v. United States (9th Cir.)
3467 Rosato v. United States (2d Cir.)
3502 Drake v. United States (9th Cir.)
[VOL. 39:841
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 962 1995-1996
Federal Tax Decisions
3515 Ressler v. United States (5th Cir.)
3539 Mathes v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3564 Graves v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3578 Haley v. United States (6th Cir.)
3676 Noall v. United States (2d Cir.)
3807 Maryland Lumber v. United States (4th Cir.)
48 U.S.L.W. 3008 Simons v. United States (5th Cir.)
3048 Lattimore v. United States (5th Cir.)
3144 Ryan v. United States (7th Cir.)
3184 Thomassen v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3230 Russell v. United States (9th Cir.)
3282 Wagner v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3316 Moenckmeier v. United States (3d Cir.)
3346-7 Lull v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3347 Rizzo v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
Hotel Conquistador v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3362 Deutsch v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3424 Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. v. United States (5th Cir.)
United States v. Hotel Conquistador (Ct. Cl.) G
3512 Morton-Norwich Prods. v. United States (Ct. Cl.)
3560 Divivo v. United States (4th Cir.)
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States
(Ct. Cl.)
3631-2 Timmons v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3651 Investment Annuity & First Inv. Annuity v. Miller
(D.C. Cir.)
Seibert v. Baptist (5th Cir.)
3741 Weintraub v. United States (6th Cir.)
Levey v. United States (3d Cir.)
3793 Kowalik v. United States (10th Cir.)
49 U.S.L.W. 3022 Skalicky v. United States (5th Cir.)
3042 Roncketti v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3057 Strand v. United States (10th Cir.)
3137-8 Bowers v. United States (9th Cir.)
3184 Wilhelm v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3204 Johnston v. United States (6th Cir.)
3260 United States v. Darusmont (E.D. Cal.) G
3295 Colebank v. Commissioner (D.C. Cir.)
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. United States (1st Cir.)
Hicks v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3318 Fausner v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Farkas v. United States (D.C. Cir.)
3361 Foxman v. Renison (2d Cir.)
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 39 Howard L.J. 963 1995-1996
Howard Law Journal
3478 Hatten v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
Wells v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Shapiro v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3506 United States v. Lee (W.D. Pa.) G
Rowan Cos. v. United States (5th Cir.)
3590 Toner v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
True v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Rizzo v. Davis (3d Cir.)
3733 Schwallier v. United States (6th Cir.)
3748 Flagg v. United States (8th Cir.)
3874 Pacific Dev. v. United States (D.C. Cir.)
Baker v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3904 Yeoham v. United States (5th Cir.)
3920 Thompson v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
50 U.S.L.W. 3053-4 Citron v. United States (6th Cir.)
3168 Davis v. United States (5th Cir.)
Kemlon Prods. & Dev. v. United States (5th Cir.)
3188-9 Getz v. United States (5th Cir.)
3208-9 Childers v. United States (4th Cir.)
3308 Vetco, Inc. v. United States (9th Cir.)
3330 Oden v. Anderson (D.C. Cir.)
3361 Payne v. United States (5th Cir.)
3381 Beatty v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3410 Au v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Johnston v. United States (6th Cir.)
3475 Stonecipher v. Bray (9th Cir.)
3602-3 First Pentecostal Church v. United States (5th Cir.)
3644 Weinstein v. United States (9th Cir.)
United States v. Meeks (5th Cir.) G
3645 United States v. Rylander (9th Cir.) G
3684 Midwest Growers Coop. v. United States (9th Cir.)
3750 Salkin v. United States (7th Cir.)
3786 Levenson v. United States (2d Cir.)
3787 Feinberg v. United States (2d Cir.)
3808-9 Andersen v. United States (9th Cir.)
3872 Dykema v. United States (7th Cir.)
3888 United States v. Baggot (7th Cir.) G
3942 Watson v. United States (5th Cir.)
51 U.S.L.W. 3084 Hall v. United States (9th Cir.)
3148 Considine v. United States (Cl. Ct.)
3187 Antelman v. Decataldo (1st Cir.)
3206 Mirkin v. United States (1st Cir.)
3400 El Paso Co. v. United States (5th Cir.)
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3450 Timms v. United States (9th Cir.)
United States v. Arthur Young & Co. (2d Cir.) G
3451 Arthur Young & Co. v. United States (2d Cir.)
3463-4 Barbaran v. United States (11th Cir.)
3540 Murray v. United States (8th Cir.)
3591 Everett v. United States (9th Cir.)
3724-5 Eisenberg v. United States (5th Cir.)
3743 Zack v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3780 Afshar v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
Badaracco v. Commissioner (3d Cir.)
3781 Deleet Merchandising v. United States (3d Cir.)
3891 T-1740 Trusts v. Commissioner (D.C. Cir.)
3004 Commissioner v. Dowell (10th Cir.) G
3017 Sun Chem. v. United States (Fed. Cir.)
3037 Wynshaw v. United States (2d Cir.)
3052 Nesmith v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
Lask v,. United States (8th Cir.)
Mertsching v. United States (10th Cir.)
3131 Drey v. United States (8th Cir.)
Ocean Sands Holding v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3145 Mallette Bros. Constr. v. United States (5th Cir.)
3181 Leaseway v. United States (6th Cir.)
3226 Fernandez v. United States (11th Cir.)
3274 Schlansky v. United States (6th Cir.)
3328 Pettineo v. United States (3d Cir.)
Tilford v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3354 Ducommun v. Commissioner (10th Cir.)
Jacques v. United States (9th Cir.)
3391 Kleinman v. United States (11th Cir.)
3402 Hall v. United States (6th Cir.)
3408 Gryder v. Commissioner (8th Cir.)
3496 Dale v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3552-3 Siebert v. Baptist (11th Cir.)
3594 Gray v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3622 Tiffany Fine Arts v. United States (2d Cir.)
3641 Stonehill v. United States (9th Cir.)
Brooks v. United States (9th Cir.)
3642 Trio Mfg. v. United States (11th Cir.)
3657 Jones v. Berry (9th Cir.)
3725 Dorison v. United States (4th Cir.)
3728 United States v. Dahlstrom (9th Cir.) G
3884 Turk v. United States (10th Cir.)
McAnlis v. United States (11th Cir.)
52 U.S.L.W.
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Franks v. United States (10th Cir.)
Watkins v. United States (4th Cir.)
3027 Zolla v. United States (9th Cir.)
3077 Zukowski v. United States (2d Cir.)
3081 Heyward v. United States (4th Cir.)
3104 Eisenberg v. United States (7th Cir.)
3139 Rutter v. Commissioner (5th Cir.)
3163 Kraft v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3179 Beer v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3197 Manning v. Nelson (2d Cir.)
3252-3 Chaplain v. Commissioner (4th Cir.)
3296 Redhouse v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
3351 Bulkley v. United States (10th Cir.)
Parker v. United States (11th Cir.)
3442 United States v. National Bank of Commerce (8th
Cir.) G
3518 Barth v. United States (2d Cir.)
3607-8 Mims v. IRS (4th Cir.)
3626 Garman v. United States (4th Cir.)
3709 Huene v. United States (9th Cir.)
3764 Riggins v. IRS (5th Cir.)
3817 Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury (9th Cir.)
3872 Bibby v. United States (6th Cir.)
3887 Terrell v. United States (5th Cir.)
Beeker v. United States (9th Cir.)
3898 Afflerbach v. United States (10th Cir.)
3031 Zuger v. United States (2d Cir.)
3127 Moeller v. Carradine (8th Cir.)
3238 Dale v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
3337-8 W.C. Garcia & Assocs. v. Sassi (9th Cir.)
3352-3 Coplin v. United States (Fed. Cir.)
3366 Mann v. United States (9th Cir.)
Bressler v. United States (7th Cir.)
3429-30 Smith v. United States (11th Cir.)
3490 Interfirst Bank v. United States (5th Cir.)
Resha v. United States (6th Cir.)
3513 United States v. Harris (11th Cir.) G
3526 Christensen v. United States (10th Cir.)
3543 Halter v. Secretary of Treasury (9th Cir.)
3619 Temple Univ. v. United States (3d Cir.)
3641 Huckaby v. United States (5th Cir.)
Aruba Bonaire Curacao Trust v. Commissioner (D.C.
Cir.)
[VOL. 39:841
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United States v. Merchants Nat'l Bank (11th Cir.) G
MacKenzie v. United States (2d Cir.)
Mosher v. IRS (5th Cir.)
McKee v. United States (4th Cir.)
Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States (3d Cir.)









































Agoranos v. United States (5th Cir.)
McCarthy v. United States (10th Cir.)
Lodwick v. United States (8th Cir.)
Acker v. United States (6th Cir.)
Mackey v. United States (7th Cir.)
Fahey v. United States (9th Cir.)
O'Connor v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
Baird v. United States (2d Cir.)
Wainwright v. United States (10th Cir.)
McCabe v. United States (7th Cir.)
Lewis v. United States (9th Cir.)
Campione v. United States (7th Cir.)
White v. United States (2d Cir.)
Caiello v. United States (2d Cir.)
Matosky v. United States (7th Cir.)
Simon v. United States (9th Cir.)
Miriani v. United States (6th Cir.)
Davis v. United States (5th Cir.)
Hanon v. United States (8th Cir.)
Tiktin v. United States (6th Cir.)
Prudden v. United States (5th Cir.)
Scott v. United States (6th Cir.)
Nolan v. United States (10th Cir.)
Mengarelli v. United States (9th Cir.)
Tonahill v. United States (5th Cir.)
Townsend v. United States (7th Cir.)
Mitchell v. United States (1st Cir.)
O'Connor v. United States (1st Cir.)
Stone v. United States (5th Cir.)
Hogg v. United States (6th Cir.)
Jaskiewicz v. United States (3d Cir.)
Hamilton v. United States (2d Cir.)
MacLeod v. United States (8th Cir.)
Balistrieri v. United States (7th Cir.)
Viviana v. United States (2d Cir.)
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3498 Stribling v. United States (6th Cir.)
Frank v. United States (9th Cir.)
3514 Carpenter v. United States (5th Cir.)
3529 Stein v. United States (7th Cir.)
3136 Guon v. United States (9th Cir.)
3137 Egenberg v. United States (2d Cir.)
3140 Bailey v. Commissioner (6th Cir.)
3183 Wilson v. United States (5th Cir.)
3259 Philpott v. Hill (7th Cir.) G
3260 Carzoli v. United States (7th Cir.)
3305 Urban v. United States (5th Cir.)
3402 Nemetz v. United States (3d Cir.)
3434 Penosi v. United States (5th Cir.)
3530 Coblentz v. United States (2d Cir.)
3535 Gettelman v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
3591 McKee v. United States (6th Cir.)
3591-2 Wainwright v. United States (10th Cir.)
3604 Wenger v. United States (2d Cir.)
3605 Berger v. United States (2d Cir.)
3074 Bland v. United States (5th Cir.)
3105 Milder v. United States (8th Cir.)
3118 Egan v. United States (6th Cir.)
3160 Ming v. United States (7th Cir.)
3232- Lehman v. United States (7th Cir.)
3259 Carter v. United States (6th Cir.)
3290 Merrick v. United States (10th Cir.)
3348-9 Slatko v. United States (5th Cir.)
3418 Waller v. United States (5th Cir.)
3434 Waitkins v. United States (7th Cir.)
3465 Newman v. United States (5th Cir.)
Krilich v. United States (7th Cir.)
3488 Lachmann v. United States (1st Cir.)
3489-90 Rosenfield v. United States (3d Cir.)
3506 Jenning v. United States (9th Cir.)
3518 Harrison v. United States (7th Cir.)
3529 Parenti v. United States (3d Cir.)
3544 Hagen v. United States (10th Cir.)
3055 Bernabei v. United States (6th Cir.)
3249 Marra v. United States (6th Cir.)
3260 Moody v. United States (5th Cir.)
3273 Daly v. United States (8th Cir.)
3273-4 Tager v. United States (10th Cir.)
3309 Brewer v. United States (10th Cir.)
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Ledford v. Commissioner (9th Cir.)
Krowczyk v. United States (7th Cir.)
DiVarco v. United States (7th Cir.)
Slutsky v. United States (2d Cir.)
Tunnell v. United States (5th Cir.)
Erckman v. United States (7th Cir.)
Sahley v. United States (6th Cir.)
Brobeck v. United.States (3d Cir.)
Considine v. United States (9th Cir.)
Malnik v. United States (5th Cir.)
Fencl v. United States (7th Cir.)
Madden v. United States (9th Cir.)
Hawk v. United States (9th Cir.)
Klee v. United States (9th Cir.)
Lowder v. United States (4th Cir.)
Amos v. United States (8th Cir.)
Ferraro v. United States (3d Cir.)
Paterno v. United States (2d Cir.)
Denti v. United States (2d Cir.)
Smith v. United States (4th Cir.)
Mirelez v. United States (5th Cir.)
Lawhon v. United States (5th Cir.)
Burkhart v. United States (6th Cir.)
United States v. Kasmir (5th Cir.) G
Robson v. United States (9th Cir.)
Cirami v. United States (2d Cir.)
Terrell v. United States (5th Cir.)
Abbas v. United States (9th Cir.)
Gray v. United States (5th Cir.)
Beckwith v. United States (D.C. Cir.)
Bowness v. United States (5th Cir.)
Merritt v. United States (5th Cir.)
McCorkle v. United States (7th Cir.)
Greenspahn v. United States (5th Cir.)
Ross v. United States (5th Cir.)
Vincent v. United States (6th Cir.)
Ryan v. Commissioner (7th Cir.)
Serra v. United States (9th Cir.)
Greenlee v. United States (3d Cir.)
Liebert v. United States (3d Cir.)
Vernell v. United States (5th Cir.)
Fisher v. United States (2d Cir.)





















































United States v. Beattie (2d Cir.) G
Pandilidis v. United States (6th Cir.)
Meier v. Keller (9th Cir.)
Gentile v. United States (2d Cir.)
Leonard v. United States (2d Cir.)
McNulty v. United States (9th Cir.)
Truitt v. Lenahan (6th Cir.)
Haddad v. United States (6th Cir.)
Cooper v. United States (9th Cir.)
Bugliarelli v. United States (2d Cir.)
Wangrud v. United States (9th Cir.)
White v. United States (4th Cir.)
Snow v. United States (9th Cir.)
Bianco v. United States (2d Cir.)
Lacy v. United States (5th Cir.)
Stone v. United States (8th Cir.)
United States v. Pomponio (4th Cir.) G
Littrell v. United States (8th Cir.)
Bernabei v. United States (6th Cir.)
Intrieri v. United States (2d Cir.)
Estate of Klein v. Commissioner (2d Cir.)
Gillis v. United States (6th Cir.)
Miller v. United States (9th Cir.)
Afflerbach v. United States (10th Cir.)
Hemphill v. United States (8th Cir.)
Kaplan v. United States (3d Cir.)
Methot v. United States (9th Cir.)
Hoopes v. United States (10th Cir.)
Turner v. United States (5th Cir.)
Pace v. United States (6th Cir.)
United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank (7th Cir.) G
Pomponio v. United States (4th Cir.)
Anthony v. United States (9th Cir.)
Tsanas v. United States (2d Cir.)
Dillon v. United States (10th Cir.)
Clinton v. United States (9th Cir.)
Holladay v. United States (5th Cir.)
McLaughlin v. United States (3d Cir.)
Giacalone v. United States (6th Cir.)
White v. United States (6th Cir.)
Taylor v. United States (5th Cir.)
Constanzo v. United States (2d Cir.)
Boulet v. United States (5th Cir.)
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General Motors v. United States (6th Cir.)
Stobaugh v. United States (9th Cir.)
Londe v. United States (8th Cir.)
Granberg v. United States (9th Cir.)
Evans v. United States (5th Cir.)
Rucci v. United States (2d Cir.)
Hankins v. United States (5th Cir.)
Fairchild Indus. v. Harvey (4th Cir.)
Moenckmeier v. United States (5th Cir.)
Johnson v. United States (9th Cir.)
Bengel v. United States (3d Cir.)
United States v. Euge (8th Cir.) G
Shelton v. United States (9th Cir.)
Bomher v. United States (3d Cir.)
Hallman v. United States (9th Cir.)
McBrearty v. United States (9th Cir.)
Jacka v. United States (10th Cir.)
Marcy v. United States (7th Cir.)
Genser v. United States (3d Cir.)
Watkins v. United States (9th Cir.)
Renfro v. United States (6th Cir.)
Brown v. United States (10th Cir.)
Millican v. United States (5th Cir.)
Smith v. United States (6th Cir.)
Warinner v. United States (8th Cir.)
Buckner v. United States (9th Cir.)
Hudler v. United States (10th Cir.)
Sawyer v. United States (7th Cir.)
Awerkamp v. United States (7th Cir.)
Sparks v. United States (10th Cir.)
Clemente v. United States (2d Cir.)
Penrod v. United States (4th Cir.)
Jahoda v. United States (7th Cir.)
West v. United States (10th Cir.)
Larson v. United States (8th Cir.)
Pliss v. United States (2d Cir.)
Breger v. United States (2d Cir.)
Amen v. United States (2d Cir.)
Neff v. United States (9th Cir.)
Lefkowitz v. United States (9th Cir.)
Carlson v. United States (9th Cir.)
Callow v. United States (10th Cir.)
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3562 Hedman v. United States (7th Cir.)
Moore v. United States (7th Cir.)
3563 Bagley v. United States (9th Cir.)
3564 Nicoladze v. United States (9th Cir.)
3580 Castelli v. United States (3d Cir.)
3624 Jones v. United States (5th Cir.)
3715 Burns v. United States (9th Cir.)
3811-2 Hazelip v. United States (9th Cir.)
3869 Gust v. United States (2d Cir.)
3885 Schwenk v. United States (8th Cir.)
50 U.S.L.W. 3029 Samara v. United States (10th Cir.)
3031 American Law Ass'n v. Merkel (9th Cir.)
3202 Akmakjian v. United States (9th Cir.)
3330 Sutherland v. United States (5th Cir.)
3382-3 Middlebrook v. United States (5th CiT.)
3405-6 Gray v. United States (6th Cir.)
3492 Ness v. United States (9th Cir.)
Menius v. United States (4th Cir.)
3575 Sarcinelli v. United States (7th Cir.)
3677 Fogg v. United States (5th Cir.)
3867 Hebel v. United States (8th Cir.)
3922 McCarty v. United States (5th Cir.)
Barksdale v. United States (11th Cir.)
51 U.S.L.W. 3007 Amon v. United States (10th Cir.)
3078 Keltner v. United States (4th Cir.)
3103 Butcher v. United States (9th Cir.)
3123 Knapp v. United States (2d Cir.)
3156 Sanzo v. United States (2d Cir.)
3206 Manning v. United States (4th Cir.)
3264 Colacurcio v. United States (9th Cir.)
3309 Pate v. United States (2d Cir.)
3382 Dean v. United States (9th Cir.)
3383 Oggoian v. United States (7th Cir.)
3446 Tucker v. United States (5th Cir.)
3587 Stuart v. United States (8th Cir.)
3589-90 Groom v. United States (3d Cir.)
3689 Bunch v. United States (6th Cir.)
3809 Rapaport v. United States (2d Cir.)
3830 Ingredient Tech. v. United States (2d Cir.)
3875 Ardt v. United States (7th Cir.)
3925 David v. United States (6th Cir.)
52 U.S.L.W. 3126 PB v. United States (3d Cir.)
3146 Damico v. United States (3d Cir.)
[VOL. 39:841























Cruz v. United States (11th Cir.)
Sasscer v. United States (4th Cir.)
Radue v. United States (11th Cir.)
Hull v. United States (3d Cir.)
Kozachenko v. United States (5th Cir.)
Greger v. United States (9th Cir.)
Patmon, Young & Kirk v. United States (6th Cir.)
Vittorio v. United States (11th Cir.)
Eisenberg v. United States (4th Cir.)
Lillie v. United States (9th Cir.)
Barshov v. United States (11th Cir.)
Todaro v. United States (2d Cir.)
Kramer v. United States (7th Cir.)
O'Brocta v. United States (3d Cir.)
Blauvelt v. United States (5th Cir.)
Senft v. United States (2d Cir.)
Zuger v. United States (2d Cir.)
Long v. United States (6th Cir.)
Marchant v. United States (8th Cir.)
Marcantonio v. United States (7th Cir.)
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APPENDIX B
Petitions for Certiorari in Federal Tax Cases by Substantive Area,
Term, and the Party Petitioning
Key:
Appendix B converts Appendix A into tables. Thus, the box "1969/business
tax" indicates that six business tax petitions were filed during the 1969 Term,
only one of which was filed by the government ("G"). Furthermore, the in-
formation at the bottom of the business tax column indicates that 85 petitions
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APPENDIX C
Cases Examined in Detail by Substantive Area
Key:
After each case, the party petitioning the case to the Supreme Court and
the party in whose favor the Court decided are both listed.
G/T: Indicates that the government petitioned the Court and that the
taxpayer won.
GIG: Indicates that the government both petitioned the Court and won.
SC: Indicates that the case involved a clear split among the circuits.
notation
I. BUSINESS TAX
A. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970) - GIG, SC
B. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) - T/T, SC
C United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973) - GIG
D Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673 (1974) -
T/G, SC
E Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617 (1975) - T/G, SC
F Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978) - T/G, SC
G United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982) - G/T,
SC
H Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985) - T/G, SC
II. DEDUCTIONS
A. Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970) - T/G, SC
B. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970) - GIG,
SC
C. Commissioner v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345
(1971) - GIG
D. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972) - GIG, SC
E. United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972) -
GIG
F. United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 412 U.S.
401 (1973) - GIG
G. Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973) - T/G, SC
H. Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974) - T/T, SC
I. Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co.,
417 U.S. 134 (1974) - GIG, SC
J. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974) - GIG, SC
K. Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156 (1981) - G/
G, SC
L. United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571 (1981) - G/T
M. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206 (1984) - G/T and TiT, SC
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A. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972) - G/T
B. United States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257 (1973) - G/G, SC
C. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973) - G/T, SC
D. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305 (1982) - T/G, SC
E. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191 (1982) - T/G, SC
F. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) - T/G, SC
IV. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
A. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472
(1979) - T/G, SC
B. HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981) - T/G, SC
C. St. Martin Evangelical Luth. Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772 (1981) - T/T
D. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) - G/
G
E. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) - T/G
F. United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834
(1986) - G/G
G. United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986)
-G/G
IV. INCOME
A.. Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394 (1972) - G/T, SC
B. United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976) - G/G,
SC
C. Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569 (1977) - T/
G, SC
D. United States v. Consumer Life Ins., 430 U.S. 725 (1977) - T/T
and G/T, SC
E. Commissioner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins., 433 U.S. 148
(1977) - G/G, SC
F. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977) - G/G, SC
G. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21 (1978) - T/T,
SC
H. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) - T/T, SC
I. United Cal. Bank v. United States, 439 U.S. 180 (1978) - T/T,
SC
J. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979)-T/G
K. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983) - T/T
and G/G
L. Commissioner v. Thfts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) G/G, SC
1996]
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APPENDIX C (continued)
SUMMARY OF APPENDIX C
By area, number of cases petitioned by each party and number of
cases won by petitioner.
-BUSINESS TAX petitioner cases petitioner won
G-3 2
T-5 1
-DEDUCTIONS petitioner cases petitioner won
G-10 8
T-4 2
-ESTATE PLANNING petitioner cases petitioner won
G-3 1
T-3 0
-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS petitioner cases petitioner won
G-3 3
T-4 1
-INCOME petitioner cases petitioner won
G-7 5
T-7 5
Total number of cases petitioned by each party and number of cases won by
petitioner:
Petitioner Cases won by petitioner/cases petitioned by petitioner
G 19/26
T 9/23
There were 33 splits among the circuits.
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